Mobility and school choice in England by Wilson, Joan
Faculty of Policy and Society, 
Institute of Education, University of London 
Mobility and School Choice in England 
Joan Wilson 




State sector education policy in England aims to deliver raised standards of 
attainment and equality of educational opportunity through offering fair access to 
schools for all pupils from any background. Two initiatives of 'school choice' and 
`school improvement' have been specifically introduced for this purpose. 
Choice policies came about in the late 1980s. They propose to provide equal access 
through breaking the historical geographical link between the home and the school 
attended. Pupils can apply for admission to any preferred school from their current 
home location. An equal distribution of better standards in education is thought to be 
achieved through the scheme's creation of school competition for pupils. 
Improvement strategies took off in the early 2000s under the Academies Programme. 
The initiative targets the re-emergence of low-performing schools as viable 
competitors for pupils through a process of institutional reform. It aspires to raise 
standards and equality by providing more opportunities for all pupils to have access 
to better-quality schools. 
The National Pupil Database is an administrative annual census of state school pupils 
that allows enrolment-related activity in schools to be tracked. It is used here to 
address whether fairness is an outcome of the two education policies. Evaluation 
considers (i) if pupils of differing backgrounds gain access to popular primary 
schools without moving home under the choice system and; (ii) if failing secondary 
schools that convert into Academies remain accessible to all pupils. 
Evidence indicates that the connection between the school attended and home 
location persists partly because entry rules by popular schools reinstate school-home 
proximity as an admissions criteria. Meanwhile, there is exclusivity in entry to 
Academies, with proportionally fewer underprivileged, low-ability pupils featuring 
in the renewed schools. These outcomes suggest that education policy has a long way 
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Introduction 
According to Human Capital Theory individuals invest in education in order to 
maximise the anticipated labour market returns accruing to the productivity 
enhancing labour inputs individuals acquire through education1. Estimates suggest 
that the gross private rate of return to an additional year of schooling is in the range 
of 5 to 10 per cent for most Western economies and in the case of the UK lies 
between 5 to 7 per cent (8 to 10 per cent) for men (women) (Adnett and Davies, 
2002). Such increases in productivity attributable to individual educational initiatives 
transfer positive externalities to the wider society by both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary means. 
Pecuniary externalities arise from greater human capital inciting firms to invest more 
in physical capital (machinery, buildings or equipment)2 so that the wages of all 
workers are raised by this channel and not just those of the initial education 
investors, increasing societal income. In a progressive taxation system, higher 
earnings in turn allow for an equality enhancing redistribution of income by means of 
benefit transfers to low-income households, presenting a further channel of operation 
for pecuniary spillovers to society. 
Non-pecuniary externalities are generated from the exchange of ideas amongst 
workers that raise productivity, such that societal benefits to education derive from 
human interactions (Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000). Evidence points to social rates of 
return to an extra year of schooling in the UK that are of relatively similar magnitude 
to those in other OECD countries, with mean rates of return of 8.6 per cent (8.5 per 
cent) to primary education, 7.5 per cent (9.4 per cent) to secondary education and 6.5 
Human capital is commonly proxied by years of schooling. The original concept was alluded to by 
the classical economist Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations (1776), in which he considered man's 
human capital investments in education and the physical capital investments undertaken by firms as 
both contributing to the productive capacity of society (Psacharopoulos, 1987; Machin and Vignoles, 
2005). 
2 Specifically, firms will invest in new technologies only where it is profitable to do so and this will in 
turn depend on there being an adequate supply of trained workers to replace those exiting the firm 
(Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000). Therefore physical capital investments are induced by higher human 
capital in the firm. 
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per cent (8.5 per cent) to higher education in the UK (OECD) (Machin and Vignoles, 
2005)3. 
The individual and society-wide gains that human capital produces have led many 
governments to adopt policies aimed at not only tapping into education 
accumulation, but also encouraging its more equal dispersion. In England two 
education policy initiatives have specifically been introduced that seek to raise 
access to publicly-provided schooling provisions. The expectation is that better 
access will generate a more even distribution of educational opportunity coupled 
with higher returns to learning by increasing the supply of good quality schools 
available to all pupils from their current home location. 
The first initiative of school choice was launched onto the English state schools arena 
in the late 1980s. This policy aims to establish a market-place for schooling by 
replacing a traditional admissions system in which each pupil simply attends their 
nearest local school with a practice of open enrolment, where pupils can apply to 
attend a school of their preference from their current home location. The scheme 
offers parents (and pupils) accountability information on the academic performance 
of schools relative to nationally-defined education targets in order to guide their 
choices. School funding is attached to the social background and the number of 
pupils a school attracts. Under market conditions, higher standards of attainment and 
equal learning opportunity among all pupils stem from the competition between 
schools for students that the scheme is designed to create. 
The second policy of school improvement has its largest outlay in the Academies 
Programme, which came about in the early 2000s. This scheme acknowledges the 
uneven foundations of school performance from which the schooling market-place 
attempts to operate. Historical variations in attainment standards across schools 
reflect a conventional process of location-related admissions, which cause the 
performance of schools to relate to the academic ability and socio-economic status of 
pupils in the neighbourhood. As a consequence of a reputation of poor historical 
performance — in turn brought on by relatively stable local demographics of low 
academic ability students — some schools appear undesirable to pupils in a choice 
3 The OECD figures given here are derived from several studies that use data spanning the early 1970s 
to the late 1990s. Data for the UK are from 1986. 
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system. The initiative targets re-emergence of low-attaining schools as viable 
competitors for pupils through a process of institutional reform, in which private 
agents can be in charge of running state-owned schools. School renewal aims to 
deliver better standards and a fairer system by providing more opportunities for all 
pupils to have access to schools potentially improving in their quality. 
In order to achieve an equal distribution of higher standards in education, the two 
policy initiatives of school choice and institutional reform should ensure fair right of 
entry to a school for all pupils from any background. The choice process should 
allow pupils to access their preferred school by transferring between schools without 
moving home, given that the policy seeks to untie the dependence between the 
school attended and where a pupil lives. Under this scenario school choice should 
encourage mobility between schools if the quality of the current school attended is 
not preferred. A scheme of school reform and renewal should similarly allow all 
pupils equal access to the potentially improving school, including those who seek 
entry to the school under the choice system and those who would have traditionally 
attended the school under a proximity-based system of place allocation. In this case 
improving the quality of local schools in the choice system should encourage and 
allow attendance at the nearest school, if that school is subsequently preferred to 
alternatives. 
Empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of these recent education initiatives in 
providing equality of educational opportunity is thin on the ground, despite their 
growing significance as policy tools. This is a consequence of a lack of suitable data 
sources that allow for the assessment of issues surrounding the concept of fairness as 
applied to education policy. The onset of the National Pupil Database (NPD) since 
January 2002 has established a valuable source of information that makes this kind of 
analysis possible. The NPD is an administrative annual census that provides details 
on the academic performance and social background of all pupils in every state 
school across England and is the first dataset of its kind to offer researchers the 
potential to track pupil enrolment-related activity in schools. In this research the 
NPD will be used to address the issue of fairness by considering (i) whether pupils 
differing in their background gain access to popular primary schools without moving 
home and; (ii) the extent to which secondary schools that undergo a strategy of 
improvement, in the form of conversion into an Academy, remain accessible to all 
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pupils. As the main goals of these policies are to enhance the equal distribution and 
accumulation of human capital through ensuring fair access to schools for all pupils, 
so the central aim of this study is to establish if fair access is their outcome. 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. Key Concepts outlines the historical 
formation of choice policies and describes the steady growth of school improvement 
strategies, of which the Academies Programme is the most prominent. Thus this 
Section puts into context the significance of these education policy initiatives. 
In Part I, Chapter One presents descriptive analysis of the amount of pupil 
movement between schools that does and does not involve a move of home for one 
cohort of pupils attending England's state primary schools. This evidence fills an 
important gap in knowledge on the extent of school change of the two differing 
types. This Chapter also considers whether participation in these moves varies by 
pupil characteristics and therefore if there are differences in the use of choice by 
social background. One barrier to choice operation that has the potential to impact on 
fair access is the existence of constraints in the supply of school places. These 
necessitate rules of entry when popular schools are above-capacity, and a criterion 
that is commonly applied is that of proximity of the home to the school. To assess the 
implications of this barrier for equality of educational opportunity, evaluation looks 
at the capability of pupils differing in their background to enter popular schools by 
engaging in school only transfers instead of relocating home in order to satisfy 
oversubscription admissions rules. In Chapter Two of Part I, the descriptive content 
of the initial Chapter is set in a regression framework. This allows for formal testing 
of the link between school change and pupil characteristics, as well as of the 
relationship between school change and entry into oversubscribed schools by pupils 
differing in their characteristics. Statistical associations consider the likelihood that a 
pupil makes either of the two move forms of pure school change or combined school 
and home moves. 
Part II consists of Chapters Three to Five, across all of which an extensive 
evaluation is carried out into the issue of fairness in access to state secondary schools 
that undergo reform as part of the Academies Programme. Chapter Three contains 
details on the features of Academy schools and the ways in which, as a consequence 
of their independence from local authority control, they differ from other schools in 
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the state system. Here the main objectives of the scheme are also laid out, with the 
key aim that matters for equality and fair access being one which requires Academies 
to be inclusive schools featuring pupils of mixed ability ranges. In Chapter Four the 
methodology behind the construction of the dataset to be used in empirical analysis 
of equal access in Academies is described in detail. This process includes defining a 
control set of non-Academies against whom the enrolment activities of Academy 
schools can be compared, where this control group consists of other schools located 
in the same area as, and with similar characteristics to, Academies that did not 
themselves undergo any process of school reform. Chapter Five considers whether 
institutional change results in access to improving schools for all pupils at the 
expense of none or whether the Academies Programme is associated with 
proportionally more 'exclusive' entry to the school by a higher quality pupil type. 
Statistical difference-in-differences estimation is used to evaluate changes in the 
pupil intake profile of Academy schools. The composition and prior academic ability 
of pupils being admitted into year 7 of the Academies sample are compared to those 
in both the predecessor schools that they replaced and other non-Academy schools 
located within the same region. To give a broader picture to the study of fair access 
in Academy schools, analysis also looks at whether there are changes in the whole 
school-level aspects of composition in Academies relative to in predecessor and 
control schools. 
Following on from this is the overall Conclusion to the thesis, in which empirical 
findings across all Chapters are summarised, recent policy developments and their 
implications are discussed, and potential areas for future research are highlighted. 
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Key Concepts: School Choice and School Improvement 
Two significant policy initiatives applied to the English state schools education 
sector in recent decades are those of school choice and institutional change. The aim 
of this Section is to provide some background information on these Key Concepts. 
School choice policies are a dominant theme throughout this research, with Part I 
aiming to understand if choice-type school change occurs for all pupils and Part II 
considering equality of access to reforming schools that, through this process, are 
attempting to return to the school choice market-place. The policy of school 
improvement is central to the evaluation undertaken in Part II of this thesis, which 
focuses on the Academies Programme as the largest version of this initiative in 
particular. 
i. The Development and Functioning of School Choice in Education 
Before the 1960s and 1970s the structure of state secondary school education in 
England centred around a stratified system of selection by ability, with academically 
orientated students who were successful in passing their "11 plus" entry exam 
transferring onto state-sponsored "grammar" schools for their secondary education. 
All other students attended "secondary modern schools" with a vocational bent and 
these pupils tended to leave formal education by the compulsory school leaving age 
of 15 (16 after 1973). In the 1970s, however, there was an undercurrent of immense 
change to the operation of secondary schools, with a movement towards a mixed 
ability, "comprehensive" style of schooling. While mixed ability schools are non-
selective at the entry level, streaming at the class level by ability occurs for core 
subjects such as English, mathematics and the sciences4. 
4 The 1976 Education Act required Local Education Authorities (LEAs) to replace schools previously 
split by the 11 plus examination with comprehensive schools, but this act was repealed in 1979. As a 
result around 85% of secondary schools within the state sector are of mixed ability, but there are some 
33 (out of 150) authorities in England which still allow selective state grammar schools to co-exist 
alongside comprehensives (Machin and Vignoles, 2005). 
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Since the 1988 Education Reform Act various market-oriented strategies have been 
applied to England's maintained schools, at both the primary and secondary phases, 
in an attempt to generate competitive behaviour among education providers. This 
competition is assumed to be delivered through a process of allowing pupils access to 
a wide choice of schools from their current home location, rather than restricting 
admission to traditional place allocation in the school nearest their home. The 
creation of a schooling 'market-place' aims to counteract both the perceived drop in 
educational standards of attainment and the inequality of their distributions. 
For schools themselves, choice strategies have largely introduced greater 
transparency surrounding their operation, performance and accountability as means 
for raising their productivity, efficiency, and overall competitive strength. In terms of 
their operation, schools are able to opt out of local government financial control and 
obtain their finances direct from central government, with internal (board of 
governor) rather than local authority level management of income. Whilst this has 
allowed schools more control over their budget, funding has been increasingly 
attached to student enrolment numbers, leading to a pressure to attract students in an 
attempt to operate to full potential, thereby maximising revenue. Where schools are 
able to attain their capacity-limit of student numbers and face further demand for 
places, those Local Education Authorities (LEAs) that control admissions into the 
school are required to make publicly available their oversubscription entry criteria, 
which serves to open up the school and LEA intake procedures. At the same time, the 
requirement to have more parental representation on the board of school governors, 
in conjunction with the delegation of financial management and appointment of staff 
to the board, has also increased visibility of internal school processes. 
The formation, setting of key targets and publication of school results in National 
Curriculum examinations have been the main objectives by which school 
performance has been made more transparent. The National Curriculum was 
established through the 1988 Act and was in place in all primary and secondary 
schools between the academic years of 1989/90 and 1996/97. It produced a much 
5 State primary schools in England have traditionally been non-selective, of mixed gender and non-
specialist in subjects. The introduction of market forces served to base their funding on pupil numbers 
and allow control and governance autonomy (if a primary school opted out of LEA control), thus 
providing mechanisms to attract students in the same way as for secondary schools. 
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scripted form and content of subjects to be taught in state schools for all pupils aged 
5-16. Curriculum comprehension is now tested through national attainment exams at 
the ages of 6/7 (Key Stage 1), 10/11 (KS 2), and 15/16 (KS 4) and the government 
has set national targets of achievement at each stage. 
Publication of school average test scores in the Key Stages (in the form of "league 
tables" appearing in local newspapers and on the interne) seeks to generate school 
accountability through performance transparency. This information enables the 
public to compare the performance of individual schools relative to both other 
schools within the local area and to nationally set targets. The Office for Standards in 
Education (Ofsted) was set up under the Education (Schools) Act of 1992 to inspect 
all state-funded schools at least every one in four years and to produce a publishable 
detailed report on the internal management, functioning and quality of schools, as a 
more direct method of accountability (Machin and Vignoles, 2005). 
For parents, the transparency of the system is designed to present them with more 
options in the educational exposure of their child(ren), beyond home location-related 
provisions, thereby laying the demand-side foundations of a schooling market-place. 
Information on school effectiveness, offered through performance tables and Ofsted 
reports, forms the tool to be used by parents to help them choose schools most 
satisfying the preferences and pedagogic needs of their offspring. The higher 
competition between schools for pupils that more parental choice aims to create is 
intended to produce a system of effective schools that are able to expand to full 
capacity, since, at least theoretically, schools should face no constraints in their 
supply of places. In this system weaker schools are charged with either improving 
their performance, through schemes such as conversion into an Academy school, or 
otherwise facing the prospect of permanent closure. 
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ii. Institutional Change as a Feature of Education Policy Initiatives: the 
Academies Programme 
Academy schools have featured in the English state secondary education sector since 
2002. As an education policy initiative the Academies programme forms part of the 
government's commitment to tackle the legacy of the inequality of opportunity that 
exists together with a long tail of poorly performing schools. The driving force 
behind the Academies programme is school improvement delivered through a unique 
and complete form of institutional change, in which an underperforming school is 
restarted from the ground upwards. A new school building, management structure 
and autonomy of functioning are packaged together to give Academy schools "the 
potential to make a major contribution to improving opportunities for all our 
children" (Rogers and Migniuolo, 2007, pp. 8, quoting the then Education Secretary 
David Blunkett). 
Despite the government's coming-to-power rhetoric that "[s]tandards, more than 
structures, are the key to success" (Labour Party, 1997) and would therefore form the 
basis of education policy developments, there has nevertheless been a steady stream 
of initiatives designed to tackle education underachievement which, like the 
Academy schools model, have institutional change at their heart. As a general 
reference for Part II of this study, this Section charts the rise of school reform 
policies of different types and sets the significance of each against that of the 
Academies initiative. 
a. Fresh Start Schools 
The Fresh Start initiative was first introduced by the New Labour government in 
1997 in the White Paper Excellence in Schools as part of the school improvement 
policy agenda, and was applied to underperforming schools from 1998 onwards6. It 
was presented as an option for schools in Special Measures, or, more specifically, 
"where schools over three consecutive years failed to get 5 good GCSE passes for at 
least 15 per cent of their pupils, they would be considered for a Fresh Start" (DfES, 
6 The Fresh Start Schools initiative was partially modelled on the American schools model of 
`Reconstitution', under which failing schools start from afresh with new staff, new leadership and a 
new curriculum (Matthews and Kinchington, 2006). 
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2000). Very often it acts as a last resort for failing schools frequently characterised 
by a high fraction of pupils from low socio-economic backgrounds with lower-than-
average academic outcomes. The policy involves the closure of a failing school, the 
employment of new school staff and the development of a renewed school ethos, 
plus either a complete refurbishment of the physical plant of the school or the 
continued use of existing school buildings. As noted in Matthews and Kinchington 
(2006, pp. 107), "[a] school may be closed on one day and opened as a new school 
on the following day on the same site, but with a new identity and frequently with a 
new staff, governors, vision, environment, initiatives and extra funding." Additional 
capital and revenue funding from government covers the initial three years of the 
scheme and is combined with Ofsted school inspection within one to two years of the 
formation of the new school. To date 37 Fresh Start schools are known to have been 
set up in England (Hansard, 2008d). 
b. Building Schools for the Future (BSF) 
First launched in 2004, the BSF is a Private Finance Initiative (PFI) programme7 that 
represents a major source of capital funding for public secondary schools and aims to 
rebuild or renovate the entire state secondary school estate (around 3,300 schools in 
20078) by 2020 (Curtis et al., 2008; Rogers and Migniuolo, 2007; Gadkowski, 2007). 
The scheme enables all LEAs to rebuild up to 50 per cent of their estate and to 
undertake major and minor refurbishments to 35 per cent and 15 per cent 
respectively of the remaining builds. Beginning in 2005/06, there are a total of 15 
planned waves of investment, with the order in which LEAs are entering into the 
programme reflecting their relative levels of social and educational need (PSA 
Delivery Agreements, 2008; Sibieta et al., 2008). The initial receipt of BSF funds 
requires LEA submission of a 'Strategy for Change' document which sets out the 
educational aspirations, secondary school estate plans, and pupil placement forecasts 
of the area for the next ten years. Additionally the LEA is required to agree on 
7 "The PH began in 1992, and engages a private consortium, the PH provider, to invest in new or 
refurbished buildings such as schools, once there is a public invitation to tender. Under the PH, a 
contractor is responsible for construction or refurbishment of the school, and then can additionally 
provide a range of services such as school meals, and utilities on behalf of the local authority under a 
long-term contract. The Local Authority pays a monthly charge to use the PFI's infrastructure and, at 
the end of the contract the Local Authority adopts responsibility for the infrastructure" (Gadkowski, 
2007, pp. 12). 
8 Figure obtained from DCSF (2007), Table 1: All Schools: Number of Schools and Pupils by Type of 
School, January 1998 to 2007. 
21 
projects with governmental bodies, such as Partnerships for Schools, the body in 
charge of the delivery of BSF, prior to funds allocation. The government plans to 
spend a total of £9.33 billion on BSF over the next three financial years (2008/09 to 
2010/11) (Sibieta et al., 2008; Astle and Ryan, 2008). To date 26 BSF projects have 
been agreed (PwC, 2008). 
c. The National Challenge (NC) 
The National Challenge was announced by the current Secretary of State for 
Education, Ed Balls, in June 2008. The policy aims to raise standards in schools with 
the lowest GCSE results and sets a target rate of achievement across the entire state 
secondary school network in England. By 2011 it is expected that "in every 
secondary school at least 30% of students will achieve at least five GCSEs at A*-C 
including English and mathematics" (DCSF, 2008, pp. 1, quoting Ed Balls)9. The 
majority of secondary schools falling below this benchmark are those where greater 
than fifty per cent of pupils are eligible for free school meals, a proxy measure of 
disadvantage10. As such the Challenge is in line with two major aims of the 
government of (i) improving the life chances of children from deprived social 
backgrounds by lifting the schools they attend out of failure; and (ii) narrowing the 
gap in educational achievement between children from disadvantaged and low-
income backgrounds and their peers (DCSF, 2008; PSA Delivery Agreements, 
2008). 
Standards are to be raised through the introduction of a package of financial and 
functional strategies of support in underperforming secondary schools. To date a 
budget of £400 million has been set aside by the government for the programme. Of 
this, £20 million is to be spent on bringing in a National Challenge Adviser (NCA) to 
each NC school, whose task it is to work with the school to identify their problem 
areas. A further £20 million provides for leadership guidance and support, and £100 
9 This performance target for schools was originally referred to in the April 2008 Public Service 
Agreements (PSAs) for the 2008-2011 spending period of the Government. PSAs were first 
introduced through the 1998 Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) as a performance management 
framework for Government, setting out their key priority outcomes (in the form of "Delivery 
Agreements") 	 for 	 each 	 wave 	 of 	 spending 	 (see 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/about the cabinet office/publicserviceagreements.aspx). 
	 The 
National Challenge is contained within the "Fairness and opportunity for all" category of PSA 
Delivery Agreements, as PSA number 10 (see PSA Delivery Agreements, 2008). 
10 See Appendix 1A, Section l A.G for an explanation of the parental financial or other conditions 
under which their children are entitled to free school meals. 
22 
million for teaching, learning and study support. Thus the scheme offers "structural 
solutions" to poor school performance (DCSF, 2008, pp. 13). Funds are distributed to 
NC schools according to their need and can result in an individual school being 
awarded anywhere up to one million pounds to help reach the achievement target 
(DCSF, 2008; Curtis et at., 2008). In 1997 there were 1,610 secondary schools below 
the National Challenge threshold, representing around 46 per cent of all secondary 
schools. By 2007 this fell to 638 schools (close to 20 per cent of the total) and at the 
latest measure in 2008 it stood at 440 schools, or 13 per cent of the total (DCSF, 
2008)". 
d. The Significance of Academies as an Institutional Change Initiative 
Aspects of the Academies programme can be seen in each of the education policies 
described above. Academy schools, like Fresh Start schools, offer a catalytic system 
of whole school renewal in order to bring about school improvement, involving 
fundamental changes to school operations and the development of a new school 
philosophy from within the same environment (Matthews and Kinchington, 2006). In 
fact, from their inception Academy schools were hailed as a "new approach", 
bringing "a radical new edge to the Fresh Start initiative — strengthening the 
programme designed to turn failure into school improvement" (DIES, 2000) and 
forming an integral part of New Labour's "zero tolerance of underperformance" 
within state secondary schools (Labour Party, 1997). 
Like the BSF scheme, Academies involve expenditure on the physical stock of 
schools, either in the form of the development of a new school building, or through 
the remodelling of a pre-existing school that is being replaced by an Academy. Both 
initiatives are presumed to provide a clear signal of local community investment and 
regeneration, and to have a direct impact on pupil motivation and engagement. In 
their first annual report on the BSF programme on behalf of the Department for 
II The figure for 2008, of 440 schools, relates to a press briefing on the progress of National Challenge 
schools given by the Secretary of State according to information available as at 15 January 2009 (see 
http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/nationalchallenge). In 1997 there were around 3,500 maintained secondary 
schools in total in England (DCSF (2006a), Table 1: All Schools: Number of Schools and Pupils by 
Type of School, Position in January each year: 1997 to 2006) and by 2007 this was down to around 
3,300 schools (DCSF (2007). Table 1: All Schools: Number of Schools and Pupils by Type of School, 
Position in January each year: 1998 to 2007). The percentage calculation for 2008 (of 13%) uses the 
2007 total of 3,300 schools as the total for 2008 is not yet available. 
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Children, Schools and Families (DCSF), PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) noted that 
the overall purpose of the initiative is to contribute to the transformation of education 
through school reconstitution that has a maximum possible effect on pupil 
performance. Specifically, "it is hoped that it [BSF] will engage and inspire teachers, 
young people and their local communities" (PwC, 2007, pp. ii). Likewise, the House 
of Commons (HC) report on the matter identifies an underlying conjecture that, as a 
policy measure, capital investment can be used "to deliver much higher standards of 
education and to transform learning and working environments in schools" (IX, 
2007, pp. 12). 
In terms of the National Challenge, the focus that this places on poor-performing 
schools characterised by pupils from disadvantaged social backgrounds has its 
parallels in the Academies scheme. The Academies model originally targeted failing 
schools classified as being in Special Measures or more generally showing signs of 
underachievement, and therefore likely featuring a higher proportion of pupils 
eligible for free school meals, as is the case for NC schools. The Academies 
programme also endeavours to bring about a new positive direction for weak schools 
through significant structural changes to school functioning, in line with the main 
means by which the NC aims to deliver school improvement. 
The fact that there are many common threads running through several government 
education policy measures and the Academies programme highlights both the 
importance of institutional change as an education initiative overall and the relative 
prominence of the Academies model as one such type of this initiative. The 
Academies programme has reached new heights of significance more recently, 
following its specific incorporation into some of the above proposals12, which has 
allowed for a more widespread expansion of the scheme. In March 2006 it was 
announced that all future Academy school buildings would qualify for capital funds 
under the BSF project, meaning that Academy school formation now explicitly 
contributes to the redevelopment of the school estate within a locality and can be 
used to satisfy BSF requirements (Rogers and Migniuolo, 2007; Curtis et at., 
12 
 As was mentioned, the Academies programme was launched as a new aspect of the Fresh Start 
initiative. Given that recent records show there to be only 37 Fresh start schools (and it is unclear how 
many of these relate to the secondary education phase), Academies have contributed and continue to 
contribute much more to driving this scheme forward. 
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2008)13. As stated above, the National Challenge applies to underachieving schools 
defined by 30 per cent of pupils or more not attaining five good GCSEs in the A*-C 
range, including in English and maths. Since 2008 this definition has been used in 
the Academies programme to offer a more precise indication of what constitutes an 
underachieving school that consequently qualifies for replacement by an Academy 
(Curtis et al., 2008). The implication is that one option for National Challenge 
schools is to convert to Academy school status. Crucially, of the £400 million that 
has been budgeted by the government for the National Challenge, £195 million has 
been earmarked for the transformation of NC schools into Academies, representing 
near half of the budget slice and creating a strong impetus for NC schools to make 
this switch. In total, it is expected that a further 70 Academy schools will result from 
the National Challenge (DCSF, 2008)14. 
Putting the above points into context, the Academies scheme initially came with a 
government target of 200 Academy schools to be either fully open or in the pipeline 
by 2010, 60 of which were to be in London (DfES, 2004, pp. 9, paragraph 6)15. In 
November 2006 this target was doubled to 400 Academies, recently predicted as 
being established by 2015 (Rogers and Migniuolo, 2007; HC, 2008). At the time of 
writing (June 2009) there are 133 Academy schools open in 65 (out of 150) LEAs16. 
Prior to the announcement of additional funds being made available for Academy 
school set-up as an option for National Challenge schools, it was expected that a 
further 55 Academies would open in each of September 2009 and 2010, bringing the 
actual total by 2010 to 243 Academies, 43 schools in excess of the original target. 
Following the budget support offered through the National Challenge however, the 
government anticipates the expansion of the Academies programme to lead to 80 and 
100 Academy schools opening in 2009 and 2010, representing 25 and 45 more 
schools respectively than was expected (70 more in total, as was mentioned, see 
DCSF (2008)). On these bases, there should be 313 Academies open in September 
13 Academy schools financed under the B SF scheme usually involve redevelopment of an existing 
(predecessor) school building. Consequently their turnaround time is shorter than for Academies that 
require completely new builds, taking only around two years (Rogers and Migniuolo, 2007). 
14 
 To clarify, the £400 million budget for the National Challenge is expected to be allocated amongst 
national challenge advisers (£20mn), national education leaders and other leadership support (£20mn), 
teaching, learning and study support (£100mn), Academy schools (£195mn) and the establishment of 
Trusts (£65mn). Thus the largest allocation goes to Academies (DCSF, 2008). 
15 This is in line with the original concept of "City Academy" schools. These were to be established in 
such conurbations so as to provide a means for urban education reform in particular. 
16 The current number of open Academies was obtained from the following website (accessed 27 
January 2009): http://www.standards.dfes.gov.uk/academies/projects/?version=1   
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2010, around one-and-a-half times more than was initially planned, and, according to 
the DCSF (2008), the Academies programme should be responsible for the 
replacement of more than 200 National Challenge schools overall (using the 
definition of a NC school applied to schools that had already been replaced by 
Academies prior to NC introduction as well as following implementation of the NC). 
This would suggest that the target of 400 Academies forecasted as being open by 
2015 is feasible, requiring only a further 87 such schools to be set up between 2010 
and 2015. In this case, based on current government projections of the number of 
state secondary schools in the system being 2,659 by 2015, Academies will account 
for about a 15 per cent share at this time, up from a near 7 per cent share had the 
original target of 200 Academies being established by 2010 remained17. This is a 
sizeable fraction that has the potential for yet further expansion and is indicative of 
the weighty presence of Academies on the schooling and education policy landscape 
for the foreseeable future. 
17 The projected number of secondary schools figure for 2015 is obtained from HC (2008) and refers 
to the academic years 2014-2015. For 2009-2010 it has been forecasted that there will be 2,966 
secondary schools in the system (ibid). 
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Part I 
Chapter One: Exploring Dimensions of School Change 
during Primary Education in England 
1.1 	 Introduction 
Family background constitutes the most important determinant of child cognitive 
development. Cognitive ability concerns the knowledge procurement process and 
involves the capacity to engage in thought and reason, as well as to exercise 
perception, judgement and awareness. Observable measures of schooling outcomes 
such as standardised tests capture both innate and acquired cognitive ability 
(Postlewaite and Silverman, 2006). Estimates suggest that the proportion of variation 
in pupil achievement that can be attributed to household characteristics is as much as 
75 per cent (West and Pennell, 2003)18. The influence of the family on child 
cognitive outcomes works through aspects such as parental interest in schooling and 
aspirations for their child's success, both of which are related to the education and 
income of parents (Adnett and Davies, 2002). 
The role of schools within cognitive skills formation is to close the gap in learning 
ability associated with differences in the family background of children. Research 
has indicated a small but nonetheless significant position played by schools in this 
respect, with estimates suggesting a 'school effect' on variations in pupil outcomes 
of between 5 and 18 per cent (Machin and Vignoles, 2005)19. That part of child 
cognitive development linked to education depends on the types of schools available 
in the locality and the accessibility of these schools by different households. School 
accessibility in an area varies according to whether institutions are centrally funded 
by the government (state schools) or require the payment of fees (independent or 
private schools). For the vast majority of families state schools represent the 
principal accessible supplier of education given that they provide free compulsory 
education for all, so that they form the focus of schooling considerations. At the 
18 This refers to the original work of Thomas. S. and Mortimore, P. (1996). Comparison of Value-
Added Models for Secondary School Effectiveness. Research Papers in Education.11 (1): 5-33. 
19 This refers to the original work of Sammons, P. (1999). School Effectiveness: Coming of Age in the 
Twenty-First Century. Lisse, the Netherlands: Royal Swets and Zeitlinger. 
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household level, travel costs and school quality issues, amongst other factors, result 
in preferences for entry into some local state schools above others20. Minimisation of 
travel costs implies attendance at those maintained schools that are geographically 
close to the home, or that can fit into the travel-to-work patterns of employed 
household members. For pupils within households the quality of the state school 
attended shapes cognitive learning and affects the life course, since education 
outcomes are carried through to the labour market (Adnett and Davies, 2002). 
Non-cognitive, or life-skills — such as self-assurance, motivation, interpersonal 
attributes and general emotional intellect (Carneiro et al., 2006; Heckman and 
Rubinstein, 2001) — are mainly a function of family background, though their 
development in children is also affected by schooling and the external 
neighbourhood surroundings to which a child is exposed. At home, parent-child 
interactions instil the family norms, values, attitudes and behavioural responses that 
impact on child non-cognitive development. Within the school these skills relate to 
the nature of friendships and peer group communications that the child engages in —
both inside the classroom and when interacting with other year groups — in addition 
to the overall ethos of the school. Outside of the school, residential location affects 
notions of opportunities that exist beyond educational years through the amount of 
social capital and adult role model influences that are present in the home 
surroundings, impacting on child academic aspirations and persistence (Glaeser, 
2001). Research has revealed that life skills acquired by individuals are advantageous 
not only to the individuals themselves but also to society as a whole, since they 
encourage the formation of socialisation attributes and can reduce deviant behaviour, 
like involvement in crime, or minimise individual exposure to risks factors, such as 
unemployment or teenage motherhood (Carneiro et al., 2006). 
In general the intertwined cognitive and non-cognitive facets of child progress react 
to and depend upon the local provisions of public services that relate to schooling, 
housing and other community inputs. Changes to these spatial dimensions can 
produce differences in the life chances of children by affecting their exposure to 
effective schools and therefore both their cognitive and non-cognitive development. 
20 School quality is used here to refer to the performance of the school in National Key Stage tests. In 
general, it can also indicate aspects of schools such as the quality of teaching provision, the 
compositional mix of fellow pupils and their academic ability, and the current governance and 
management conditions of the school. 
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In terms of schooling, spatial change may involve attendance at a different school 
whilst remaining in the current residential location, or may relate to a change of 
school occurring together with a move of home. 
To date there has been limited research examining the varied aspects of moves 
between schools. These seem necessary to understand if consideration is made for 
the contribution attendance at an 'effective' school can make to child development. 
Recent changes in public sector education policy in England have acted to affect the 
form of moves made and therefore the influence of schooling on child progress, 
strengthening the need to evaluate dimensions of school change. In particular, 
government initiatives in the state school system have increasingly involved an 
attempt to widen the scope of education institutions that pupils can access from the 
current home location, an admissions method that compares with traditional place 
allocation in a state school nearest to the pupil's home. At the same time, 
performance indicators on the academic standards of England's maintained schools 
have been made publicly available, promoting the notion of parents 'choosing' a 
school for their child to attend. Combined, these factors have potentially promoted 
the likelihood of movements between state schools driven by the pursuit of raised 
education standards, with this mobility prospectively able to occur independently of 
a move of home. However, one major caveat to the effective operation of choice has 
been the fixed capacity constraints faced by state schools that have necessitated the 
imposition of 'oversubscription' entry criteria when applications for places exceed 
the number available. The most significant of these involves the proximity of a 
pupil's residence to the school, a condition that serves to reinstate the school-home 
link which choice polices have attempted to forge apart. 
In this Chapter features of school moves excluding and involving home moves will 
be described and assessed for one cohort of pupils as they progress through the 
primary years of state schooling that encompass Key Stage 1 (aged 6/7) to Key Stage 
2 (aged 10/11) National Curriculum examinations. The empirical source of reference 
for this analysis is the National Pupil Database (NPD), which comprises of an annual 
collection of administrative records on all state school pupils in all phases of 
education throughout England since the academic year 2001/2002. The aims of this 
research are: (i) to define and measure both 'pure' pupil mobility, in which pupils 
change schools without moving home, and combined school-home moves; (ii) to 
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describe the key pre-move attributes of the different mover types, as well as their 
pre-move academic attainment; so as to establish the association between pupil 
characteristics and the form of move made, and (iii) to establish some understanding 
of the effectiveness of school choice policies by considering evidence on the extent 
and nature of pure school change that involves entry into an oversubscribed school. 
Section 1.2 introduces evidence on the common way of classifying and measuring 
pupil mobility identified in the literature and on the amount of school moves 
witnessed according to this method. Much of the literature uses a composite 
approach in which no distinction is made between school change that does and does 
not involve a move of home. In Section 1.3 recent government initiatives in the state 
education sector discussed above are described in more detail and are pinpointed as a 
reason for the need to separate out differing forms of school change. Section 1.4 
explains the primary school set-up in England as a precursor to the empirical focus. 
Here it is suggested that the importance of parental access to a wide network of good 
quality schools for their children from an early age must be set against the desire for 
the school attended to be close to the home, conflicting concerns that give rise to an 
interest in assessing mobility patterns and the operation of school choice during the 
primary education stage in particular. 
In Section 1.5 details on both the structure of the NPD and on the Key Stage 1 to 2 
cohort of primary school pupils attending state schools in England, who make up the 
empirical source of reference for this Chapter, are given. Section 1.6 describes the 
means for measuring dimensions of school mobility in this data sample and 
establishes the sample size under analysis. In Section 1.7 estimates of school and 
home moves are presented according to both the composite measure defined by the 
literature, and to measures that divide school change only from combined school-
home moves. This empirical Section highlights the loss of valuable detail on mobility 
patterns that is brought about when only a composite indicator of school moves is 
estimated. As a natural extension to the re-evaluation of mobility, Section 1.8 looks 
at the characteristics of the differing mover types, including their prior attainment, 
and highlights the tendency for pupils from a more advantaged background to make 
pure school changes over and above school-home moves. 
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The effectiveness of school choice policies forms the cornerstone of assessment 
undertaken in Section 1.9. Here estimation looks at entry into popular schools by 
pupils making one move of school, or school-home, as a means for establishing 
whether school choice is counteracted by oversubscription rules applied in England's 
filled-to-capacity state schools. The findings from this angle of enquiry and those on 
the attributes of pupils are then brought together in a brief discussion that considers 
issues of equality in the utilisation of school choice. Finally, Section 1.10 
summarises the main results of this work and its contributions to education research. 
32 
1.2 	 Literature on Mobility 
The movement of pupils between schools has been discussed in literature concerned 
with the sociology of education and the management of schools as early as the 1960s 
(see for example, Plowden, 1967, and Douglas, 1964). In England, the first large-
scale study of the nature and causes of school change was undertaken by Dobson and 
Henthorne (1999). Their project involved the collation of general LEA statistics on 
pupil mobility in schools, for which they attained details from 130 out of 150 of the 
surveyed authorities (an 87 per cent response rate). The authors established a 
common formula that LEAs employ in order to measure pupil mobility in their 
regions, which is named the Joiners Plus Leavers (JPL) method and refers to those 
pupils entering the school at times other than the normal starting period of the 
beginning of the academic year. This formula is given by21:- 
Pupils joining school+Pupils leaving school * 100 
Total school roll 
In terms of the nature of school moves, the authors note a perception of 'high' 
mobility at the primary school stage of education where it is at or above an annual 
rate of 20 per cent in LEA primary schools. Contributors to high mobility include 
travellers and members of armed force families, those experiencing changes to the 
household dynamics through parental break-up or separation, those accommodated in 
particular types of housing (such as rented or temporary) and households engaging in 
seasonal employment. Areas characterised by high mobility include major cities, 
particularly London, coastal resorts and regions featuring armed forces bases. 
The causes of school change are divided into four main categories: international 
migration, internal migration, individual movement and institutional movement. Both 
international and internal migration are mainly driven by household employment 
factors, and in the former case can result in permanent settlement in the UK or 
elsewhere, while in the latter case the overall quantity of moves are mostly 
determined by stages in the life cycle. Individual movement relates to changes in 
family circumstances which necessitate children moving between households. Of 
21 See Dobson and Henthorne (1999, pp. 12). 
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direct relevance to the focus of this Chapter is institutional movement, which 
involves children changing schools by choice, or transferring between differing 
school types, such as special and mainstream schools. 
Though their analysis addresses mobility at the LEA-level, Dobson and Henthorne 
(1999) also provide a general definition of mobility at the level of the individual 
pupil. This is stated as "a child joining or leaving a school at a point other than the 
normal age at which children start or finish their education at that school — whether 
or not this involves a move of home" (pp. 5, original emphasis). Thus, pupils who 
switch schools at times other than when transferring from primary to secondary 
school, for example, are included in the measure. This definition of school movers is 
applied in many studies that assess mobility, especially those concerned with the 
impact of school change on own-pupil educational attainment (see for example 
Blane, 1985, Strand, 2002, and Burgess et al., 2006b). If one considers the potential 
for this relationship to differ according to the form of mobility involved then the use 
of such a general definition could be problematic. In this respect isolated school 
changes or combined school-home moves may exert varying effects on attainment, 
rather than having an overall clear-cut consequence. Categorisation of mover types 
along these dimensions matters not only in the evaluation of aspects such as the 
mobility—own-pupil performance relationship, but also in the development of a group 
of immobile pupils against whom educational outcomes of school movers are 
compared. If a 'stable' set of pupils only alludes to those pupils not changing schools 
over the study period under consideration then it could be that this group are not 
residentially immobile. Then if school stayers (or likewise school changers) who do 
and do not move home differ along a range of significant dimensions, clustering 
them into one group according to their schooling behaviour alone could result in an 
incorrectly defined comparison group and incorrect analysis of the result of moving 
schools. The implication of this is that there is a need to redefine mobility in a way 
that allows for consideration of the importance of the type of move made. 
To date there has been little research undertaken that distinguishes between differing 
kinds of pupil moves between schools, predominantly due to a lack of available data 
that provides detailed coverage of moves and information on their nature. Previously 
co-authored work (Machin et al., 2006) has utilised the Naticinal Pupil Database 
(NPD) — a state-school-level Census of pupils on roll in January of each academic 
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year — to address mobility patterns, where an allowance is made for differing mover 
types. Composite school moves across two waves of the Pupil-Level Annual School 
Census (PLASC) component dataset to the NPD are studied, as is residential 
mobility behaviour associated with in-school children, from the stance of whether 
there are changes of home residence occurring together with pupil mobility. Table 
1.1 details school moves that involve a change of residence for pupils moving 
schools between 2001/2002 (the first wave, or year, of PLASC) and 2002/2003. 
Moves of school attended are identified by changes to the code of the school 
recorded in the PLASC data between the two years, and refer only to those non-
compulsory school changes rather than expected school shifts, as per Dobson and 
Henthorne (1999). Residential moves reflect home postcode changes over the same 
period. 
Table 1.1: Proportion of School Movers Moving Home by Year Group and Key 














1-2 40,897 27,387 0.670 
2-3 30,681 20,527 0.669 
KS 1 average 0.669 
3-4 39,606 25,188 0.636 
4-5 37,007 22,948 0.620 
5-6 32,577 20,984 0.644 
6-7 8,808 2,365 0.269 
KS 2 average 0.606 
7-8 20,894 11,706 0.560 
8-9 20,555 10,688 0.520 
9-10 17,225 9,042 0.525 
KS 3 average 0.536 
10-11 8,815 4,274 0.485 
Source: Adapted from Machin et al. (2006, pp. 264, Table 4). 
Notes: School movers are pupils moving school other than at compulsory times. The remaining non-
compulsory movers between years 6 - 7 (when the move to secondary school occurs) reflect pupils 
attending middle school who leave later than year 6. Column (1) shows total year group numbers of 
movers when both the REE school code and the home postcode contained in PLASC are available for 
both academic years for the pupil. 
In the analysis of mobility patterns across all stages of education, the national dataset 
used in this research revealed that just over 900,000 school children switched schools 
across the two PLASC years, equal to roughly 16 per cent of the total of almost 5.9 
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million pupils sampled. Of these, just over a quarter of a million, or 4.4 per cent of 
school changes were made at non-standard time stages of transition between the 
academic years. It was found that non-compulsory school changes occur most often 
in the transition from school Year 1 (aged 5/6 in 2001/02) to school Year 2 (aged 6/7 
in 2002/03) at a rate of 7.3 per cent, and that, overall, mobility was considered to be 
more prevalent in the primary school stage of education. Table 1.1 shows that more 
than half of those pupils switching schools also changed residence in almost all year 
group transitions (except for between years 6 and 7 and years 10 and 11). Residential 
transfers were higher in the primary school years, particularly in the years leading up 
to and including the Key Stage 1 examinations (taken at the end of year 3, when 
pupils are aged 6/7), at an average of 70 per cent for the two year groups involved 
(column 3)22. 
This evidence emphasises the complexity of the school changing process and 
additionally indicates that the analysis of mobility patterns needs to go beyond the 
informative content deriving from the general definition of pupil mobility between 
schools that Dobson and Henthorne (1999) provide. In the Section that follows the 
importance of differentiating between school changers of different forms is further 
highlighted in reference to recent developments in government education policy, 
which have served to impact on the nature of school moves made. 
22 Section IA.A of Appendix I A also provides some statistics on child migration from the 1991 and 
2001 Population Censuses. These data indicate that home moves are particularly prevalent in the pre-
compulsory schooling years when children are aged 1-4. They additionally signal a higher amount of 
home mobility at the primary schooling ages, as found by Machin et al. (2006), though it is not 
possible to identify from the Censuses how much residential change also involved a school transfer. 
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1.3 	 Mobility and Government Education Policy 
State school admissions systems can be broadly categorised into two main models of 
schooling provision, namely community-school models and parental-choice models. 
In a community-based model schools serve only local community pupils and 
admission is determined purely by residential location, typically within the limits of a 
defined geographical 'catchment' area that comprises of pupils inhabiting homes of 
close proximity to the school concerned. In the choice-based model admissions are 
weighted towards parental preferences, so that parents are given more freedom and 
input over the education exposure of their children. This model of education 
provision incorporates a wider local area and is not restricted to place allocation in 
schools nearby the home (Gibbons et al., 2006). 
In recent decades, the UK government has enacted reforms pushing the organisation 
of the procedure of admissions into public-sector education towards the choice mode, 
as opposed to the more traditionally featuring community system, resulting in the 
current existence of a hybrid education service. A 'quasi-market' for the provision of 
education based on school choice was first introduced through the 1988 Education 
Reform Act. Justifications for this policy shift lie in the perceived merits of incentive 
mechanisms existing in a competitive market-place for schools characterised by 
parental choice, and the ability of these devices to drive up standards in education23. 
In the UK this is exemplified in the performance of independent schools, which tend 
to operate under the choice-based mode, and which have consistently produced 
academic records above those of state schools — 60 per cent of privately educated 
pupils attained post-secondary degrees in the 1980s and 1990s compared with only 
16 per cent of state educated pupils (Machin and Vignoles, 2005)24. State schools, on 
the other hand, having been historically characterised by the neighbourhood-based 
approach to schooling allocation, are faced with education standards that are partly 
dependent on the learning capacity and socio-economic status of local community 
pupils. It is argued that this allows for poor standards of academic achievement to 
prevail by preventing those living in poorer communities in particular from attaining 
23 
 For background information on the school choice policy, see the Section entitled 'Key Concepts'. 
24 Literature on the effects of school choice and competition attributes the superior performance of 
independent schools relative to state schools to the competition induced by parental choice which 
improves the technological efficiency of private schools (see, for example, Gibbons et al.. 2006). 
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education services that may accurately match their wants and capabilities (Gibbons et 
al:, 2006). 
The application of parental choice and school competition to the state school system 
has featured the formation of market-based incentive mechanisms in school 
enrolment and school performance. In terms of enrolment, school funding is linked 
to the number of pupils on roll at the school and their characteristics. At the 
institution-level, league tables of performance have been supplied to the public since 
1996 (1994) for primary (secondary) schools, providing accountability information 
on the academic achievement of schools in standardised tests relative to both 
nationally defined education targets and to other schools in the local area. Taken 
together, these two changes mean that parents are enticed into 'shopping around' for 
a local education supplier that best matches the preferences and learning needs of 
their children and schools, in order to maximise their revenue funding, are 
encouraged to actively engage in market-like competition for pupils as a result of the 
policy reforms (Tiebout, 1956). 
Theoretically one would expect that more transparency in the relative academic 
performance of local schools and a greater parental freedom to choose amongst a 
wider range of differing education providers within the same local area would affect 
spatial mobility that relates to schooling, as parents attempt to take advantage of 
opportunities for improving the learning circumstances of their children. Under 
effective policy, localised changes in the school attended should be feasible without 
such moves necessitating changes of home. More specifically, the emphasis on 
parental choice in education provision put forward by recent government policy 
represents an attempt to sever the link between where a child lives and the range of 
schools that s/he is eligible to attend, a situation imposed by the historical prevalence 
of education provision under the community-school model. Instead school choice 
aims to forge a link between the demand for and the supply of local education 
services, by offering more school alternatives conditional on pre-existing family 
residential location (Gibbons and Silva, 2006a). Then it is conceivable to suggest that 
such initiatives may have introduced or strengthened an element of spatial activity in 
which pupils change schools whilst remaining in the same place of residence, a 
situation that can be termed 'pure' pupil mobility. 
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Empirical evidence on 'pure' school moves is limited, given that the common way of 
assessing pupil mobility in the literature has thus far failed to distinguish between 
school moves only and those that involve changes of home. Statistical facts about the 
distinct amount of moves of each type appear important, in light of the disconnection 
of the home-school link that government policy has targeted. Hence the empirical 
Section that follows will incorporate the redefinition and re-measurement of school 
shifts, dividing them up between 'pure' pupil mobility and 'school-home moves.' 
One cohort of pupils aged between 5/6 and 10/11 and attending state Primary schools 
in England throughout the Key Stage 1 to Key Stage 2 learning phase will be 
extracted from the NPD for this purpose. Prior to the presentation of empirical 
findings, the following Section provides a brief description of the structure of state 
Primary schooling, and then goes on to address why this education stage is of 
particularly high relevance to the mobility discussion. 
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1.4 	 Primary Schools in England and Admissions Policies 
Primary schools in the state or 'maintained' schools sector in England are organised 
into one of four categories — Community, Foundation, Voluntary-aided (VA), and 
Voluntary-controlled (VC) — where variation reflects structural differences in 
governance, ownership, and pupil admissions policies, as summarised in Table 1.2. 
The Table shows that Community schools represent the predominant form of state-
provided primary schooling in England, catering for close to 62 per cent of all 
primary-age pupils. VA and VC schools supply education services to near 22 per 
cent and almost 14 per cent of primary-age pupils respectively, with Foundation 
schools accounting for the remainder (just above 2 per cent). 
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Parents >30%, Staff 
<30%, LEA 20%, 
Community 20%. 
Parents >30%, Staff 
<30%, 
Foundation/Partnership 
<25%, LEA <20%, 
Community 10%. 
Foundation >50%, 
Parents >30%, LEA 
<10%, Staff <30%. 
Parents >30%, Staff 
<30%, Foundation 












Source: Adapted from Gibbons and Silva (2006b, pp. 36, Table 1). 
Notes: The number of schools (and percentage of total) is based on the Key Stage 1 and 2 cohort data 
used in the empirical Section and includes only those pupils with a full set of mobility indicators and 
pupil characteristics (see Table 1.6). LEA stands for Local Education Authority. On average 
Community schools are the dominant institution type in England, accounting for about 65 per cent of 
all Primary schools. 
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In terms of governance, the governing body (or board of school governors) of a 
primary school is responsible for the overall management of the school — that is it 
"sets the strategic direction of the school, draws up school policies, sets targets and 
monitors performance" (Gibbons and Silva, 2006b, pp. 8) — while responsibility for 
daily school management falls on the leadership group. Community schools feature 
the highest representation of the LEA on their governing body relative to other 
school types, with the LEA accounting for a 20 per cent share. VA and VC schools 
are commonly attached to a 'Foundation', comprising of a charitable (including 
faith) or a business organisation. Foundation schools themselves, on the other hand, 
tend to operate with local organisations on a partnership basis. The board of school 
governors (including the 'Foundation') linked to VA schools contributes financial 
resources to the building and maintenance expenses of the school, which is in line 
with their greater presence on the governing body, where they account for a share of 
in excess of 50 per cent (see column 4 of Table 1.2). Overall ownership of school 
assets (the land and buildings) can belong to the LEA or to the school governors and 
the principal employer of staff to the school also varies along these dimensions 
(column 5). 
Where pupil admissions are concerned, across all primary school types the initial 
coordination of the admissions process is in the domain of the LEA, but they are only 
responsible for allocating places in the schools for which they are the admissions 
authority, that is, in Community and VC schools. LEAs are required to allocate 
pupils to these schools on the basis of stated parental preference in the first instance, 
as appearing in the admissions application form. So-called 'oversubscription criteria' 
are laid out by the LEA for use when there are more applications to the Community 
or VC school than places available. In Foundation and VA schools there is greater 
flexibility over pupil entrance decisions, since the governing body is the admissions 
authority and therefore has more freedom to set the admissions and oversubscription 
rules and allocate places with adherence to these rules25. However, the majority 
representation of the 'Foundation', as opposed to the LEA, on the board of school 
governors in VA schools implies that only in these schools can admissions practices 
25 In turn, the admissions rules must comply with the law and any mandatory requirements of the 
relevant Code on admissions, as discussed in Section 1.4.1 below (West et al.. 2009). 
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truly deviate from those applied in LEA-run institutions (Gibbons and Silva, 2006h: 
Tough and Brooks, 2007)26. 
1.4.1 Primary school mobility and admissions 'oversubscription' 
The main reasons for addressing school and home moves undertaken by pupils 
attending state-sector Primary schools in particular relate to both the education sector 
changes introduced by the 1988 Education Reform Act and to the admissions criteria 
adopted in the event of place oversubscription, both of which, it will be argued here, 
are likely to have impacted more on mobility during the primary education phase. 
As discussed in Section 1.3, since 1988 government policy has favoured a quasi-
market method of education provision, in which parents are encouraged to be 
actively involved in the schooling choices for their children. Theoretically, the radius 
of parental choice of schools is meant to encompass a wider field than that which the 
traditional allocation of pupils to localised schools would allow, and this field should 
be attainable from the current residential setting. At the same time schools are 
encouraged to attract a high number of pupils, since pupil quantity determines school 
sustainability by being directly related to total school funding. 
The process of admission into England's state schools has only received a legal 
setting in the last decade, under the School Standards and Framework Act 1998. This 
established a School Admissions Code, the first of which was the 1999 Code, that 
was applied to the admissions round beginning in September 2000. There have since 
been three updated versions of the Code (2003, 2007 and 2009), each coming into 
effect in the September of their year of publication, which differ in their statutory 
strength. In particular, the 1999 and 2003 Codes contain admissions guidelines, 
which admissions authorities for schools (the LEA or a school's governing body) 
were only required to "have regard to" (DfES, 2003, pp. 40. paragraph A.1)27. Under 
the Education and Inspections Act of 2006 the admissions framework was tightened, 
26 All admissions authorities, whether the LEA or the school's governing body, are required to publish 
their admissions arrangements, including those applying in the event of oversubscription (see DtES. 
2003, paragraphs 4.15 and 4.17). 
27 
 West et al. (2009, pp. 7) note that this enabled admissions authorities to "set admissions criteria that 
did not comply with the Code as long as they had good reasons for their actions." 
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and the 2007 Code was introduced, which obliged admissions authorities to "act in 
accordance with its mandatory provisions" (DfES, 2007b, pp. 7), a legal status that 
has been upheld in the 2009 Code (Tough and Brooks, 2007; West et aL, 2009). 
These "mandatory provisions" have been enforced mainly on the normal admissions 
process, while non-statutory guidelines have applied throughout in the case where a 
school is oversubscribed, although, since the 2007 Code, some practices have been 
explicitly ruled out28. The 2003 Code states that "[a]dmission authorities have 
discretion, which they must exercise reasonably, to determine their own 
oversubscription criteria provided these criteria are objective, clear, fair, compatible 
with admissions and equal opportunities legislation...." (DfES, 2003, pp. 10, 
paragraph 3.4). Hence there is room for variation in the entry rules of oversubscribed 
schools, though there are certain "acceptable" criteria that are "[c]ommonly used" 
(ibid, pp. 10, paragraph 3.5). For majority-LEA-governed Community and VC 
schools, specifications usually involve a higher chance of school entry for cases 
where (i) the child is 'looked after';29 (ii) the child is of Special Educational Needs; 
(iii) the child has siblings attending the same school; or (iv) the household to which 
the child belongs resides in the school 'catchment area', an area within a close 
geographical range of the school (Gibbons et al.. 2006). VA schools are not 
controlled by the LEA and in these schools more weight is given to religious 
affiliation or an expression of faith by the pupil when there is surplus entry demand, 
rather than to the satisfaction of criteria such as residential proximity to the school. 
This is in keeping with the faith-based ethos of VA schools. Indeed it has been found 
that travelling distances to VA schools generally exhibit longer area ranges than for 
other school types (Gibbons et al., 2006), suggesting a more tenuous link of the 
school-home distance. As Table 1.2 highlights, the vast majority of Primary school 
pupils attending state schools in England are educated in Community schools, for 
whom the LEA is the admissions authority. This means that for most pupils the 
oversubscription rules (i) to (iv) stated above are of greater relevance. 
28 These include criteria that consider a parent's occupation, their marital status or their financial 
position, among other factors (DIES, 2007b). 
29 The 2003 Code defines a 'looked after child' as one "who is in the care of a local authority or 
provided with accommodation by that authority" (DIES, 2003, pp. 36, paragraph 7.22). In terms of the 
ranking of looked after children, the 2003 Code states that "[i]t is recommended that all admission 
authorities give these children top priority in their oversubscription criteria" (ibid). The 2007 Code 
makes the prioritisation that should be given to this group of children statutory and states that "[a]ll 
admission authorities must give highest priority in their oversubscription criteria to these children" 
2007b, pp. 45, paragraph 2.7, original emphasis). 
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Taken together, the concepts of school choice and admissions oversubscription 
criteria applied to majority-LEA-governed schools invoke a situation characterised 
by two main features. Firstly, all schools that are perceived as being of good quality 
on the basis of their attainment performance are likely to appear desirable to parents. 
If this holds, then this will result in an excess demand for places in such schools and 
the application of the oversubscription criteria. The latter will apply in the short-run, 
since schools face physical infrastructure limitations, a supply-side rigidity that 
restricts their pupil admissions quantity to the maximum capacity threshold. Capacity 
constraints may also have a long-run effect, if additional buildings are not made 
available or building expansion does not take place. 
Secondly, all admissions authorities are required to make public their admissions 
rules, and the publication of oversubscription criteria gives parents a chance to 
influence place allocation for their child in the oversubscribed school, if they are able 
to satisfy one or more of these conditions of entry. The most significant condition for 
the concept of 'pure' pupil mobility set in the context of school choice is that of 
catchment area occupancy. In respect of the geographical coverage of catchment 
areas, the 2003 School Admissions Code states that "it is good practice for admission 
authorities to provide a map of the areas, and to indicate how far parents within those 
areas have succeeded in getting places in the past, and whether that is a good guide 
for the future" (DfES, 2003, pp. 22, paragraph 4.17)3°. Thus parents are sufficiently 
informed of the catchment area space of a school and whether living within this 
space helps in ensuring place allocation to an oversubscribed school. If pupils inhabit 
homes that exceed these catchment boundary limits, some households may be 
prepared (and more financially able) to engage in residential mobility to within the 
boundary walls in order to ensure compliance with this clause. This is likely to be a 
more important aspect of spatial activity at the primary school stage in particular 
because parents will wish to maximise the quality of the school attended so as to 
secure optimal future returns to schooling and at the same time they will want to 
minimise travel-to-school distances for their children in order to allay safety fears. 
Thus they will have a stronger interest in relocating if this enhances the potential for 
place allocation of their children in good schools nearby to the home. If strategic 
3° This is the same under the 1999 Code. It should be noted that, in terms of the cohort of pupils to be 
evaluated in this study, the 1999 Code and the 2003 Code are the most applicable, since they cover 
school entry during the periods September 2000 to August 2003 and September 2003 to August 2007 
respectively. 
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moves of this kind are made, this suggests that the attempt by the parental-choice 
model of schooling provision to undo the link between residential setting and the 
school attended is counteracted by the oversubscription criteria of LEA-controlled 
schools at the primary school stage, in turn induced by supply-side inflexibilities in 
the physical capacity of schools. Hence while 'pure' pupil mobility may be enhanced 
by parental choice provisions, oversubscription rules imply a significant 'school-
home moves' connection. In respect of establishing some knowledge on the success 
or otherwise of the quasi-market in education, it is therefore valuable to accurately 
define and measure mobility patterns that relate to school moves exclusive of home 
moves and combined school-home changes with particular reference to the primary 
school years. 
As preliminary evidence, Table 1.1 showed the relatively greater extent of composite 
pupil mobility and conjunctional schooling and residential mobility at the primary 
school stage over a two-year period. Extended data availability now permits the 
longitudinal tracking of pupils over a longer time frame during this education phase. 
Such information can be used to analyse multiple moves of different types made by 
the same pupil, as well as to look for evidence of an effectively operating quasi-
market for schools. In Section 1.5 the empirical source to be employed for this 
purpose is described and the structure of the sample is set out. 
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1.5 	 Mobility in the National Pupil Database 
Definition and measurement of isolated school change or combined school and 
residential mobility will utilise a cohort of pupils attending state-maintained primary 
schools throughout Key Stage 1 to Key Stage 2, details on whom are contained in the 
National Pupil Database (NPD). This is made up of two data sources: (i) the Pupil-
Level Annual School Census (PLASC) and (ii) National Curriculum Key Stage test 
scores of attainment. In this Section the origins and content of the NPD are 
explained, as well as the exact structure of the cohort to be assessed. 
1.5.1 Describing the PLASC dataset component of the NPD 
PLASC is a unique national pupil-level administrative Census which has 
traditionally derived information on the whole school roll in January of each 
academic year. Data collection encompasses all pupils across the education spectrum 
of the maintained schools sector in England only, a situation that is enforced by the 
legally binding status of the Census, in which schools are statutorily required to 
provide Census information under Section 537A of the Education Act 1996 (Harland 
and Stillwell, 2007). Records are supplied electronically by the school and 
transferred to central government (the DCSF) via each LEA. Legal enforcement of 
the administrative records provision and their centralised collection reflects the use 
of the collated statistics on pupil numbers and pupil characteristics to determine the 
amount of funding to be allocated to each school (Gibbons and Telhaj, 2007). 
PLASC collection first began in January 2002 to include pupils on roll for the 
academic year 2001/2002. Since 2006 (2007) a tri-annual procedure for 
administrative data collection was introduced into secondary (primary) schools, 
known as the School Census and featuring data collection points on the third 
Thursday of the months of May and September in addition to the usual (third 
Thursday of the month of) January record (Harland and Stillwell, 2007). At the time 
of writing (April 2008) there are 5 waves (academic years) of PLASC data available 
for the annual January school roll only, yielding some 8 million pupil observations 
per wave, the latest being that for the school year 2005/2006 (based on data collected 
in January 2006). These waves can be linked together by means of a unique, 
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anonymous, pupil identifier, to give a five-year longitudinal source of PLASC 
information in which pupils can be tracked as they transfer from one year group to 
another within the state school education system. 
PLASC contains data on individual pupil characteristics and the social background of 
each pupil. Important to the measurement and analysis of mobility, each wave of 
PLASC includes information on the date at which the pupil entered the school, an 
identifier for the school attended by the pupil, and a record of the home postcode of 
the pupil, all on an anonymous basis. 
1.5.2 Describing the Key Stage dataset component of the NPD 
The National Curriculum was established through the 1988 Education Reform Act 
and provides a standard form and content of subjects to be taught across schools for 
all pupils from the age of 5 to 16. It was in place in all maintained primary and 
secondary schools between the academic years of 1989/90 and 1996/97. The 
Curriculum divides schooling years into blocks, with each block representing a 'Key 
Stage' (KS). Curriculum comprehension is tested through national attainment 
examinations taken at the end of each Key Stage. Formal introduction to the Key 
Stages begins at the age of 5/6 (KS1) and comprises of 2 school years of instruction, 
leading to KS1 examinations at the age of 6/7. The KS2 phase of learning spans 4 
school years and final exams are sat for when pupils are aged 10/11. Until recently, 
after a further 3 academic years, which include a transfer from the primary to the 
secondary schooling phase (at around the age of 11), KS3 exams were taken at the 
age of 13/1431. At the age of 15/16 the end-of-compulsory-schooling General 
Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) exams are taken (KS4). The publication 
of school average test scores in some of the Key Stages (usually KS2 and KS4 results 
are published in the form of 'league tables' appearing in local newspapers and on the 
internet) enables the public and, in particular parents, to compare the relative 
performance of individual local schools to other schools within the local area and to 
nationally set government targets of achievement at each Key Stage. Thus school 
31 These have since been abolished with effect from October 2008, such that the last academic year in 
which they were sat for was 2006/07. They are to be replaced by classroom assessment and 
randomised testing. See http://www.telegraph.co.uldeducat ion/primaryed uc ation/3199156/S ats-for-
14-year-olds-abol ished-Teachers-and-parents-praise-dec ision.html (accessed 15 October 2008). 
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attainment details provide a means for parents to make informed choices in the 
process of applying for a school place. 
Information on test score outcomes for each pupil at the end of each KS is available 
in the NPD since the academic year 1997/98 for KS1 and KS3, 1995/96 for KS2, and 
2001/2002 for KS4. As a unique anonymous pupil identifier is included in both 
PLASC and in each of the Key Stage records of the NPD this allows for one-to-one 
matching of the files, such that background variables can be aligned with attainment 
scores. For the analytical details presented in this Chapter, the test score information 
of pupils is used to determine the exact cohort members in the sample of interest. It is 
also used to assess educational attainment before any measured move activity takes 
place, given by the averaged KS1 exam outcomes of each pupil in the specific cohort 
sample. 
1.5.3 Key Stage 1 to Key Stage 2 cohort coverage 
In this Chapter, one cohort of pupils contained within the NPD are studied as they 
move between National KS1 and KS2 exams during state primary education in 
England, where the exact form of this longitudinal sample is shown in Table 1.3. 
Table 1.3: The Structure of the KS1 to KS2 Cohort 
School year group 2 3 4 	 5 6 
Age 6/7 7/8 8/9 	 9/10 10/11 
Key Stage End of KS1 ►  • KS2 
Key Stage exam year 2002 2006 
PLASC academic year 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 	 2004/05 2005/06 
This cohort started their KS1 phase of education in the academic year 2000/2001 at 
the age of 5/6 (school year group one) and subsequently sat for their KS1 exams in 
English Reading, English Writing and Mathematics at the end of year group two, in 
the summer of 2002. Their KS2 learning phase began in the school year 2002/2003 
and covered 4 academic years of instruction, leading to KS2 examinations in 
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English, Mathematics and Science being taken in the summer of 2006. Table 1.4 
details the number of pupil-level observations for this particular cohort32. 
32 
 Note that the figures in Table 1.4 are based on pupils with a valid KS1 and KS2 entry in the NPD, 
and they are exclusive of pupils attending independent schools. Row (3) additionally restricts the 
sample to include pupils with no completely missing mobility indicators across all PLASC waves. For 
further details see Appendix 1A, Section IA.D. 
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Table 1.4: Number of Pupil-Level Observations in the KS1 to KS2 Cohort 
Status 	 Number of pupils 
In KS1, not KS2 or PLASC (1) 	 23,599 
In KS2, not KS1 or PLASC (2) 	 23,908 
In KS1 through KS2 (3) 	 552,892 
Total (4) 	 600,399 
A total of 552,892 pupils can be traced across all years of the KS1 to KS2 phases of 
education. PLASC records existing from the academic year 2001/2002 to 2005/2006 
inclusive are matched to this sample of pupils, henceforth known as the `KS1-2' 
cohort, using the anonymous pupil identifier available in all KS and PLASC files. 
Every PLASC wave contains variables that can be used to assess individual mobility 
patterns between the two Key Stages. For those cohort members appearing in the 
sample in only a single KS, their mobility patterns cannot be observed throughout the 
entire KS1-2 window. Observations on this group of pupils are dropped from the 
sample of interest (a loss of 47,507 pupils in total - rows (1) and (2) of Table 1.4 - or 
7.91 per cent of the KS1 to KS2 cohort of 600,399 pupils). 
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1.6 	 Measuring Mobility in the KS1-2 Cohort 
Three indicators are available to use in PLASC that allow for the measurement of 
pupil and residential mobility among the KS1-2 cohort. Two of these indicators can 
be applied in order to quantify school switches for individual pupils, these being the 
date at which the pupil entered the school and the unique school code. The third 
indicator, the home postcode of the pupil, enables evaluation of residential moves. 
The exact measurement approach taken in each case is dealt with here. Beginning 
with school moves, the methods are referred to as follows:- 
a. 'Date of school entry approach' — this takes academic year-on-year changes 
to the recorded date of entry into the school provided in the administrative 
data as indicative of a school change by the pupil, so that pupil mobility = 1 if 
date of school entry in year t+1 for pupil i 0 date of school entry in year t for 
pupil i 
b. 'School code change approach' — this takes changes in the recorded identifier 
for the school, the school code, from one academic year to the next as 
indicative of a pupil move, so that pupil mobility = 1 if school code in year 
t+1 for pupil i 0 school code in year t for pupil i 
Three key issues must be raised in respect of school mobility measured by both of 
these approaches. Firstly, only those school moves taking place at non-standard 
points during the Key Stage 1 to 2 phases are counted here. For this cohort, this 
means that the following moves are not counted under pupil mobility: 
• transfers from Infant School (covering the age ranges 5-7 or 5-8) to Junior 
School (age ranges 7-11 or 8-11); 
• transfers from First School (age ranges 5-7 or 5-8) to Junior School (age 
ranges 7-11 or 8-11); 
• transfers from First school (age ranges 5-8, 5-9, or 5-10) to Middle School 
(age ranges 8-11, 9-12, 10-13, or 10-14). 
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Secondly, an intention of the analysis is to isolate 'pure' school moves, in which the 
only dimension of the environment that is changing for the pupil is the school. In this 
respect the term 'pure pupil mobility' is used to refer to a non-standard change of 
school that does not involve any move of home in this analysis. Thirdly, in addition to 
pure school shifts, pupils can also make school changes that do involve moves of 
home. The unique advantage of the PLASC data source is that it allows for 
estimation of the extent of combined school and home moves. In the text the term 
`school-home moves' will be used to address those non-standard changes of school 
that occur together with a change of home. 
Turning now to the actual estimation of home moves, a count of home changes 
between the Key Stages can be made by comparison of PLASC records on pupil 
home postcode from one academic year to the next, so that: 
c. Home mobility =1 if home postcode of the pupil in year t+1 for pupil i 
home postcode of the pupil in year t for pupil i 
Though this forms the only method for measuring home mobility using PLASC, it 
does present an accurate method when consideration is made for the geographical 
proximity of postcodes: a postcode ordinarily covers at most 10 adjacent housing 
units, allowing for precision in determining residential location and changes to it 
(Gibbons and Telhaj, 2007). 
1.6.1 Counting mobility in the KS1-2 cohort 
Utilising the information contained in PLASC and the Key Stage data, the following 
Table details the cumulative number of school moves and home moves that can be 
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Table 1.5 reveals that there are a total of seven observations on the school code, as 
compared with five observations on both the date of school entry and the home 
postcode. This is a consequence of the KS data collection phase occurring at a 
different time point in the academic year relative to PLASC data collection and the 
exclusion of any administrative information on the pupil from the KS files, other 
than the code of the school attended by the pupil when taking their KS tests. Thus 
pupil mobility measured according to the school code approach can be counted for a 
maximum of six times across the sample period. This compares with a maximum 
count of four pupil moves using the date of school entry approach and likewise when 
measuring residential mobility. 
In order to establish comparable measures of school moves based on the school code 
method and the date of school entry method, all seven observations on the school 
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code cannot be fully exploited here. In fact, comparability requires that the two 
school mobility estimates and home mobility be based on the five PLASC waves 
only, given the lack of details in the KS datasets with which to derive all move 
measures. Therefore no more than four school moves and residential changes by the 
individual pupil can be observed. The under-use of the school code data may change 
in the future when the provision of tri-annual PLASC data (and in particular that 
collection taking place in May) presents the opportunity for the closer alignment of 
PLASC and KS data collection points. 
Accuracy of the mobility estimates requires that all pupils have an observation on the 
school code, the date of school entry, and the home postcode in every PLASC wave. 
That is, the amount of mobility to be derived here is to be based on a sample of 
pupils with a full set of mobility variables. Without this restriction on the sample, 
mobility that cannot be accounted for may occur amongst pupils with missing 
observations on some mobility indicators, to the extent that these details are missing 
precisely because the pupil moved. Then their inclusion in the sample would result in 
an underestimation of measured mobility, which would have a biasing impact on all 
subsequent analysis. Additionally, the sample is restricted such that information on 
the characteristics and social background of pupils are present in each year of 
PLASC,33 plus each pupil is required to have a valid outcome in each of the three 
KS1 tested subjects34. These details can be used to assess how movers of differing 
types vary by their attributes and the association between pre-move academic 
33 PLASC background variables on each pupil that are used to examine the link between mobility and 
individual characteristics are gender, ethnicity, Free School Meal Eligibility (FSME), Special Educational 
Needs (SEN) status and English as a First Language (EFL). FSME is used as a proxy measure for family 
poverty. Corrections to these variables, made to ensure their presence in each PLASC wave, are discussed 
in Appendix 1A. Section 1A.E (see in particular Table 1A.1.1). Note that EFL is included in the descriptive 
tables of this Chapter but it is excluded from regression estimation in Chapter Two. This is because EFL is 
highly correlated with the ethnicity variable, and estimation uses the latter since its richer categorisation of 
pupils is preferred. 
As noted in Appendix 1A, Section 1A.D, a pupil is deemed to have a valid KS1 test outcome if they 
achieve a recognised level of attainment in each KS1 test, or if records indicate that the pupil was eligible to 
sit for a KS1 test, but failed to do so. In the latter case the KS1 outcome is coded as missing in the sample 
for the purpose of calculating the KS1 average point score. Inspection of the data revealed that failure to 
achieve a test score outcome despite eligibility was a consequence of pupils being either 'absent' or 
`disapplied' at the time of the test. For some pupils absence or disapplication occurs across all three KS1 
subjects, such that their KS1 average points score is missing overall. These pupils are not dropped from 
descriptive Tables 1.9 to 1.12 presented in this Chapter, since their numbers are small, their records on 
background and mobility indicators are full, and the weighted average figures shown in the Tables are 
unaffected by their inclusion. However, in the regression estimation of Chapter Two these few pupils are 
dropped from the analysis, since estimation requires non-missing attainment data, and, as was stated above, 
missing details may be due to mobility. Section 1 A.F of Appendix 1A indicates the slight sample size 
differences in the numbers of pure school movers and school-home changers shown in Tables 1.9 to 1.12 
when pupils without a KS1 average point score are excluded. 
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attainment and the form of move made, analysis that is included both in the 
descriptive work of this Chapter and in the further statistical evaluation undertaken in 
Chapter Two. A complete set of background data and valid KS1 outcomes for each 
pupil is required so as to minimise the likelihood of missing details being correlated 
with moving behaviour. 
For the KS1-2 cohort of 552,892 pupils, a total of 539,387 pupils have a full set of 
observations on mobility indicators only, as shown in Table 1.6 below. Therefore 
13,505 pupil observations drop out in the process of merging the PLASC data to the 
KS1-2 cohort and in defining a sample size containing a full set of mobility 
indicators based on the original contents of the PLASC files. 
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Table 1.6: Defining a Full Sample: Associated Sample Size Changes in the 
KS1-2 Cohort 
Sample type Number of pupils 
Sample change 
(number of pupils) 
ICS1-2 cohort (1) 552,892 
Initial full sample (2) 539,387 -13,505 
Imputations (3) 4,515 
Full sample A (4) 543,902 +4,515 
Missing pupil characteristics (5) 21,462 
Full sample B (6) 522,440 -21,462 
Total sample change (7) -30,452 
Notes: In rows (2) and (4) the 'full' sample is defined as that where the KS1-2 cohort member has an 
observation on their school code, date of school entry, and home postcode in every PLASC wave. The 
initial full sample uses the original number of observations on these indicators, prior to any 
imputations or corrections. Full sample A indicates the number of additional pupil observations that 
are obtained following imputations. Only the imputations made (not the corrections) affect the size of 
full sample A. Row (6) additionally conditions pupils to have observations on their gender, ethnicity, 
EFL, FSME, and SEN in all five PLASC waves, plus a valid outcome in each KS1 test (averaged KS1 
performance is used to indicate pupil attainment in the period prior to measured moves). 
Some imputations are made to the mobility variables and row (4) of the Table shows 
how this initial full set is altered following the imputations procedure, which 
increases the sample size by 0.84 per cent. Necessary imputations to make were 
established through data inspection and involved replacing a missing pupil-level 
observation on the school code, the date of school entry, or the home postcode with 
that from the next PLASC wave when data entries in adjacent years to the missing 
year were the same. 
Aside from imputations, corrections are also made, though these only apply to the 
mobility indicator of the home postcode of the pupil. Corrections required were also 
identified through visual inspection of the data. A pupil's postcode was replaced by 
the next most adjacent one where this was the same as in other years except for the 
year(s) to be corrected. This technique was applied in the following cases: (i) where 
the first and last characters of the home postcode differed in some years from others 
(while all other postcode characters were the same) (ii) where the postcode increased 
in length by one character in some years (also with all other characters unchanged). 
Other corrections made required the use of Royal Mail postcode data to adjust for 
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cases where the Royal Mail had implemented postcode changes. Both imputations 
and corrections were carried out through a process of writing executable programme 
commands in the software package utilised for data analysis throughout this thesis 
(`Stata', version 10, Special Edition). 
In addition to the mobility variables, inconsistent data on pupil characteristics can 
also be imputed using information from other years in which a consistent pattern is 
followed and therefore the pupil-level observation can be retained within the sample. 
This process was required and undertaken for only two pupil attributes, these being 
the ethnicity variable and English as a First Language, or EFL. After completing all 
possible imputations to pupil characteristics, both remaining non-correctable 
inconsistencies and missing data on attributes reduce the full sample size further, 
leaving a total of 522,440 pupils with details on mobility measures, pupil background 
factors and valid prior attainment outcomes across 2001/02 to 2005/00. This 
represents a total sample loss from the original KS1-2 cohort of 30,452 pupils (as 
shown in rows (6) and (7) of Table 1.6 respectively), equivalent to 5.51 per cent of 
this cohort. 
35 Appendix 1A, Section 1A.E contains detailed information on: (i) imputations and corrections that 
are made to the mobility indicators; (ii) imputations that are made to characteristics (ethnicity and 
EFL); (iii) observations that are dropped because the pupil has no records on their ethnicity, FSME, or 
SEN status in all 5 PLASC waves; and (iv) observations that are dropped due to inconsistencies on 
characteristics that should remain unchanged over time (gender, ethnicity and EFL). Note that no 
imputations or corrections are made to KS! or KS2 test outcomes. 
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1.7 Estimating School Moves and Home Moves 
It was noted in Section 1.2 that a general definition of school moves is given by those 
occurring when a child enters or exits a school at a non-standard time point, whether 
or not each school change involves a move of home (Dobson and Henthome, 1999). 
However, Sections 1.3 and 1.4 highlighted that such a composite indicator of 
mobility may be inadequate when consideration is made for both recent advances in 
government education policy and oversubscription rules applying in LEA-governed 
state schools, both of which suggest the importance of distinguishing between mover 
types. The aim of this empirical Section is to separate out and measure the amount of 
`pure' pupil mobility versus 'school-home moves' made by the KS1-2 cohort of 
pupils in the NPD, as well as to discuss the implications of these results. 
1.7.1 Composite measures of pupil mobility 
In Table 1.7, two composite measures of pupil mobility in the KS1-2 cohort are 
estimated. These both conform to the general definition of pupil mobility referred to 
above. The purpose of estimating school moves by this method is to facilitate 
comparison of the findings with those gained under definitions that allow for 
separation of mobility forms. 
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Table 1.7 shows the number of pupils making one or more change of state school 
attended (that may also involve a move of home) as they transit across the school 
years of the KS1-2 phase of education. Composite measures of pupil mobility are 
presented that do (columns 1 and 5) and do not (columns 3 and 7) include those 
compulsory school moves that pupils have to make as part of their schooling process. 
These measures are estimated utilising both the date of school entry method 
(columns 1 to 4) and the school code approach (columns 5 to 8), as described in 
Section 1.6. In comparing figures attained under the inclusion of all school moves 
against those concerned with non-standard changes, it can be seen that most 
compulsory school moves take place between school years 2 and 3 (when pupils are 
aged 6/7 and 7/8 respectively). The majority of these necessary school moves include 
transfers from Infant to Junior school, yet they also comprise of changes from First 
School to Junior school and First school to Middle school (see Section 1.6). 
In order to establish a set of non-standard school changes, two techniques are applied 
to the dataset so as to determine and net out required transfers. Firstly, the postcode 
of each school attended by the pupil is matched to the data on an annual basis (via 
the unique school code), using records on educational establishments as contained in 
the DCSF-provided `Edubase' dataset. Where the postcode of the school attended by 
the pupil remains the same between one academic year and the next, but the recorded 
date of school entry or the school code changes over the same years for that pupil 
(depending on the approach used to measure composite pupil mobility), this is taken 
as an indication of a compulsory school shift. The assumption here is that if the 
schools are on the same site (as is often the case with Infant and Junior schools, for 
example), then the school move represents an expected change. Secondly, 
compulsory school changes are removed by assessing the mobility measure itself at 
the school level. Where all the pupils attending a certain school in one year move out 
of that school in the following year, this is considered to be a necessary school move. 
Extracting evidence on all required school changes from the measures reduces the 
total amount of composite pupil mobility from 221,686 to 86,073 pupil observations 
under the date of school entry approach, and from 216,801 to 86,620 pupil 
observations with the school code method. Out of the full sample of 522,440 pupils, 
around 16.5 per cent make non-standard school moves, and this is true by both the 
date of school entry and the school code methods for estimating composite school 
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change. In fact, Table 1.7 reveals a striking similarity between school mover 
estimates pertaining to the two different approaches. This finding gives confidence in 
both the estimation procedure and the accuracy of the data, and suggests a robustness 
of the results to differing ways of measuring pupil moves of school. It is worthwhile 
to point out at this stage that only those school move estimates derived under the date 
of school entry method will be taken forward from here on. This will allow analytical 
reporting to be more concise and based around a very slightly more conservative 
estimate of mobility. 
Across all year group transitions, school (and possibly home) moves are most 
prevalent between school years 2 and 3, at 4.43 per cent of the full sample, even after 
correcting for compulsory transfers (column 4). Apart from this transition period, 
composite mobility is also high between school years 3 - 4 (3.87 per cent), 4 - 5 (3.36 
per cent) and 5 - 6 (2.43 per cent). In terms of the number of school moves each 
individual pupil makes, the composite measure shows that it is most common for 
pupils to change schools just once, with single school moves representing a total of 
14.08 per cent of the full sample. As the move count rises, the number of pupils 
making multiple moves falls. Between 0.25 per cent and 0.49 per cent of pupils make 
two school moves in the full sample (two school moves account for 2.09 per cent of 
the full sample overall), and the percentage of pupils making three school moves is at 
most 0.08 per cent of the full cohort sample (with three school moves making up 
0.28 per cent of the full sample overall), where the latter pupils move between school 
years 2 - 3; 3 - 4 and 4 - 5 (ages 6/7 to 9/10). Only 138 pupils (0.03 per cent of the 
full sample overall) change aspects of their environment across every year group 
transition between KS1 and KS2. In terms of school move sequences, most multiple 
moves involve schooling interruptions that are made continuously, with only 0.25 per 
cent of the full sample making moves that include a gap of 2 school years (those in 
the transition category 2 - 3; 5 - 6). 
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1.7.2 Estimating 'pure pupil mobility' and 'school-home moves' 
Table 1.8 presents the first step in analysis aimed at rooting out differences in school 
move estimates according to whether or not separation of mover types is accounted 
for. Here 'pure pupil mobility' is compared with 'school-home moves', both defined 
in Section 1.6. In all cases school moves are determined under the date of school 















































































rn 	 CD 
 CA 
en ,..., 
	 (.1 CD In Tr CT In 	 .1- cq 
 ".., 00 In 71
- 
 on ".., -
-4 
-. CA 
CT (NI 00 4:D 00 In , 
,.../ •""4 to VD 1-1 .. CA 
	 ,,,•• 
0 
 CT ON CT C) 7r
. ' CT - 'rq 
	 T4 	
,•471:. CTI: 
(-4 ,-.1 	 1n1 	 ,-1 N EN  	 (NI ,, 	 Cl 
VD 00 Lc) CA 7r Oh on 71- v.) vn to 00 ru c) un Tr 
r- CA CD CD CD 	 CD 	 Cl CD 	 CA vl 
Csi CS 6 6 o 6 CD CS CA CD CD CS (Ni CS 
	 try  
4 71- 	 71. 	 ru 
	
in — oo o 
	 00 
71- -






(f) Ch CD CD CD CT CD 7t CT In C) 7r 00 (fl VD r0 
C C. C C 	 C. C. C VD D D C WI D 	 00 
A C C D 
 
CD CD C) 0 6 0 e5 6 -4 u: 











 cu .-4 u,,,I. . 
00
0 D  , 
r







(.1 	 (..,1 	 ,_, , 






tiY 	 o 





I' 	 kr.) t'r.;' 	 Lk"; `f 	 '64 
en en en en Tr Tr un 
	 Tr Tr un 	 un 	 1;  
er.) r.f5. 	 e.f;' 	 e•f5. 1. 	 19 
("1 	 (.4 (4 (4 (4 (.4 (.4 en rn egl on Tr Tr (re E-1  
A consistent pattern emerging from these results is one in which there is a dominance 
of conjunctional school-home moves over and above pure pupil mobility across all 
year group transitions featuring mobility and irrespective of the number of school 
moves made. At the aggregate level, school changes that include residential change 
are more than 1.5 times higher among this KS1-2 cohort compared with school 
moves only: 10.4 per cent of the full sample engage in school-home moves (column 
4), while 6.8 per cent make isolated school changes (column 2). In line with the 
findings of the composite pupil mobility measure shown in Table 1.7 (columns 3 and 
4), changers tend to make at most one school or school-home move, while pupil 
numbers are decreasing in the number of any kind of moves made. However, 
whereas school moves under the composite estimates of Table 1.7 were found to be 
higher during the transition between school years 2 - 3, here this holds true more for 
pupils making school moves only. For those making school-home moves once 
between school years 2 - 3, years 3 - 4, and years 4 - 5, their percentages of the full 
sample are quite similar, at 2.76 per cent, 2.56 per cent and 2.12 per cent 
respectively. 
The 'new' composite measure reported in Table 1.8, column (5) does not appear, at 
first glance, to be comparable with that appearing earlier in Table 1.7, column (3) 
(the 'old' composite measure), and this is actually the case. The new composite 
version is the sum of pure pupil mobility (column 1) and school-home moves 
(column 3). Estimation of the old composite measure is based on the general pupil 
mobility definition identified in the literature. This old version does not distinguish 
between school movers of different types, whereas the new measure enforces this 
distinction. This is exactly where the reason for the discrepancy between the two 
estimates lies. Taking, for example, a pupil included in the mover category '2 - 3; 5 -
6', under the old composite measure no details are known about whether each of 
these moves are pure school moves, school-home moves, or one of each. Defining 
mover types separately, it may be established that the '2 - 3' portion of this move 
represents pure pupil mobility, while the '5 - 6' segment is a school-home move. 
Then mover type separation would result in a re-classification of the school moves of 
this pupil, such that their multiple move status is recorded once under the pure pupil 
mobility column (1) and again under the school-move column (3), but these counts 
on the pupil would be tabulated in different rows (`2 - 3' on the one hand, versus '5 -
6' on the other). So mover type separation enables multiple moves to be accounted 
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for, but a composite sum total of the different types of moves is counterintuitive 
because there is a double-counting of pupils who make multiple moves of differing 
dimensions. The difference between the total number of school movers under the old 
and new composite measure reflects this. What this implies is that there is an 
inaccuracy in the count of pupils categorised as making multiple moves according to 
the old composite measure precisely because an individual pupil may not always 
make school moves of one particular type. However, this information is lost in the 
grouping together of mobile pupils as is done under the general definition of pupil 
mobility, suggesting that estimation based on a separation of mover types is much 
more informative in the case where a pupil changes schools more than once and 
under multiple move dimensions. 
The findings shown in Table 1.8 bring to the fore an important area of concern that 
might be raised with regard to the current analysis, and that warrants further 
discussion at this stage. The issue of whether evidence of the operation of a choice 
system can be gleaned from data on pupils in schools is a significant one. More 
specifically, it could be argued that choice policies are exploited by households 
immediately upon their children formally entering compulsory education, or 
otherwise it could be suggested that choice is not exploited at all by parents. In the 
former scenario parents might have chosen a school for their child to attend that can 
be accessed from the current home location, such that right from the start of their 
schooling entry a pupil is at their preferred school. In the latter scenario, choice 
policies, which are designed to allow attendance at a preferred school conditional on 
where a child lives, might not be considered to be operating to their full effectiveness 
by parents. Then some households may prefer to engage in residential mobility, and 
to strategically select their home location in order to ensure that their child is better 
able to secure entry to a favoured school based in part on home proximity to the 
institution. In each of these cases, data on pre-school entry home moves and final 
home location in relation to the school the pupil initially enters could offer more 
insights into considering when the choice system is used and if it exists. 
Evidence from the Population Censuses of 1991 and 2001 suggests that, of all 
children aged 1-15, the most residentially migrant group were those in the age range 
1-4 (accounting for 42.03 per cent and 36.37 per cent of all migration activity among 
children aged 1-15 in 1991 and 2001 respectively; see Appendix 1A, Section 1A.A). 
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The prevalence of home moves when children are young indicated by this data 
implies that strategic schooling-related residential locations are being sought by 
parents, if residential change correlates highly with primary schooling preferences. In 
turn, this evidence suggests that the choice system is hardly utilised. Under both of 
the scenarios depicted above, and given the evidence from Census data, a priori one 
might expect to find little evidence of mobility of any form in data on a cohort of 
school-age pupils, as is assessed here. However, the results of Table 1.8 indicate 
otherwise, revealing a non-trivial amount of pure school change taking place in the 
primary school stage, of almost 7 per cent of the full sample. Thus, while it is likely 
to be the case that pre-compulsory school age mobility is an important omission from 
the in-school cohort dataset utilised here, it appears a valid and valuable exercise to 
consider the potential exploitation of choice policies by pupils in the schooling 
system36. Some degree of pure school moves may well reflect the use of choice and 
the search for better-quality schooling from the current home location relative to that 
which was secured from the outset of entry into formal education. More stringent 
testing of the link between pure pupil mobility and the choice system forms a key 
area of analysis that is presented in Section 1.9, when evaluation looks at the extent 
of entry into oversubscribed schools by pure school changers. 
36 The lack of information on the home location(s) of a pupil before they begin compulsory schooling 
is a shortfall of the evaluation that is discussed in further detail in Chapter Two, Section 2.7 
(`Limitations of the Analysis'). 
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1.8 Mobility and Pupil Characteristics 
A significant advantage of using the NPD to distinguish between school movers 
varying in the type of move made is that the additional statistics this source provides 
on pupil-level attributes enable examination of whether pure school movers and 
school-home movers differ by their pre-move background. In addition, the 
longitudinal nature of the NPD is such that it allows for variation in the early 
academic attainment of the two mobile pupil groups to be assessed. More 
specifically, Table 1.3 indicated that at the start of the sample period, and prior to 
measurable moves taking place, pupils complete their KS1 exams, outcomes that 
may influence subsequent measured move activity and the type of move made, and 
therefore may provide important further content. Given the tendency for studies 
assessing pupil changes of school to pool together movers of all forms, evidence on 
the pre-move characteristics and academic performance of school movers, like the 
school mobility measure itself, is affected by imprecision in the mover definition37. 
Thus exploration of the attribute and attainment differences between the distinct 
mover types represents a natural extension to the analysis presented so far that serves 
to add value to the understanding of the nature of school change. 
In Tables 1.9 to 1.12 shown below details on five pupil-level characteristics 
contained within every PLASC wave are presented for pure school changers versus 
school-home movers; these being gender, EFL, ethnicity, FSM eligibility and SEN 
status38. In terms of prior attainment, KS1 points scores averaged across the three 
KS1 exams in reading, writing and mathematics are also illustrated in these Tables 
for the two mover groups39. Only those pupils moving no more than twice are 
considered throughout, since it is evident from Table 1.8 that few pupils make 
multiple moves exceeding this amount (just 0.01 per cent of the KS1-2 sample 
engage in more than two school only moves, while 0.19 per cent of the full sample 
37 See the literature discussion of Section 1.2. 
38 Unless otherwise stated, the pre-move period percentages of pupils with a certain attribute by the 
mover type are reported (see the notes to each of Tables 1.9 to 1.12). 
39 Table I A.6 of Appendix 1A details the KS1 levels-to-points scores conversion system that is used 
to convert KS I levels given in the raw data of the NPD into workable figures that can be compared 
across different Key Stages. As stated previously, the characteristics of pupils without a KS1 average 
attainment record are included in the descriptive tables of this Chapter, but these pupils are excluded 
from the sample used in the regression analysis of Chapter Two. Table 1A.12 of this Appendix shows 
how the numbers of pupils moving school only or school-home changes when pupils with missing 
KS1 average points scores are excluded, where these very minor sample size adjustments are 
indicated for pupils moving once or twice. 
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make in excess of two school-home moves overall). 'Pure pupil mobility' and 
`school-home moves' shown in Tables 1.9 to 1.12 are the same as those given in 
Table 1.8; therefore they are based on the date of school entry approach to measuring 
mobility and they exclude compulsory school moves of the type discussed in Section 
1.6. 
To begin with, Table 1.9 considers the unchanging attributes of pupils by the mover 
type, plus their KS1 average attainment, for pupils moving at most once40. What 
stands out here is that boys are more likely to move school only than to change both 
the school and home aspects of their environment: the difference in the weighted 
average between the two mover groups is highest for the characteristic of male 
gender, at 2.06 percentage points (column 3). Pupils with English as their first 
language also tend to make pure school changes more than school-home moves 
across each transition period. Interestingly, the ethnic categories of other white, 
Asian and black feature fewer school only movers relative to school-home movers, 
as indicated by the negative difference in the weighted average for these categories 
of pupils (at -0.30, -0.82 and -0.17 percentage points respectively — see columns 5 to 
7). In comparison, pupils of white ethnicity are the most likely group to change only 
their school, findings that suggest the prevalence of school-home moves among 
ethnic minorities. 
Turning to the pre-move academic attainment of the separate mover types, a slightly 
weaker KS1 Average Points Score (APS) is evident for one-time pure school movers 
relative to those pupils changing school and home once, at 14.58 versus 14.78 points 
respectively. Two important issues regarding this achievement measure are worthy of 
mention here. The first is the extent to which this indicator does capture pre-move 
academic attainment. In the sample frame under analysis, the initial window over 
which pupil moves can be gauged is between January 2002 and January 2003, these 
being the data collection times for the first two waves of PLASC. Amid these two 
points KS1 exams are taken, in the summer of 2002, so that there is a gap between 
the first PLASC wave and the time at which KS1 exams are sat for of some six to 
seven months (January 2002 to around July 2002; see Tables 1.3 and 1.5). As the 
4° The characteristics of EFL, gender and ethnicity should be unchanging over time, but examination 
of the data revealed there to be inconsistencies in these records year-on-year. Where possible these 
were corrected for, or otherwise the pupil was dropped from the sample. Further details of the sample 
changes concerning these indicators are given in Appendix 1A, Section 1 A.E. 
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exact timing of any move made is not obtainable from PLASC information, pre-KS1 
exams moves that cannot be accounted for may have taken place during this period, 
calling into question the pre-move status of this measure. This may only be a slight 
issue within the sample window, but one that is amplified when consideration is 
made for potential immeasurable moves happening before the entire sample period. 
As Table 1.1 showed, changes of school are high between year groups 1 and 2 (when 
the age range of pupils is 5/6 to 6/7), implying that mobility prior to the KS1 exam 
age of 6/7 represents an important omission in detail within the current KS1-2 cohort 
dataset41. The restrictions placed on the analysis of mobility by the lack of 
information on pre-school age moves in the dataset utilised here is an area that is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Two (see Section 2.7). 
The second issue arising in the use of average KS1 outcomes as a measure of prior 
achievement concerns the degree to which this indicator does reflect actual academic 
attainment, rather than some unobservable pupil or family background 
characteristics. It could be, for example, that KS1 performance captures an 
unobserved element of family behaviour such as parental interest in schooling, a 
factor that may influence attainment and the propensity for the family to move in 
order to seek out better schooling. In this case the KS1 APS will incorporate this 
unobservable and (in the utilised dataset) unmeasured family attribute that 
determines both attainment itself and the move likelihood, making it an 
`endogenous' variable. Then, if evidence of attainment differences along the KS1 
dimension for the separate mover types is found, this cannot be deemed to be 
depicting real variations in prior academic performance between the two mobile 
groups. 
As pupil-level KS1 outcomes provide the only indicator of pre-move attainment in 
the dataset utilised here, no cross-checks or replacements with other variables can be 
carried out in order to establish the accuracy of this measure. Despite the potential 
flaws in this statistic, assessment of differences in pupil prior performance by the 
mover group seems valuable, given the lack of empirical evidence on their relative 
records of attainment presented in the literature on mobility to date. Therefore it 
41 See also the child migration statistics from the 1991 and 2001 Population Censuses, presented in 
Section 1A.A of Appendix 1A, which indicate a high amount of residential moves between the pre-
compulsory schooling ages of 1-4. 
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serves best to emphasise the need to exercise caution in the interpretation of findings 
that concern the prior academic performance of the separate mover groups. 
The penultimate row of the Table illustrates the characteristics of non-movers, that 
is, those pupils who change no aspect of their geographical environment throughout 
the entire sample period. Overall there are no discernable attributes that are unique to 
this stable group of pupils over and above movers, other than the percentage of 
pupils of unknown ethnic origin, which, at 1.69 per cent, is higher in comparison to 
both pure school changers (0.75 weighted average per cent) and school-home movers 
(0.57 per cent on average). In general, non-movers display characteristics and a prior 
attainment score that more closely resembles the school-home movers group, apart 
from in the black and unknown ethnic categories. The attributes and pre-move 
attainment of the full sample of pupils, shown in the last row of Table 1.9, are similar 
to those of the stable set of pupils. Hence, as was the case for stayers versus movers, 
there are no distinct differences in characteristics between the entire sample and 
movers, aside from in the 'unknown' ethnicity category, for which there is a higher 
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Table 1.10 addresses fixed characteristics for multiple movers who change their 
school or school-home twice. Again there is evidence of higher pure pupil mobility 
relative to school-home moves for boys. Here the difference in the weighted average 
between the mover types, of 3.37 percentage points, is greater than was the case for 
pupils changing school versus school and home once. As for one-time movers, pupils 
with EFL tend to engage in multiple changes of school only, as opposed to multiple 
moves of schooling and residence. Noteworthy findings on ethnicity are that pupils 
moving twice and of white race are less likely to move school only than to change 
their school and home (the percentage point difference between the two mover types 
is -0.76 as shown in column 4), while pupils of an Asian background are more likely 
to engage in multiple changes of school only rather than school and home shifts. 
These results are in direct contrast to those for pupils moving once. This is 
particularly true for the Asian ethnic group, for whom there is a complete reversal of 
the dominant mobility type away from a slightly higher likelihood of their making a 
one-time school-home move and towards a much greater likelihood of pure pupil 
mobility among multiple movers of this ethnic origin. The weighted average 
percentage of Asian school only changers moving twice is 5.83 per cent of the 
overall sample of two-time pure school movers (panel A, column 6). This compares 
with a school-home movers weighted mean of 3.81 per cent (panel B, column 6), a 
positive difference in the weighted averages of some 2.02 percentage points. The 
final column of Table 1.10 shows that there is not a great deal of difference in the 
KS1 APS of two-time school only versus school-home changers, with prior 
attainment figures standing at 13.87 and 13.74 points respectively. These 
performance scores are lower than for those moving once, where the KS1 attainment 
of school only changers was 14.58 points compared to 14.78 points among school-
home switchers (see column (10) of Table 1.9). However, that pupils moving twice 
and changing only their school have a slightly higher previous attainment record than 
multiple switchers of school and home is a reverse finding to the case for one-time 
movers. 
Both the full sample of pupils and the group of students moving neither school nor 
home (nor both) across KS1-2 vary from those making multiple moves mostly by 
their ethnicity and KS1 attainment. Focusing on stayers relative to multiple movers, 
the stable group consists of a lower percentage of pupils of white ethnic origin (83.44 
per cent) compared to school changers and school-home movers who move twice 
72 
(their weighted averages are 86.83 per cent and 87.59 per cent - see column 4). 
Instead Asian pupils and those of unknown ethnicity feature more in the group of 
non-movers than among multiple movers, especially relative to school-home 
switchers moving twice. The weighted average percentages of multiple school-home 
movers of Asian and unknown ethnic origin are 3.81 per cent and 0.06 per cent in 
each case, compared with 6.83 per cent and 1.69 per cent shares in the stable set of 
pupils. In terms of previous attainment, the stable group fares better at KS1 than 
mobile pupils, achieving an average points score of 15.67, which is some 1.8 to 1.93 
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Further statistics on the characteristics of mobile pupils are shown in Tables 1.11 and 
1.12, where again the focus is on pupils moving either once or twice. Two specific 
attributes are assessed here — FSME and SEN status — with the key distinction 
between these features and those considered previously being their capacity to 
change through time and in a way that may be related to the form of move made. For 
the one-mover category (Table 1.11) it is clear that pupils eligible for FSM 
throughout the transition period are marginally more likely to move school only than 
both school and residential setting. The percentage point difference in the weighted 
average between the two mover types is estimated at a positive 0.68. However, this is 
slight in comparison to the situation for non-FSM eligible pupils. In this case the 
weighted average difference between those undertaking isolated school moves 
relative to school and home transfers is a much higher 4.43 percentage points, 












































































































 VD „r ch (:). 
	 ,--1 ul 	 un 
--1 e5 e5 06 ci 























































 rI Oe 	 c7,  
Ch VI VD CV .1D 	 „ 

























N CD ,--i VD Cc) cv N VI VD 00 


















CA .--4 In 0 7-1 	 1,-• 
in VD VD VD un 	 en 







E' 	 ;-4 r..% 
e 
nir:i g:, 	 '8 :Pi 
4 4 ri e5 re: 











V1 	 V0 ,-4 D ,ct 7t 	 cz 
N 0..0 vi N  
VD VD VD nCD VZ 	 ,  
IT) r- 
4 
&- w 7_, 
uo 
gi. 7.). h t..tz. A 
00 e5 	 '.0 r4 
---n cl 'Cl cq CA 
z 
e W4 '-‘, -, 
un 
aN, s 8 r7,-.. Fir; 	 ,in  























) CV 0 'I' 'I' en II 	 IiI el 00 (::. 













( 5  )
 VD ,..1 ,-1 '-' N 	 -T itn 7t VD Ch 1..4 	 Cq 
00 00 0'. 2 






















)  0\ N 0\ CD N N CA CD 7r VD 






















Ch Ccl N VI 71" 	 \4::' 
	
00 Ch VD 't 1,q 	 0 

















CA Ch N cfl lin 
VD VD ,--i.  -4. c:,  
-. e5 ,-.. e5 r4 
N N N N N 
...4 
2 	 c,),-,  
can ..-, 
e w., 
CD 0. 7r -7r ri 	 en 
oo .c r- 71-. 4:‘,. 	 r 
In '.0 Ir.- n.0 	 4 











oo -4. eD rl un 
o ir) 	 ul en en 
• • 	 • 	 • CT C:71 Ch 0\ 0 \ 
	







Q 	 ,--, (-1 
can `..." 
wo  
wn N 00 CD N 
r- O.  6. cg v 	 7:' 
• • 	 . 	 . 	 .e,  
0\ 00 N N 00 	 =, 
Il 	 1-1 	 .--f 	 1
- 
.1 	 1.0 



































)  '1- ,--4 CA 	 CD -7r r- oo g; ct, 71-., cf.) 0., --(5 cy, 
 
-I- cli -' 06 '45:  














































































































ul m  
g JL 
= E." U o  -- cr • 
-0 0 _- 
= 
CD r





















Z b2  0. 
o 
41, 
O eq 75 
g 
Z u LT4 




2 0 -0 
o o 




CL. ci3 3 th a, 
0 000  
>' enst4 a)  
{ aci ."" a.) u ch 
rtz.".1 ce4 .s(1) 0 CI' )-7t1. 0 
Cti 	 csi 
o cs" 
Z 	 0 
In columns (4) and (5) of Table 1.11 crude findings on mobility and income changes 
are presented. Entitlement to FSM is determined by a means-testing process and 
requires household receipt of certain state-provided benefits, so that the indicator 
provides a proxy measure for low family income42. Pupils entering into FSME will 
have experienced negative household income changes that alter their entitlement 
circumstances, and those exiting from eligibility will have seen income rises among 
household members. Column 4 of the Table indicates that pupils who become 
eligible for FSM are less likely to move school only than they are to move school 
and home, but this pattern of behaviour is much more pronounced for pupils exiting 
from FSME. The difference in the weighted average between school changers versus 
school and home movers is -1.86 percentage points amid pupils that become eligible 
for FSM during the move period, as compared with a much greater -3.24 percentage 
point difference for pupils who come out of FSM entitlement. This suggests that 
income gains are associated more with school and home moves than are drops in 
income. However no inferences can be made about the direction of the link between 
mobility and proxy income changes from these findings without highly detailed data 
on their timing and circumstances, alongside evidence on other factors influencing 
these components. Additionally, the percentages of pupils moving school or school-
home and entering into or exiting from FSME are low in general. The majority of 
pupils in this KS1-2 cohort are not entitled to FSM throughout the move period 
(between 70.43 and 71.62 per cent of pupils moving school only, and in the range of 
65.80 to 67.74 per cent of school-home changers, as shown in column 3 of the 
Table), while about 20 per cent of pupils are entitled to FSM across the move 
duration. Therefore it appears that pupils from a more advantaged background make 
school only moves and for low income households school and home moves are 
almost as typical a mobility form as pure school changes. 
Turning to SEN status, pupils with SEN are much more likely to engage in one-time 
school only changes than they are to move their school and home. The opposite is 
true for those without SEN, where across all move transitions such pupils are more 
likely to make school and home changes than isolated school moves. Again the 
directional flow of any relationship between SEN status and mobility cannot be 
established from these findings. It could be that a pupil with SEN changes their 
42 For further details see Appendix IA, Section 1A.G. For a discussion of the validity of the FSME 
indicator as a proxy measure of family economic disadvantage see Chapter Two, Section 2.7. 
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school in order to find one with provisions for learning difficulties that better match 
their needs, or otherwise assessment of a new entrant to a school might result in that 
pupil being classified as having SEN. Instead for non-SEN pupils, their greater 
amount of mobility involving school and home change may reflect less of an 
immediate need to harmonise pupil learning capabilities with the school context. An 
important point to note is that SEN status is not independent of the school attended 
and in fact schools are responsible for identifying and categorising pupils in relation 
to this (McNally, 2009). However, diagnosis itself likely reflects learning difficulties 
that existed prior to formalised schooling, rather than classification as a consequence 
of poor learning in school, especially where SEN categorisation occurs when the 
pupil is very young. To comment briefly on the final two columns of the Table, 
pupils entering into (column 8) or exiting from (column 9) SEN during the move 
period illustrate similar patterns of moves as for pupils with (column 6) and without 
(column 7) SEN throughout the transition stage. However, the percentage point 
differences in the weighted averages between the two mover types are lower here, 
particularly for pupils entering into SEN (0.31 percentage points compared with 5.85 
percentage points for pupils with SEN across all 5 waves of PLASC). 
Among the sample of non-movers a much lower percentage of pupils are eligible for 
FSM and, by symmetry, a higher percentage of pupils are non-FSME than is the case 
for mobile pupils of either form who move once. About 9 per cent of the stable group 
are FSME compared with an average of between 18.67 and 19.35 per cent of movers, 
while 78.76 per cent of non-movers are not entitled to FSME relative to between 
66.62 and 71.05 per cent of school-home or school only changers on average. The 
same situation holds for SEN and non-SEN immobile pupils relative to the mobile 
ones, though here the differences between movers and stayers are less marked; 12.13 
per cent of the stable group are classified as having SEN (compared to between 15.39 
and 21.24 per cent of movers), while 68.56 per cent of non-movers do not have 
recognised learning difficulties (relative to between 63.35 and 67.42 per cent of 
movers). Meanwhile, the percentages of stable pupils entering into or exiting from 
FSME lie between the weighted average percentages of pure school changers and 
school-home switchers moving once (4.68 per cent become entitled to FSM and 7.20 
per cent leave FSME among stayers, compared with weighted average percentages of 
3.67 to 5.54 among pure school changers entering into FSME and between 5.93 and 
9.17 per cent for one-time movers exiting from FSME). In terms of SEN, non- 
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movers feature a higher percentage of pupils entering into and a lower percentage of 
pupils exiting from educational needs than does the movers group in any transition 
category. 
Points of comparison can also be made between the attributes of the full sample of 
pupils and the movers group. Table 1.11 indicates higher percentages of pupils 
entering into or exiting from FSME in the full sample, at 6.18 per cent and 9.28 per 
cent respectively (relative to maximum weighted averages of 5.54 per cent and 9.17 
per cent respectively among one-time movers, as was mentioned above). In terms of 
pupils without SEN, at 65.77 per cent the full sample percentage sits between the 
weighted average of pure school changers (63.35 per cent) and school-home movers 
(67.42 per cent). Among those exiting from SEN, the full sample features a slightly 
higher percentage relative to school only movers (10.84 per cent versus a weighted 
average percentage of 10.59), while school and home movers are most likely to 
switch to non-SEN status (their weighted average is 12.68 per cent). In respect of the 
percentages of pupils who are and are not eligible for FSM, the percentage with 
SEN, and the percentage entering into SEN, the characteristics of the full sample of 
pupils are similar to those of non-movers. Therefore, for these attributes, the above 
comments made in reference to the immobile group relative to the movers group 
apply equally if percentages in the full sample and in the set of one-time movers are 
instead compared. 
Table 1.12 provides descriptive details on the FSME and SEN status of pupils 
moving twice. Similarities in time-varying attributes and move patterns between one-
time movers and multiple movers are evident here. First of all, as for pupils moving 
once, those engaging in two school or school-home switches and entering into or 
exiting from FSME during the move periods are less likely to move school only. The 
percentage point difference in the weighted average between school changers versus 
school-home movers is -6.38 for those multiple movers becoming eligible for FSM, 
as compared with a larger negative difference of -8.16 percentage points for pupils 
experiencing household income gains and exiting from FSME. Additionally, pupils 
with SEN-status who move twice are, like pupils moving once, more likely to 
undertake school only moves than school and home changes. The converse scenario 
is true for the non-SEN group of multiple movers, who, as for isolated changers, are 
less likely to change school only than they are to engage in school-home mobility. 
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Certain aspects of the characteristics of pupils moving twice stand out against those 
making one-off changes. Most noticeable is the very high tendency for pupils who 
are not entitled to FSM throughout the move periods to make multiple moves of 
school only rather than school and home. The percentage point difference in the 
weighted average between the mover types is 15.09 here, compared with a 4.43 
percentage point difference for pupils who are mobile once during the sample 
window. In contrast to both non-FSME pupils moving twice and FSME pupils 
moving once, there is evidence that pupils entitled to free school meals are 
marginally more likely to make multiple school-home transfers (column 2). As was 
the case for one-time movers, this suggests that pupils from better-off backgrounds 
comprise multiple pure school changers, whilst income-disadvantaged pupils are 
almost as likely to make multiple school-home moves as they are to engage in two 
school changes. The remaining point of comparison between the findings of Tables 
1.11 and 1.12 is that pupils entering into SEN and moving twice are less likely to 
change their school only than they are to move school and home. This is indicated by 
the negative sign on the percentage point difference in the weighted average between 
the two multiple mover groups (-0.83 percentage points, see column 8 of Table 1.12), 





































































































-. .1. 00 vD kin --0 00 M N -. m 00 -1 ,4: 














































on 00 N 00 on N VD 	 00 
	
.I- o N VD VD un 00 	 ,* 
oc; on 
	




























vl vn v::. -. -. CN on 
O\ O\ ,--4 VD 00 00 1.-1 

















,..-4 00 C) VI Cr on VD 	 on 
vD CA on on N ..1- CN 	 00 








.... 	 .--.. c '''' 
= Fti E: 
,,, e 
47' gi Si; 41- eirl ?E.) C17)( "IT 















un on 01 un r- -7r .1. 	 N OesItn'71- 0NNII 	 CZ 
v5 c,i r4 vi --, vi yl 
	 (.4 







W4 	 .--, 
Un 	 ::)., S 
 
cN (NI r- CD ...-1 N 00 
eq kr-1 r- VD Cq c.4 VZ 
vi oi 1/46 6 o: (-: crn 

































c) ON ,i. In en r- 
r- w. N.  r- e'c' m el • .






















.1- ul c) CD oo ..d. .1. 
	 VD 
vD C- (NI r- "1.  Crn 'TP 	 r0 
\O c6 4 cA N -. 6 	 00 

























 14-.) e-- CA 	 4:1' r- '''' In oo o v:). cx2. .....,v:) en 
CT M6 cA 






















00 a N o s s o a, 	 00 
	
cl. v) —1 CA c.4 00 VD 	 VI 
	
06 vi vi vi v3 v:3 vi) 	 nei, 
	







O CI4 0 	 ••-• 
yo .-.., 
e wo 
.0 In .0 in en . cr\ 
on CA CA kin un --i On 
-, on un VD vD VD VD 






























VD N VD UD ,--4 VD CD 	 CN 
CD On cl ol un cf- en 	 CD 
c:; 	 er; 	 ,--1 	 ,--4 	 csi 	 ,...• 
	 ,...4 	 kr; 








00 00 on CD un CA N VI VI eq ,-1 C.-- 00 0 
6 r": V.; c4 4 06 .-4 N c-i N N N N el 
Q 	 '...' 
N un F2,1 Wo 
•-4 cl- 'at 00 't 0 00 	 V0 
V/ Cq 	 r (3 \ r- c:IN klq 	 In 






















) .1. -. nc) 00 N N 0 op 
r- .0 (o. v) CD 00 r, 
















)  .1- 	 o kr) In 00 tr) oo 't en o 
71" cf?, F-7-4 N- Ct' 0.• 'r  r-I 
	













































































































































































•••-• (1) C..) (-4 





• 01) (e{••• 
(1) 0 CU U 
a) . 


















O eo bA 
o 
c.)1, 
O 	 4,Ri 
O C14114 
0 0. En 
tiv4..• .0 
° 76°  c13 
01:1 
•- o 3 cys 	 •a% 0.) Q 
0 U C1  
•al-, 	 "c0 
4 "A 
!.5.! 
o 0. 4... 
Z o 
Looking at how the attributes of FSME and SEN status among immobile pupils 
compare with those for multiple movers, it is evident that FSME (non-FSME) pupils 
are highly less (more) likely to feature among non-movers and this group also 
consists of non-SEN pupils to a greater extent than does the movers group. 
Variability in FSME status is much lower for stable pupils, with the percentages of 
the immobile sample who enter into or exit from FSME always being below 
comparable weighted average percentages for both pure school switchers and school-
home changers moving twice. In respect of SEN status, the percentage of non-
movers with SEN is above that for multiple school-home movers, at 12.13 per cent 
for the former relative to an 11.65 weighted average percentage for the latter. Given 
that SEN classification is determined at the school-level, it is unsurprising that non-
school changers experience minimal variation in their SEN classification, which is 
likely to have been established early on in the child's entry to the school and 
consequently reflects learning difficulties existing before the onset of formalised 
schooling°. 
To summarise the findings from this stage of the analysis, it has been established that 
there are clear differences in the characteristics of pure school movers and pupils 
who change their school and home. One important pattern that has emerged is the 
relative tendency for pupils from a less well-off family background to engage in 
school-home changes and pure school moves to a similar degree, irrespective of the 
move frequency, while better-off, non-FSME pupils, are much more likely to 
undertake pure school switches, particularly among those making multiple moves. 
This pattern is evident from the percentage point difference in the weighted average 
compared both within and across FSME and non-FSME pupils (see columns (2) and 
(3) of Tables 1.11 and 1.12, for pupils moving once or twice respectively). In the 
Section that follows, evidence on the types of moves made and which kinds of pupils 
are more likely to make them is placed in the context of school choice policies. The 
aim of this exercise is to gauge some understanding of the effectiveness of the 
scheme in creating changes to the way education is accessed and therefore the 
potential for school choice to enhance educational opportunity and the future life 
chances of pupils. 
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 It should be noted that the discussion presented in this paragraph also applies if a comparison is 
made between the full sample of pupils and multiple movers, in reference to these specific attributes. 
This is because of similarities in the percentages of pupils with these characteristics in the immobile 
group and in the full sample (as shown in the last two rows of Table 1.12). 
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1.9 Considering Entry to Oversubscribed Schools 
It was explained in Section 1.4.1 that LEA-governed Community and Voluntary-
controlled schools characterised by applications for places that exceed school 
capacity adopt oversubscription criteria in order to rank potential entrants. One such 
procedure for prioritising entry relates to catchment area occupancy, in which pupils 
inhabiting homes in a radius of close geographical proximity to the school will rank 
higher on the school waiting list. It was suggested that this aspect of the admissions 
procedure distorts the notion of school choice, since it reduces the potential for 
schooling access to be less dependent on residential location. In Table 1.8 above a 
distinction was made between school movers only versus school-home movers, and 
it was noted that there is more school change involving a move of home than there is 
pure pupil mobility in the cohort under assessment. This finding implies that the link 
between the school attended and the home setting still matters when it comes to 
schooling choices. However, whether this holds true may be illustrated to some 
extent by the successfulness or otherwise of pure school movers in gaining entry to 
oversubscribed LEA-governed state schools relative to school-home movers. 
In Table 1.13, findings from a first attempt at evaluating the potential for school 
movers of the differing forms to move to oversubscribed schools are presented. For 
simplicity, the analysis focuses only on those pupils moving either to oversubscribed 
Community or VA schools and on those changers making only one move of school, 
or school-home. As Table 1.2 showed, most pupils in the state primary school sector 
attend Community or VA schools (83.65 per cent in total in 2005/06). Multiple 
movers may change the type of school that they attend in each move made (e.g. a 
pupil moving schools three times may switch from a Community, to a VA, back to a 
Community school). This complicates matters since oversubscription rules vary for 
more autonomously governed VA schools compared with Community schools. In 
fact, as discussed in Section 1.4.1, VA schools are more likely to place emphasis on 
factors such as religious commitment rather than catchment area satisfaction when 
ranking excess pupil numbers, suggesting less of a geographical link between the 
school attended and the home location for pupils in VA schools. 
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An oversubscribed school is classified as such in the sample if the ratio of the total 
number of pupils in the school to school capacity exceeds one, where annual pupil 
roll and school capacity measures are obtained from the Edubase data source as 
referred to earlier. These ratios are based on a three-year average of annual pupil 
numbers and school capacity figures, so as to minimise the margin for error in the 
oversubscribed schools indicator that might occur were it calculated using annual 
ratios only. In the full sample under analysis around 5,500 primary schools are 
oversubscribed according to this definition of an above-capacity institution (and 
using three-year averaged data), equivalent to almost 37 per cent of the near 15,000 
primary schools featuring in the dataset. 
44 Note that ratios do not use averaged annual total pupil numbers and school capacity data over the 
five sample waves (2001/02 to 2005/06 inclusive) because records on these variables are not available 
in all five years for all schools, such that using a five year average would constrain measurement on 
entry into oversubscribed schools. A 3-year average is the next best alternative that can be used both 
to overcome the lack of full data availability on these indicators and to allow for a reduction in the 
error margin on the subscription rate. For a discussion of the limitations of the oversubscription 
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The findings of Table 1.13 show that pupils making one pure school move are 
marginally more likely than pupils making one school-home move to enter an 
oversubscribed Community school (column (3) of panels A and B respectively). This 
is true across all year group transition categories except 5 - 6, where school-home 
mover entry is 0.43 of a percentage point higher (at 23.39 per cent versus 22.96 per 
cent for school only changers). The weighted average figures indicate that some 
25.61 per cent of pupils switching schools once enter oversubscribed Community 
schools on average, compared with 24.67 per cent of one-time school-home movers, 
a difference of nearly one percentage point (0.94). Thus it appears that some families 
do gain access to oversubscribed Community schools from their current place of 
residence, as the pure pupil mobility figures show. However, the fact that school-
home movers are only slightly less likely to enter these schools suggests the 
continued importance of the link between the school attended and residential location 
in the Primary school stage, a situation that may be being reinforced by the 
catchment area criteria of filled-to-capacity LEA-governed schools. 
Interestingly, the estimates of Table 1.13 reveal a regular pattern in each of the year 
group shifts for pupils moving to oversubscribed VA schools: pupils making one 
pure school move are consistently much more likely than those making one school-
home move to enter a capacity-constrained VA school. The weighted average for 
pure school changers moving once stands at 8.44 per cent, relative to 5.83 per cent 
among pupils making one school-home move, a substantial difference of 2.61 
percentage points. This evidence is in support of a more tenuous link existing 
between school and home proximity among pupils in VA schools, given the tendency 
for these schools to adopt oversubscription criteria related to their ethos. 
To summarise the results found thus far, among this KS1-2 cohort pure school 
movers changing schools once are more likely than pupils making one school-home 
move to gain entry to both oversubscribed Community and VA schools. Their 
relative strength lies in gaining entry to filled-to-capacity VA schools in particular, as 
the difference in the weighted average percentages across the two mover types and 
school types indicates. In general it must be emphasised that these findings should be 
interpreted with caution. The observation that pure school movers are gaining access 
to Community schools operating above full potential could simply be because their 
home setting already conforms to the catchment area clause. Indeed, for some pupils, 
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the current home location may be contained within the catchment area of several 
Primary schools, particularly in areas with a higher density of Primary education 
providers, such that catchment areas of different schools overlap the same home. In 
this case, one cannot infer that the pure school move was attributable to the 
possibilities allowed by school choice settings. Otherwise, isolated school change of 
this kind may reflect some proportion of delayed place allocation at a preferred 
popular school for which a pupil was on an admissions waiting list, such that the 
school move into an oversubscribed school occurs at a non-standard time point and 
without necessitating a change of home. At the same time, the assertion that the link 
between the school and the home still matters and could be being strengthened by 
LEA-governed schools' catchment area rules necessitates evidence on the reasons for 
the move of school and home. If the school and home move occurred as a result of 
upward employment mobility, for example, then access to a higher quality, popular 
school may be more an outcome of the job-related move, rather than the consequence 
of a calculated move of home done so as to ensure access to a preferred school. All 
of these points indicate the need for more substantive information on the nature of 
school and school-home moves before any firm conclusions can be drawn about the 
effectiveness or otherwise of school choice policies. 
Taking heed of these concerns, columns (4) and (6), panels A and B of Table 1.13, 
look for evidence of the existence or otherwise of an effective quasi-market for 
schools. Estimation considers whether the school move made to either a Community 
or to a VA school with an excess demand for places involves pupils coming from a 
school (of any type) with spare capacity. If a pupil is able to make a pure school 
change from an institution that has no restrictions on admissions (due to unfilled 
places) to one where entry constraints apply, then this may signal that choice 
exploitation is possible despite the existence of these constraints. In turn, this would 
offer some indication of the effective operation of a choice system, particularly if 
such moves are made into above-capacity Community schools, where 
oversubscription admissions rules tend to resort back to school-home proximity. On 
the other hand if moves of this manner take place to a greater extent among school-
home changers, this may suggest that proximity factors act as a barrier to the 
effective functioning of a market-place for schooling. 
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The results indicate that school only movers are much more likely than school-home 
movers to make school changes motivated by school choice policies among almost 
all year group transitions for those entering filled-to-capacity Community schools 
(column (4) compared across panels A and B). Only for transition group 2 - 3 is this 
pattern in reverse: 52.59 per cent of those pure school movers joining an 
oversubscribed Community school do so having previously been in an 
undersubscribed school, as compared with 55.09 per cent of school-home changers. 
On average, school only movers are 2.68 percentage points more likely to switch 
schools in pursuit of quality gains relative to pupils moving school and home (the 
weighted average for the former mover type is 59.70 per cent and for the latter 57.02 
per cent). 
Meanwhile, for joiners of oversubscribed VA schools who previously attended a 
school with spare places, those making a school only move also seem to be much 
more likely to exploit school choice opportunities than school-home movers (column 
(6) compared across panels A and B). This is weakly not the case for the transition 
period 2-3, where entry to oversubscribed VA schools by school-home movers 
coming from undersubscribed schools is just above that for pure school switchers (at 
55.81 per cent versus 55.30 per cent respectively). The weighted average is 3.72 
percentage points higher for school only changers, suggesting that moves motivated 
by school quality gains feature more among this group and also relative to pupils 
entering oversubscribed Community schools from an undersubscribed school (where 
the difference in the weighted average between the two mover types was noted as 
being 2.68 percentage points). In line with earlier findings, this evidence reinforces 
the assertion that catchment area occupancy is of less relevance as a criterion for 
ranking pupils when VA schools are oversubscribed. 
Overall, it would appear from the estimates in Table 1.13, that some school moves 
are rationalised by an interest in exploiting quality differences between local schools, 
and that such school moves are able to take place without necessitating a home 
change45. However, as mentioned above, there are shortcomings to the analysis that 
45 Analysis of the data revealed that the school-level average percentage of pupils achieving Level 4 at 
KS2 (across the three subjects of English, maths and science) was 80.18% in oversubscribed schools 
compare to 76.98% in undersubscribed schools, a difference of 3.2 percentage points, or 4.16%. This 
suggests that there are quality gains to be made from transferring between primary schools under the 
choice system. 
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necessitate caution when interpreting these findings. Bringing in information on the 
characteristics of pupils moving once (as discussed in Section 1.8), it is likely that 
school change motivated by choice will be undertaken by males, pupils of white 
ethnic origin, and non-FSME pupils with a better-off family background. In contrast, 
ethnic minorities and pupils from low-income households are marginally less likely 
to be represented among those exploiting the opportunities for education advances 
offered by choice policies. 
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1.10 Summary and Discussion 
In this study the dimensions of pupil movement between schools have been 
described and assessed for one cohort of pupils of different attributes, as they 
progress through the primary years of state schooling in England. This evaluation 
makes a significant contribution to education research for several reasons. Firstly, no 
empirical evidence available to date provides details on the amount of school change 
that does and does not involve a move of home for a nationally-representative cohort 
of pupils tracked throughout their primary years of schooling in public-sector 
education. Indeed, the literature discussion presented in this Chapter has highlighted 
that pupil mobility is frequently inadequately defined, with no distinction made 
between pure school change and school-home moves. Secondly, there are also no 
statistics on how participation in these different kinds of moves varies by the social 
background and characteristics of pupils. Thirdly, no empirical evaluation has so far 
attempted to set move behaviour by pupils differing in their attributes in the context 
of the most significant development in education policy of the last twenty years, that 
of the school choice system. Information on all of these areas of analysis has been 
uncovered for the first time here, a situation that has been made possible by the onset 
of the NPD. 
The policy of school choice seeks to raise access to schools from the current home 
location among all pupils, irrespective of their social background and where they 
live, as a means for driving up attainment standards and educational equality. 
Empirical descriptive statistics presented here suggest that some school change does 
take place independently of a move of home, though this is more common among 
pupils from better-off families. There is also evidence of the pursuit of education 
quality gains in the form of school only moves to oversubscribed Community 
institutions that, as a consequence of their popularity, employ criteria for ranking 
excess entry demand which includes the proximity of the home to the school. While 
these findings imply some degree of effectiveness in the operation of school choice, 
and a reduction in the traditional school-home link, moves of these kinds are also 
likely to feature among pupils from economically advantaged backgrounds. This 
calls into question the capability of choice policies to offer better standards and 
equality in educational opportunity when inefficiencies in the way choice is 
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administered generate entry-to-school restrictions. Consequently, this raises concerns 
over the potential for future life chances to be enhanced through changes in spatial 
dimensions such as schooling. 
In Chapter Two that follows the relationship between mobility and pupil 
characteristics (including pupil prior attainment), as well as that between mobility 
and school choice will be formally assessed through statistical regression analysis. 
The intentions of this undertaking are to subject the findings established here to more 
rigorous testing, as well as to allow for greater degrees of complexity in the way 
factors affecting mobility can be expressed and evaluated. This process will serve to 
enrich and potentially reinforce the preliminary findings on the move patterns of 
pupils differing in their attributes and on the general effectiveness of school choice 
policies that have been determined so far. 
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Chapter Two: Testing the Relationships between Mobility, 
Pupil Characteristics and School Choice at the Primary 
Stage of Education 
2.1 	 Introduction 
Pupil mobility during the primary school phase of education in England features both 
isolated changes of institution and combined school-home shifts, with these moves 
frequently taking place at non-compulsory stages of transfer. Preliminary empirical 
evaluation presented in Chapter One revealed that for a cohort of 522,440 pupils 
transferring between state schools in the KS1 to KS2 primary years of learning over 
the period 2002 to 2006, 10.4 per cent changed school and home, while 6.8 per cent 
moved schools, at times other than the compulsory points of transfer. Further 
analysis considered the association between each form of school change and two 
particular areas of interest among pupils moving once or twice, namely (i) the 
characteristics and prior academic attainment of movers and (ii) the exploitation of 
choice policies measured through movements to oversubscribed schools by pupils 
coming from under-capacity institutions. 
In looking at the attributes of students moving once, it was shown that boys and 
pupils of white ethnicity are more likely to be pure school changers than school-
home movers, whereas the latter group of mobile pupils consists in the main of girls 
and students of Asian, black, or minority-white ethnic origin. In terms of their 
economic background, one-time movers who shift only their school are frequently 
from better-off families (non-FSME) than those making combined school and home 
transfers, while pupils without recognised learning difficulties (non-SEN) feature 
more among school-home movers. The main points of contrast between pupils 
moving once and those moving twice are that the latter encompasses students of 
Asian ethnicity among their school only shifters, while pupils of white ethnic origin 
are more likely to engage in multiple changes of school and home. Additionally, two-
time movers were found to have lower prior attainment at KS1 than pupils moving 
once, though for both single and multiple movers the pre-move KS1 performance 
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differences between pure school changers and school-home shifters were relatively 
small. 
Assessment of the relationship between mobility and entry into oversubscribed 
schools considered only those pupils moving once and coming from a school with 
below-capacity pupil numbers, in order to shed some light on the existence of a 
quasi-market for schooling. This analysis revealed that among pupils coming from 
undersubscribed schools, school only movers are more likely than combined school-
home changers to gain entry to oversubscribed schools of both the Community and 
the VA type, though their relative strength lies in entry to the latter. This was 
construed as some indication of the presence of school change motivated by the 
pursuit of school quality gains and therefore the operation of choice policies in the 
primary stage of the English education system. 
In this Chapter statistical regression analysis will be employed in order to test the 
school change-pupil characteristics46 and the mobility-school choice links in a more 
formal setting. This means that throughout this analysis the focus is on moving pupils 
only, so that regression estimation involves an assessment of the relationship 
between factors associated with mobility and the form of move that the pupil makes. 
Then the aim of this work is to determine influences behind the separate types of 
move, given that the pupil does move either school or school-home47 . This 
constitutes a restriction of evaluation to a selected sub-sample of the full cohort, with 
non-movers excluded. The general applicability of findings to the entire sample is 
thus limited here. Extrapolation of the empirical investigations conducted below to 
include the full sample and to establish the factors determining whether pupils 
change schools in the first place would require use of the Heckman procedure to 
46 Note that from this point forward, where the relationship between mobility and pupil 
characteristics/attributes is referred to in the text as a focus of this Chapter, this will also incorporate 
the KS1 average points score of the pupil (as a measure of pre-move attainment). However, in the 
regression analysis that follows, prior attainment will be modelled as a separate explanatory variable 
to the other pupil characteristics (where these come from the PLASC part of the NPD, and are 
represented by the vector X in regression equations 1 and 2 shown below). 
47 In Section 2.5 regression analysis considers the relationship between choice-related school change 
(as the dependent variable) and both the form of move made and pupil characteristics (as regressors). 
This is the only part of the Chapter in which the probability that a pupil moves school only or school-
home is not used as the outcome measure in estimation. 
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correct for the specification error of sample selection bias48. Employing econometric 
evaluation of this kind forms an important potential area for future research work. 
In Chapter One the distinctions in the background and school type entry of the 
differing mover types were discussed in a descriptive set-up. The statistical approach 
used here represents an important extension to the previous process of evaluation for 
several reasons. Firstly, a descriptive study is limited to the examination of one-to-
one, bivariate links between mobility and each factor assumed to affect moving, 
while instead a regression framework enables the simultaneous assessment of 
multivariate correlations between the move outcome and a host of independent 
variables. Secondly, and related to the first point, a multivariate regression model 
estimates the direct influence of each explanatory variable on mobility whilst holding 
constant the effect of all other regressors included in the equation. To give some 
examples of why these issues matter, the connection between FSM eligibility and 
school change has so far been examined in a bivariate manner, in which other 
observable variables that might account for some of this connection, such as 
ethnicity, have not been controlled for. In a regression set-up, the impact of ethnicity 
and FSME on mobility can be jointly specified, and the coefficient on FSME that is 
estimated by the model establishes the net effect of this indicator on the move 
outcome, keeping constant the influence of all other modelled covariates, including 
ethnicity measures. Likewise the relationship between school moves and entry to 
oversubscribed schools was assessed in the previous Chapter, but without controlling 
for plausibly associated factors, such as the characteristics of mobile pupils. This 
relationship can be properly ascertained through regression estimation in which pupil 
attributes are additionally controlled for. In a more general sense, regression 
modelling is crucial if the net effect of each independent component on the move 
decision is to be correctly determined. Lastly, the partial regression coefficient 
attached to each independent variable summarises in one single parameter the 
magnitude of association between that regressor and the dependent outcome, while 
hypothesis testing identifies the degree of statistical significance of each coefficient 
estimate as an indicator of the strength of the measured relationship. Consequently 
these aspects of the regression method allow for more clarity and precision in 
48 The seminal paper in which this procedure is presented, and to which the reader should refer for 
further details, is as follows: Heckman, J. J. (1979). Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error. 
Econometrica, 47(1): 153-161. 
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estimation of associations. Overall, the procedure of regression analysis enables a 
priori assumptions about the relationships between observable dimensions and school 
change to be empirically evaluated and scrutinised in a more rigorous setting than 
can be derived through descriptive assessment alone. 
In Section 2.2 that follows, equations used to describe the relationship between 
school change and pupil characteristics, and that between mobility and school choice, 
are laid out. Here the regression models that will be used in the process of estimation 
are also presented. Regression analysis makes use of the linear probability model, the 
logit and the probit model, all of which differ in their functional form. Results 
pertaining to each model are compared in order to assess whether findings vary by 
the functional form specified. 
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 show regression results pertaining to estimation of the mobility-
pupil attributes and the mobility-choice equations respectively. Findings reveal a 
negative relationship between pure school change and the characteristic of free 
school meal eligibility, while there is some suggestion of entry into oversubscribed 
Community schools that may reflect the exploitation of choice policies. Section 2.5 
presents another slant to regression estimation by looking at the choice-mobility-
pupil attributes relationship. Here school choice-related moves form the dependent 
variable and analysis addresses the association between choice-type school change, 
pure school mobility and pupil characteristics, with the aim of establishing if certain 
types of pupils are getting to exercise choice. Under the most conservative model 
specification, estimation indicates that there are no clear relationships between 
moves from under-to-above-capacity schools and pupil attributes, while there is a 
positive link between 'choice' moves and pure school change. In Section 2.6 the 
mobility-choice relationship is returned to and evidence on choice-related moves 
given in Section 2.4 is more thoroughly assessed, in an attempt to understand 
whether results vary by the region or by the FSME status of pupils. A distinction is 
made between pure school change into oversubscribed schools in London relative to 
other areas, where estimation shows that isolated school moves occur largely in 
London. When the entire sample is split between FSM eligible and non-eligible 
pupils, findings indicating a higher probability of isolated school change among non-
FSME pupils. These outcomes suggest that choice policies are still limited in their 
overall effectiveness. Section 2.7 discusses the shortcomings of analysis that uses the 
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National Pupil Database, a data source on which both Chapters One and Two are 
based. Finally, Section 2.8 offers some summarising comments. 
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2.2 	 Regression Analysis 
The process of empirical evaluation undertaken in this section utilises exactly the 
same KS1-2 cohort of primary school pupils that formed the basis of investigation in 
Chapter One, with estimation focusing solely on those pupils engaging in mobility of 
one form or the other. Table 1.8 of that Chapter indicated pure pupil mobility among 
35,566 pupils (of which 33,725 pupils (94.82 per cent) move once and 1,784 pupils 
(5.02 per cent) move twice) and school-home change for 54,376 pupils (with 46,990 
pupils (86.42 per cent) moving once and 6,405 pupils (11.78 per cent) moving 
twice). These figures provide a general guide to the number of pupil-level 
observations on which regression estimation will be based, although the actual 
sample sizes will depend on the exact relationship being modelled and whether this 
includes supplementary data not yet exploited. 
In a regression equation that specifies the relationship between mobility and other 
covariates, the move outcome can be expressed as a discrete choice variable taking 
the value of 0 or 1, depending on the form of move made. Throughout all regression 
models developed in this Section, school only changers will be coded 1 and school-
home movers coded 0, so that reported parameter estimates indicate associations 
between isolated school shifts and other factors, with school-home movers acting as 
the baseline reference group. This coding allocation reflects the recurrent emphasis 
on the efficacy of school choice as a core focus of analysis, where, as the discussion 
of Chapter One outlined, choice can be deemed to be operative if pupils gain access 
to a school (particularly a popular one) without moving home. Continuing along this 
line, it follows that regression output be displayed throughout from the stance of pure 
school changers. 
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2.2.1 Modelling the relationship between mobility and pupil characteristics 
Probability models constitute the principal specification to use when the dependent 
variable is a dummy indicator of binary choice. The following equation offers a 
general expression for the relationship between mobility and pupil characteristics:- 
iksj ,t = a + 
9 	 149 
,t- + L ghAge k,t-i +1co • LEA jt-1 J 
k=6 	 j=1 
9 
+ 2ES 	 2002 + E Ok(Ageo_i xKS1i,t=2002 )+ eikv,t-1 	 (1) 
k=6 
That is, the probability, y, that pupil i of age k (where k = 6 to 9) in school s within 
LEA j moves school only (y = 1) or school and home (y = 0) between period t-1 (the 
pre-move year) and period t (the year of the move) depends on:- 
• a set of individual pupil characteristics, X, pertaining to pupil i in time t-1, 
where X includes dummy variables for the gender, ethnicity, FSM eligibility 
and SEN status of the pupil prior to moving, and has an associated vector of 
sample parameters /1; 
• a group of 'age' dummies (with coefficients (5k) that control for the age of the 
pupil in time t-1 and therefore act as controls for the timing of the move in 
the KS1-2 phase; 
• a set of 'LEA' dummies (with coefficients coj) that capture unobserved time-
invariant LEA-specific effects common to all pupils attending schools within 
the same LEA j at time t-1 (there are 149 LEAs in the sample); 
• pre-move attainment, measured as the average points score achieved by the 
pupil in their 'KS!' exams (which are taken by cohort members in the 
summer of 2002), a parameter with associated coefficient 2, and; 
• an interaction expression between each 'age' dummy and pupil-level `KS1' 
prior attainment, with parameters Ok, where this term allows for a changing 
influence of the timing of the move on mobility according to pre-move 
achievement scores. 
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The process of model building is sequential and variable inclusion follows the order 
given by equation (1). Prior to the incorporation of LEA dummies, the regression 
specification includes a set of higher-level Government Office Region (GOR) 
dummies that capture time-constant unobservable regional factors which have the 
same effect on all pupils attending schools within a common GOR in time t-1. These 
can be expressed by the term v cr g GOR g , where g represents the GOR, and ag the 
g =1 
associated coefficients49. When lower-grouping-level LEA dummies are 
subsequently estimated in the regression, all regional controls drop out as their 
informative content is contained within the LEA dummies50. In equation (1) the term 
a is a constant and c is an error term that incorporates unobservable pre-move (t-1) 
random disturbances for pupil i which impact on their move outcome. Regression 
model (1) can be summarised as specifying the relationship between mobility and a 
range of pupil-level variables contained within PLASC, net of any explanatory 
power attributable to the timing of the move, area-related effects, and pupil prior 
achievement at KS1 (both alone and interacted with the age dummies). Thus the 
overall aim of regression estimation using equation (1) is to establish whether, and if 
so which, pupil-based factors impact on the likelihood of a pure school change 
versus a school-home move. 
4 9 There are nine GORs in total, which are listed in the notes to Table 2.1. 
5° All GOR and LEA controls relate to the location of the school attended by the pupil at time t-1, 
rather than to the location of the pupil's home. To the extent that Primary school pupils do not attend 
schools within the GOR or LEA in which they live, these area-based factors will not capture 
neighbourhood effects associated with the home setting, effects that may matter to the move outcome. 
Complexity involved in the mapping of home postcode information contained in PLASC to the 
relevant GOR and LEA codes has meant that this process has not been possible for the purposes of 
this research. However, two recent studies have shown that pupil attendance at a school which 
involves crossing an LEA boundary is very low at the Primary school stage, so that mostly all pupils 
attend schools within the LEA in which they live. Around 5% of pupils attending Community primary 
schools cross LEA boundaries in the London region, and just 3% do so elsewhere in England (see 
Gibbons et al., 2006 and Gibbons et al., 2009). GORs cover a wider geographical space than LEAs, 
making school attendance that involves the crossing of GORs highly unlikely. Given these points, the 
area-based controls used in regression estimation here can be viewed as incorporating neighbourhood 
effects to some degree, and therefore the potentially relevant relation between home location and 
mobility. 
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2.2.2 Modelling the relationship between mobility and school choice 
Estimation of the relationship between mobility and entry into oversubscribed 
schools by pupils coming from institutions operating below capacity is defined by 
the following regression equation:- 
Y iksj,t 
3 	 3 	 3 
= a+ E sType s 4_1 + E 4 - sType s j + liChoice i , + E ps (Choice i , x Type ,,,) 
s=1 	 s=1 	 s=1 
9 
r2zs,, +fixi,t-i +Egk Agek,t_i  2KS1ia=2002 
k=6 
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± iksj ,t-1 	 (2) 1 LEA j ,t —1  
k =6 	 j=1 
Here the probability, y, that pupil i of age k and in school s within LEA j enters that 
school by moving school only (y = 1) or by making a combined school and home 
move (y = 0) between the pre-move year (period t-/) and the move year (period t) is 
related to:- 
• a set of dummy indicators for the 'type' of school attended by the pupil in 
each period, with associated coefficients that are estimated separately for 
each school type and denoted by s  and cs in time t-1 and time t respectively. 
For simplicity, state primary schools are classified into three distinct types —
Community, VA, or `other' — where the latter category incorporates 
attendance in Foundation or VC schools; 
• a 'choice' dummy variable (with coefficient 1) which equates to 1 when a 
pupil moves from a school with spare capacity to an oversubscribed school, 
and equals 0 when a pupil moves from and to schools of other capacity 
combinations between time t-1 and time t51. Thus this regressor accounts for a 
relationship between mobility and school choice; 
• an interaction term between the 'choice' dummy and the dummy for the 
school 'type' that the mobile pupil enters into (with coefficients ps), where 
this is estimated separately for pupils entering Community, VA and 'other' 
51 
 Specifically, other combinations of capacity levels for the school a pupil leaves at time t-1 and the 
school a pupil joins at time t that are given the value of zero in the choice dummy are as follows: 
undersubscribed to undersubscribed, undersubscribed to exactly-subscribed; exactly-subscribed to 
undersubscribed, exactly-subscribed to exactly-subscribed, exactly-subscribed to oversubscribed; 
oversubscribed to undersubscribed, oversubscribed to exactly-subscribed, oversubscribed to 
oversubscribed. 
100 
schools. Hence this indicator considers the association between entry into 
filled-to-capacity schools of each type by pupils coming from 
undersubscribed schools, and school only change; 
• a set of school-level characteristics, Z, for the school the pupil attended 
previously (with associated coefficients yj) and for that which they move to 
(with sample parameters y2). These vectors contain per school-level controls 
for: the percentage of pupils eligible for free school meals, the percentage of 
pupils of non-white ethnic origin, the school size (measured as the total 
number of pupils in the school), and the pupil-teacher ratio. 
All other controls listed in equation (2) appear in regression model (1) and are as 
described in Section 2.2.1. They account for pupil-level characteristics, the timing of 
the move (age dummies), prior KS1 attainment (expressed both on its own and 
additionally interacted with the move timing), and area-specific factors (LEA 
dummies). As was the case for equation (1), model (2) is built up sequentially in the 
order shown and includes a set of higher-level regional dummies prior to estimation 
with LEA dummies (at which point all GOR dummies drop out from regression 
estimation). All GOR and LEA controls relate to the location of the pre-move school 
attended by the pupil. Overall, equation (2) highlights the relationship between entry 
into popular schools and the form of move made, when an array of additional factors 
(including school-and pupil-level variables and area-related controls) that might 
account for some of the estimated association are adjusted for. Therefore this 
regression assesses whether some mobility occurs as a result of households 
exercising their right to benefit from the possibilities for access to improved school 
quality offered through choice policies. 
2.2.3 Regression estimation using probability models 
Equations (1) and (2) will be estimated using three different types of probability 
model that differ in their functional form, namely the linear probability model, and 
logit and probit model specifications52. Estimation based on the linear probability 
model has two important drawbacks that warrant discussion at this stage. Firstly, as 
52 
 See, for example, Chapter 19 in Greene. 2000, for a more detailed discussion on these probability 
models, in which the dependent variable is discrete. 
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the name suggests, this specification fits a linear trend to the data, and as a 
consequence derives model predictions that are not constrained to always lie within 
the [0, 1] interval. Therefore linear estimation using the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) method is not guaranteed to produce predictions that resemble probabilities. 
In terms of equations (1) and (2) this problem translates into predicted values of y 
that may exceed 1 or be less than 0, outcomes that do not align with the probabilistic 
nature of the dependent variable and therefore imply potentially incoherent model 
results. 
Secondly, the error term in the linear probability model is not homoscedastic. In fact, 
the variance of the disturbances is correlated with the explanatory variables in the 
regression equation, so that eiksp_i is heteroscedastic. Then OLS produces estimators 
that are unbiased but not efficient, that is, the sample parameters do not have 
minimum variance within their class53. If heteroscedasticity in the error term is not 
taken into account then this might result in the estimation of lower standard errors 
than would otherwise be derived in the presence of homoscedastic disturbances, in 
turn giving higher t- and F-statistics and the possible rejection of a null hypothesis 
that might usually have been accepted (Greene, 2000; Gujarati, 1995). 
These pitfalls of the linear probability model are not insurmountable. The problem of 
heteroscedasticity in the error term can be resolved during the process of estimation 
by clustering standard errors at a particular group level to which the unit of analysis 
(in' this case the pupil) belongs. Clustering accounts for both correlation within 
groups and heteroscedasticity across groups. Throughout regression estimation 
undertaken here, clustering takes place at the level of the (time t-/) individual school, 
so as to adjust for both correlation in the error term among all pupils within a school 
and inter-school non-equal variance in the disturbances54. In terms of the potential 
for the linear probability model to generate predictions that lie outside of the [0, 1] 
53 In repeated sampling an estimator fie is an unbiased estimator of fi if the expected value of & equals 
the true fl  (Gujarati, 1995). 
54 The econometric software package `Stata' (version 10, Special Edition) is used throughout the 
empirical evaluation conducted in this thesis. In practical terms, adding the command 'robust' to the 
end of the regression command line in Stata allows for heteroscedasticity in the error term across 
pupils to be corrected for. If the expression 'cluster' (at the school-level) is instead added to the end of 
the regression command line then both inter-school heteroscedasticity in the disturbance and 
correlation in the error term within schools are accounted for, so that the function of the 'robust' 
command is encompassed by the 'cluster' command alone (since pupils are grouped within schools). 
In all regression estimations undertaken here (pre-move) school-level clustering is carried out (as 
indicated in the notes to the tabulated results presented in this Chapter). 
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interval, this is of more concern if the goal of estimation is to establish probability 
predictions relating to specific sample units. For example, say that analysis aims to 
determine the probability of a school move only for a girl of Asian ethnic origin who 
is not entitled to FSM and attends a school in which there are 549 other students. 
OLS estimation evaluates the mean value of y at average values of the explanatory 
variables. If the characteristics of pupils like that of the example are not close to the 
average attributes of the sample then the point prediction that is obtained from the 
model may well lie outside of the [0, 1] range. However, evaluation made here is 
predominantly concerned with assessing the effects of changes in the independent 
variables on the change in y, evaluated at the regressor sample means. Hence this 
problem associated with the linear probability model is unlikely to be of importance. 
The logit and probit models offer two alternative specifications to the linear version 
that do not suffer from the drawbacks associated with the latter. The probability 
distributions underlying the logit (logistic cumulative distribution) and the probit 
(standard normal distribution) are such that both models allow for non-linearities in 
the relationship between the dependent variable and covariates, the outcome of 
which is that their probabilities always lie within the [0, 1] interval. Moreover, the 
underlying assumption of both of these models is that their error terms are 
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d), with a mean of zero and a 
homoscedastic variance of cs2 (Greene, 2000)55. Estimation of logit and probit 
regressions therefore takes place to check for validity in findings across model 
specifications. In terms of the reporting of results, marginal effects will be shown for 
both the logit and probit models; these are evaluated at the sample means of the 
explanatory variables. Regression output pertaining to all three probability models 
will be presented where there are differences across model results. Otherwise, where 
findings are the same throughout, only those deriving from linear probability model 
estimation will be set out in the main text, with estimation from all other models 
reported in Appendix 2A. 
55 Nevertheless, clustering of the standard errors at the school-level is carried out in estimation of both 
the logit and probit models, so as to account for intra-school correlation in the error term. 
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2.3 	 Regression Results: Mobility and Pupil Characteristics 
The relationship between mobility and pupil-level attributes is considered for those 
pupils moving either school only or school-home at most twice. As was argued in 
Section 1.8 of Chapter One, very few pupils in the cohort examined make more 
moves than this during the entire KS1-2 phase. Table 2.1 starts off by assessing the 
nature of the association between school change and pupil attributes for those 
moving once. Equation (1) is estimated by OLS, using the linear probability model. 
In the first column of the Table results from a simple specification are presented, in 
which mobility is regressed on the fixed characteristics of pupils, namely their 
gender and ethnic group. Coefficient estimates pertaining to boys, and pupils of other 
white or Asian ethnicity are all highly statistically significant (at the 1 per cent 
significance level) in this preliminary regression. Findings suggest that boys are 2 
percentage points more likely to move school only than are girls over the 2002 to 
2006 window. The baseline ethnic group is that of pupils of white British ethnic 
origin and all other ethnicity types are always to be considered relative to this 
reference category. Sample parameters on both the other white and Asian ethnic 
groups are negative, at -5.2 and -3.6 percentage points respectively, implying that 
pupils of these ethnic backgrounds are less likely to move school only than are pupils 
of white British ethnicity. The opposite is true for pupils of unknown ethnic origin, 
who are more likely to change only their school than are white British pupils, though 
the degree of statistical power of this estimate is marginal (the coefficient estimate of 
0.068 is significant at the 10 per cent level). 
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Table 2.1: Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Relationship Between 
Mobility and Pupil Characteristics: One Move 
Independent 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
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KS1 Average -0.002*** 0.001 
Points Score (APS) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age `= 7 x KS1 APS M.005*** 
(0.001) 
Age = 8 x KS1 APS 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
Age = 9 x KS1 APS -0.007*** 
(0.002) 
GOR dummies No No Yes No No No 
LEA dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 80,715 80,715 80,343 80,713 80,173 80,173 
Notes: The dependent vaiable is a dummy indicator taking the value of 1 if a pupil moves school only and 
0 if a pupil moves school and home between years t-1 and t. All explanatory variables listed in the Table 
refer to the pre-move year (t-1), except for KS1 APS, which refers to 2002, the year in which this cohort sat 
for their KS1 exams. The sample number of pupils moving once is 80,715, of which 33,725 (41.78%) make 
pure school moves and 46,990 (58.22%) make school-home moves over the KS1-2 phase. For all ethnicity 
groups, 'White British Isles' is the reference category (for a description of ethnic types included in each 
group see the notes to Table 1.9. Chapter One). For the timing of the move, age = 6 (transition years 2-3) is 
the reference category. Nine regional dummies are included for GORs as follows: North East, North West, 
Yorkshire & the Humber, East Midlands, West Midlands, East of England, London, South East, and South 
West. For all regions, the GOR reference category is London. GOR data is obtained from the Edubase 
dataset, which is linked in to the KS1-2 cohort data at the school level. LEA dummies are included for 149 
LEAs. FSME stands for Free School Meal Eligibility; SEN stands for Special Educational Needs. Robust 
standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the time t-1 school level. *** = statistically 
significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level. 
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Column (2) introduces pupil characteristics that can change over time into the 
regression equation, as well as age dummies that account for the timing of the move. 
The addition of these factors affects the magnitude, though neither the sign nor the 
statistical significance, of the estimated coefficient on gender. Boys are still more 
likely to undertake isolated school change (as opposed to school-home moves) than 
girls, but the sample parameter is now 0.013, a drop of 0.7 percentage points relative 
to the estimate in column (1). 
Importantly, the results of column (2) show that Free School Meal Eligibility 
(FSME) and SEN status are both strong predictors of pure school change, with their 
effects on the move outcome working in opposing directions. FSME is a proxy 
indicator for family poverty and the negative coefficient on this variable suggests 
that pupils from worse-off economic backgrounds are less likely to move school 
only, or conversely, they are more likely to engage in combined school and home 
transfers relative to non-FSME students56. Pupils with SEN, on the other hand, are 
more likely to change only their school than are those without SEN. Both of these 
findings are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Interpreting these results 
using as a benchmark the sample percentage of pupils moving once who make a pure 
school move, of 41.78 per cent, they imply that the status of being eligible for FSM 
decreases the probability of a pupil making an isolated school move by 4 percentage 
points, to 37.78 per cent, an overall drop of 9.57 per cent. Equivalent interpretation 
for the coefficient on SEN (of 4.7 percentage points) suggests that having SEN status 
is associated with an 11.25 per cent rise in the probability of school only change by a 
pupil who moves once. 
Evidence on the timing of the move is presented relative to the age 6 dummy as the 
baseline reference age, or equivalently relative to pure institution change during the 
transition between school years 2 and 3. Only the coefficient on the age 7 dummy 
carries any statistical value (at the 1 per cent significance level), with fl estimated as -
2.6 percentage points. This suggests that school only change is most likely early on 
in the educational track of a pupil (years 2 to 3), after which point combined school 
and home moves carry more weight during transition years 3 to 4. All other age 
dummy coefficients have no impact on the dependent variable, indicating that the 
56 Criteria for the receipt of FSM are described in Appendix 1A, Section 1A.G. The validity of this 
indicator as a proxy measure of family poverty is discussed in Section 2.7. 
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timing of the move is not a strong predictor in the likelihood of undertaking school 
only shifts. 
The next two columns of Table 2.1 bring into equation (1) location-based controls 
that have a similar effect on the probability of moving for pupils attending time t-1 
schools in the same area. Column (3) introduces regional dummies in the form of 
GORs and column (4) replaces these with LEA dummies as more well-defined 
geographical units of analysis. The results found here tally with those obtained under 
the specification of column (2) with regards to gender, FSME and SEN status. 
Noticeable distinctions are in the findings concerning the ethnicity categories and, to 
a lesser extent, the age 7 dummy. The results from columns (1) and (2) on pupils of 
Asian or 'other white' ethnicity completely lose their statistical importance under the 
inclusion of area effects, and are also reversed in the model with LEA dummies. 
Estimates shown here reveal instead that mobile pupils belonging to black or 'other' 
ethnic groups who move once are more likely to change only their school (or, 
equivalently, less likely to make multi-environment changes) relative to the baseline 
case of pupils of white British ethnicity. Statistical significance in the coefficient 
estimates on these variables occurs even at the 1 per cent significance level. Again 
using as a benchmark the sample percentage of pupils moving once who engage in 
isolated school moves, of 41.78 per cent, parameter estimates suggest that black 
(other) ethnicity is associated with a rise in the probability of pure school change of 
4.3 percentage points (3.9 percentage points), or 10.29 per cent (9.33 per cent), when 
GOR dummies are added to the regression and a greater 6.3 percentage points (4.6 
percentage points), or 15.08 per cent (11.01 per cent), under the more stringent 
specification which includes LEA dummies in place of the GOR controls. For pupils 
of 'unknown' ethnic origin, the principal difference in the results of columns (3) and 
(4) of the Table in comparison to those in the previous two columns concerns the 
extent of statistical significance on the estimated coefficient. This increases to the 5 
per cent level to suggest that area-based adjustments matter. On the other hand the 
coefficient on the age 7 dummy drops in statistical relevance (to the 10 per cent 
level) when location factors are taken into account. 
The final two columns of Table 2.1 introduce into regression analysis supplementary 
details on pupil factors in the form of a control for pre-move attainment, measured 
through the KS1 Average Points Score (APS) of the pupil, and variables that account 
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for the interaction of the timing of the move with averaged KS1 outcomes. In the 
discussion following Table 1.9 (Section 1.8) of Chapter One, two points of concern 
were raised over the validity of this indicator. The 'pre-move' status of KS1 
attainment was called into question by the notion of there being unmeasured mobility 
early on in the sample window and/or before the start of the period under analysis 
(that is, before 2002, or year 2 of primary schooling). Additionally, and perhaps of 
greater concern, was the issue that this variable may include unobservable 
components as well as, or even aside from, prior attainment, so that it cannot be 
deemed to be measuring only early performance. Specifically, it was suggested that 
KS1 achievement may be capturing some unobservable family attribute, such as 
parental interest in schooling, an aspect of household behaviour that might impact on 
both schooling attainment across all learning stages and the move propensity. The 
potential for correlation between this indicator and the dependent variable leads to 
the problem of endogeneity, and hence uncertainty surrounding the use of the KS1 
achievement measure in regression estimation. For these reasons, econometric 
evaluation involving this variable has been modelled last, after the effects of all 
exogenous pupil factors and area controls on the move outcome have been taken into 
account57. 
In column (5) prior attainment is added to the regression equation. Despite high 
statistical significance in this measure, its estimated 2 coefficient is marginal, at 0.2 
percentage points. The interpretation of this statistic is that a 4-point rise in KS1 
performance — approximately a 1 standard deviation increase in the sample mean 
KS1 APS of pupils moving once, which stands at near 15 points58 — is associated 
with a fall in the probability of a pure school move of just 0.8 percentage points. This 
is equivalent to a 1.91 per cent drop in the sample percentage of one-time school 
only switchers (of 41.78 per cent). The inclusion of this variable also exerts little 
change on other explanatory factor coefficient estimates, with those deriving from 
the model specification of column (4) still pertaining in most cases. Only the size of 
the parameter on the SEN status variable changes to a noticeable extent, so that a 
57 The SEN status of a pupil is determined by the school, and therefore may also be an endogenous 
explanatory variable that is correlated with the move outcome. However, it is plausible to suggest that, 
at young ages, SEN classification reflects learning difficulties that do not relate to the school attended 
and are instead associated directly with the child's pre-school entry development. In this case SEN 
status is a (fixed) characteristic of the child that the school diagnoses over time. 
58 Table 1.9 of Chapter One showed that the weighted-average KS1 prior attainment score of one-time 
pure school movers was 14.58 points, while that of school-home movers was 14.78 points, so that 
these scores average out to precisely 14.7 points (or, rounded up, to 15 points). 
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switch from non-SEN to SEN status by a pupil is now associated with a rise in their 
probability of pure school change of 3.3 percentage points, whereas this was a 
positive and higher 4.6 percentage points in column (4). 
Column (6) includes interaction terms of the age dummies with KS1 attainment. 
When the KS1 APS of the pupil is zero these terms evaluate to zero, and in this case 
the age dummies on their own indicate the impact of the timing of the move59. At 
positive values of KS1 averaged outcomes, the move timing effect is captured in the 
age dummies and the interaction expressions combined for each transition stage. 
Therefore the interactions account for the changing impact of the move timing at 
varying dimensions of prior KS1 scores. It is interesting to find that the 6 coefficients 
on all age dummies are positive and statistically significant here, ranging between 
4.2 and 11.1 percentage points. Thus relative to the reference group of pupils moving 
once across school years 2 and 3, one-time movers at all other stages of transition are 
more likely to move school only. However, these move timing estimates are 
diminishing in rising previous attainment scores for students moving between school 
years 3-4 or 5-6 in particular. These pupils are instead less likely to change only their 
school than are students with a weaker performance background who also move 
between year groups 3-4 or 5-6. This is shown by the statistically significant and 
negative coefficients on the interaction effects between KS1 attainment and the age 7 
and age 9 dummies respectively (relative to the positive coefficients on the isolated 
age 7 and age 9 dummies)60. Moreover, pupils with a KS1 APS greater than 12 
points and moving between transition years 3 and 4 are less likely to make a pure 
school shift relative to the reference group of pupils moving between school years 2 
and 3. This is because the total effect of the age 7 dummy is negative at KS1 mean 
attainment scores higher than 12 points. For movers between school years 5 and 6, 
KS1 performance above 15.9 points is associated with a higher likelihood of school-
home moves relative to the reference transition category61. Given that one-time 
59 To see this, note that in equation (1) when the KS1 APS of the pupil is zero all interaction terms 
9 
defined by Et9k (Agekf _l x KSlia=2002 ) evaluate to zero. Therefore the entire impact of the move 
k=6 
timing is captured by the age dummy alone. 
60 The coefficient on the `age=8 x KS1 APS' interaction variable shown in Table 2.1 (which represents 
pupils moving between school years 4 and 5) is also negative, but it is not statistically significant. 
61 For pupils moving between school years 3-4 the total effect of the move timing is given by [0.060+ 
(-0.005 x KS1 APS)], where the former figure is the coefficient on the age = 7 dummy and the latter is 
the coefficient on the interaction of the age = 7 dummy with KS1 APS. Evaluation of the value of 
KS1 APS at which [0.060+(-0.005 x KS1 APS)] = 0 gives the result of 12 points. Attainment scores 
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movers have an average attainment of almost 15 points at KS1 (see Table 1.9, 
Chapter One), it is likely that only for those pupils moving between school years 3 
and 4 is the positive relation between the move timing and pure school change 
mitigated or reversed by high KS1 attainment, This latter suggestion is consistent 
with the negative and marginally statistically significant coefficient attached to the 
age 7 dummy shown in column (5), a parameter that indicates the effect of the move 
timing when all model explanatory variables, including in this specification KS1 
APS, are evaluated at their sample mean values. Overall, it is evident that regression 
estimation which also includes move timing-prior attainment interaction covariates 
does not have a substantial impact on other model coefficients. In addition, although 
the A coefficient on KS1 APS was significant in column (5), this loses any statistical 
value in the final regression of column (6), and the estimated parameter is small in 
size in both cases. This suggests that the KS1 prior attainment measure is not a 
strong predictor of the type of move made. 
higher than this lead to a negative coefficient overall, suggesting that school-home change is more 
likely among pupils with a KS1 APS above 12 points and moving between transition years 3-4 
relative to the reference group of pupils moving between school years 2-3. For students moving 
between school years 5-6, the total effect of the timing of the move is given by [0.111+(-0.007 x KS1 
APS)]. This equals zero when KS1 APS equals 15.9, and is negative at prior attainment values above 
this, indicating a higher probability of school-home moves. 
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Table 2.2 shows regression findings from evaluation of the link between mobility 
and pupil characteristics among those changing school, or moving school and home 
twice. Equation (1) is again estimated by OLS, using the linear probability model 
specification:- 
Table 2.2: Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Relationship Between 
Mobility and Pupil Characteristics: Two Moves  
Independent 
Variable  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gender = Male 0.023*** 0.016** 0.016** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ethnicity = M.120*** -0.113*** -0.091"* 0.093*** -0.085*** -0.086*** 
Other White (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
Asian 0.083** 0.087** 0.087** 0.062*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 
(0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Black -0.027 -0.021 -0.001 -0.028 -0.020 -0.019 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
Other -0.003 0.005 0.015 0.004 0.006 0.006 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Unknown 0.452*** 0.441*** 0.440*** 0.385*** 0.430*** 0.430*** 
(0.096) (0.096) (0.091) (0.080) (0.084) (0.084) 
FSME M.064*** M.073*** M.056*** M.054*** M.053*** 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
SEN 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.055*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
Age = 7 M.059** M.053* M.036* M.036* -0.044 
(transition yrs 3 - 4) (0.030) (0.028) (0.020) (0.020) (0.038) 
Age = 8 -0.048 -0.041 0.037** 0.038** -0.012 
(transition yrs 4 - 5) (0.031) (0.030) (0.018) (0.018) (0.036) 
Age = 9 M.087*** M.078*** M.046*** M.045*** 0.023 
(transition yrs 5 - 6) (0.025) (0.023) (0.016) (0.016) (0.038) 
KS1 Average 0.002 0.003 
Points Score (APS) (0.001) (0.002) 
Age = 7 x KS1 APS 0.001 (0.003) 
Age = 8 x KS1 APS -0.002 (0.003) 
Age = 9 x KS! APS M.005* (0.003) 
GOR dummies No No Yes No No No 
LEA dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 16,378 16,378  16,348 16,365 16,197 16,197 
Notes: The sample number of pupils moving twice and making the same kind of move in each phase is 
8,189 (see Chapter One, Tables 1.10 and 1.12). Counting each move phase separately among those moving 
twice results in a doubling of the total number of moves, to give 16,378 observations, of which 3,568 
(21.79%) represent pure school moves and 12,810 (78.21%) represent school-home moves over the KS1-2 
phase. Robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the time t-1 school level. *** = 
statistically significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level. For 
further details on the dependent variable and the explanatory variables see the notes to Table 2.1. 
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Again in each column of the Table equation (1) is built up successively, until 
estimation reaches the complete model that includes a full set of controls for pupil 
characteristics, the timing of the move, LEA-specific factors, and KS1 previous 
attainment plus its interactions with the age dummies. Column (6) of Table 2.2 
illustrates the results derived from estimation of this stringent model, which can be 
compared with those of column (6) in Table 2.1. When multiple movers are assessed 
the findings show that boys are highly statistically significantly more likely to change 
school only than are girls. The coefficient on the gender dummy, of 1.7 percentage 
points, is slightly above that obtained from identical model estimation based on 
pupils moving once, but with the same degree of statistical value. 
There are other similarities in the predictive power of pupil attributes in determining 
the kinds of moves made by one-time and two-time movers, but there are also some 
noteworthy differences in the sizes of estimated coefficients on certain independent 
variables. The )6 parameter on FSME, for example, is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1 per cent level as it was for pupils moving once, suggesting that 
these pupils are less likely to engage in school only transfers than are non-FSM 
entitled pupils. But here the coefficient is greater in magnitude, at -5.3 percentage 
points (compared to -4.1 percentage points previously). The percentage of pupils in 
the sample who move twice and only in respect of their school is 21.79 per cent. 
What this suggests is that the attribute of eligibility for FSM is associated with a fall 
in the probability of school mobility for pupils moving twice of 24.32 per cent, a 
weightier drop than for one-time movers (9.81 per cent). This is driven by 
differences in the sample percentages of pure school changers by the move frequency 
(which, at 41.78 per cent, is higher for pupils moving once). 
Perhaps the most dramatic changes in parameter estimates between movers of 
different rates are on the explanatory variables of SEN status and 'unknown' ethnic 
background. At 6.1 percentage points, the coefficient on SEN for multiple movers is 
almost double that for one-time changers (3.2 percentage points) but with the same 
high level of statistical significance. Thus having SEN status is linked to a rise in the 
probability of pure school change of 27.99 per cent among two-time movers and 7.66 
per cent among those moving once. For pupils classified as having 'unknown' 
ethnicity, the effect of this attribute on the probability of a school only switch is 
positive relative to the reference group of pupils of white British ethnic origin, an 
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outcome that also held for one-time movers. However, here the impact is also far 
higher: the parameter estimate on the dummy for the 'unknown' ethnic category is 
43.0 percentage points among pupils moving twice, compared with 6.9 percentage 
points for students moving once. Consequently a huge probability gain in the 
likelihood of a pure school shift (nearing 200 per cent) is associated with the 
characteristic of 'unknown' ethnic origin among two-time switchers (for those 
moving once the per cent rise in the probability is 16.52). This statistic additionally 
carries more significance in the multiple changers regression (at the 5 per cent level) 
relative to in the case of single moves (where the coefficient estimate is significant at 
the 10 per cent level). 
Two classifications of ethnicity that matter to the determination of multiple move 
probabilities, but not for one-off moves, are those of 'other white' and 'Asian'. 
Pupils of the former ethnic origin are more likely to make two moves of school-home 
than are the baseline case of pupils of a white British ethnic background, while Asian 
pupils are more likely to engage in pure school changes relative to pupils of white 
British ethnicity. Evaluating the coefficient on 'other white' against the benchmark 
of the sample percentage of two-time school-home movers (78.21 per cent) suggests 
that having this attribute is linked to an increase in the probability of school-home 
switches of 8.6 percentage points, or 11 per cent. For pupils of Asian origin the 
benchmark for comparison is the sample percentage of multiple changers moving 
only their school, of 21.79 per cent. At 6.8 percentage points, the coefficient on the 
Asian ethnic category implies that this characteristic is associated with a rise in the 
likelihood of pure school mobility of 31.21 per cent. Both of the estimated 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, indicating their high 
relevance in predicting move type probabilities for multiple movers. 
One further point of distinction to be made between the regression results of column 
(6) for pupils moving once (Table 2.1) versus those moving twice (Table 2.2) relates 
to the significance of KS1 previous attainment as an explanatory variable. It was 
noted in the discussion to Table 2.1 that on its own this indicator is statistically 
significant, but when interacted with the age dummies KS1 APS loses any statistical 
value. In general, the coefficient estimate on this pre-move attainment measure was 
found to be small. In the results of Table 2.2 shown here this variable is not 
associated with the move outcome even at low levels of significance. Therefore it 
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appears that for this cohort of pupils, early achievement scores on KS1 exams (which 
are taken in the summer of 2002) are unrelated to move propensities between KS1 
and KS2, or equivalently between the years 2002 to 2006. The 'pre-move' status of 
this explanatory variable and the potential for it to be an endogenous determinant of 
mobility were two points of concern that were raised in reference to its use in 
regression estimation. The fact that this variable is not a good predictor of the move 
outcome, while other observable pupil-level indicators and geographical controls are, 
suggests that the exclusion of a prior attainment measure from equation (1) may not 
lead to an omitted variable bias in regression results. 
Relative to the inferences drawn from the descriptive study of pupil characteristics 
and KS1 achievement by the move frequency carried out in Chapter One (Tables 1.9 
to 1.12 inclusive), regression analysis undertaken here has revealed similar findings 
across the board. However, further key results have arisen through the process of 
formal testing of the mobility-pupil attributes relationship that could not have been 
gleaned through bivariate evaluation alone. One important advantage of regression 
estimation is in enabling within-characteristic comparisons to be made. Thus, in 
terms of the pupil-level attribute of ethnicity, all regressions have involved assessing 
pure school change among all ethnic categories with respect to the case for pupils of 
white British ethnicity. For pupils moving once, this detail has indicated a greater 
probability of school only change among pupils of black, 'other' and unknown ethnic 
origin relative to pupils from a white British background, information that was not 
fully clarified in the descriptive context. Among those changing aspects of their 
environment twice, the descriptive study established that school change was most 
likely for pupils of an Asian background, and the results presented here have shown 
that this finding is statistically significant when compared to the situation for pupils 
of white British ethnicity. Additionally, regression estimation has revealed that 
pupils in the ethnic group 'other white' are less likely to make multiple school only 
moves relative to pupils of white British ethnic background, a result that is also 
highly statistically significant. Again this outcome was only weakly indicated by the 
descriptive assessment and has become more evident through in-depth regression 
analysis. 
Furthermore, in terms of the pupil characteristic of eligibility for FSM, regression 
testing has established a measure of the size and statistical significance of the 
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disparity in the likelihood of school only moves for FSME versus non-FSME pupils, 
taking into account a host of controls that might be responsible for the estimated 
effect. Although bivartiate analysis indicated differences in moves by FSME status, 
no conclusions could be drawn about the net impact of FSME on school mobility and 
therefore the importance of this characteristic to determining move patterns. 
However, regression results have provided clear evidence that this attribute matters 
both for pupils moving once and for those changing school only, or school and home 
twice, even under the most restrictive model specification (see column 6 of Tables 
2.1 and 2.2). 
Returning to the discussion on probability model estimation, thus far regression 
analysis has focused on the linear probability model and only the results that this 
specification delivers have been presented. Equation (1) was also estimated using the 
logit and the probit model with the same process of sequential model formation as 
for Tables 2.1 and 2.2. As stated earlier, parameter estimates are in the form of 
marginal effects in these models, and are evaluated at the sample means of the 
explanatory variables, as is the case for the linear version. Tables 2A.1 to 2A.4 in 
Appendix 2A show that regression analysis using these functional forms produced 
near identical estimates as given here, indicating that the problems associated with 
the linear model have been accounted for in estimation and this probability model 
specification fits the sample wel162. 
62 
 It should be noted that, under logit and probit model estimation, predicted probabilities of a pupil 
moving school only (y = 1) by the move frequency are derived by the model and are used in the 
interpretation of marginal effects. In the case of the linear probability model, coefficients are instead 
evaluated using the actual sample percentages of pupils moving once or at most twice. Logit and 
probit model predicted probabilities are bounded between zero and one and therefore tend to be lower 
than actual sample percentages. This means that the impact of incremental change in the explanatory 
variables tends to be underestimated under the linear probability model relative to the non-linear 
specifications. 
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2.4 	 Regression Results: Mobility and School Choice 
Statistical methods are also applied in order to formally test the relationship between 
mobility and one measure that is suggestive of the operation of a quasi-market in the 
primary education system, this being pupil movement from an undersubscribed to an 
over-capacity school. For reasons set out in Section 1.9 of Chapter One, only those 
pupils making one move of school, or school and home, are assessed here. 
Estimation of equation (2) first uses the linear probability model and involves step-
by-step model development. Table 2.3 below sets out the findings from initial 
regression analysis:- 
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Table 2.3: Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Relationship Between 
Mobility and Entry to Oversubscribed Schools: One Move 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Choice dummy=pupil moves 0.040*** 0.018** 0.017** 0.017** 0.016** 
to oversubscribed school (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Choice dummy x VA school 0.009 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.017 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Pupil moves to VA school 0.076*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Pupil moves from VA school 0.011 -0.007 -0.007 -0.011 -0.007 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
% FSME (old school) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% FSME (new school) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pupil-teacher ratio M.006*** -0.007*** -0.006*** M.006*** 
(old school) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Pupil-teacher ratio M.002** M.002** -0.001 -0.001 
(new school) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
School size (old school)*100 M.027*** M.026*** M.026*** M.026*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
School size (new school)*100 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
% non-white (old school) M.002*** M.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% non-white (new school) 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pupil characteristics No No Yes Yes Yes 
GOR dummies No No No Yes No 
LEA dummies No No No No Yes 
Number of observations 72,123 70,707 70,422 70,405 70,421 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy indicator taking the value of 1 if a pupil moves school only 
and 0 if a pupil moves school and home between years t-1 and t. The sample number of pupils moving 
once is 80,715, of which 33,725 (41.78%) make pure school moves and 46,990 (58.22%) make 
school-home moves over the KS1-2 phase. Pupil characteristics that are controlled for are as listed in 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 (column 6 specification). GOR dummies are as listed in Table 2.1; LEA dummies 
are included for 149 LEAs. FSME stands for Free School Meal Eligibility. All regressions also control 
for 'other' school types that the pupil comes from and goes to (where 'other' includes Foundation and 
VC schools), as well as the interaction between coming from an undersubscribed school of any type 
and entering an oversubscribed school of the 'other' type (coefficient estimates on these additional 
controls are not reported in this Table). Robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at 
the time t-1 school level. *" = statistically significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% 
level; * = significant at the 10% level. 
117 
The first column of the Table estimates a basic specification of equation (2), in which 
the move outcome is regressed on dummies for the type of school that the pupil came 
from and that which they entered into, the choice dummy, and the interaction of 
choice with the post-move school type. It should be emphasised that every regression 
specification shown in Table 2.3 includes all three types of school in any explanatory 
variable expression where the school type is referred to, as was shown in equation 
(2). That is, estimation uses the three categories of schools - Community, VA, and 
`other' (which includes Foundation and VC schools) - throughout. However, for the 
purpose of simplification, only the coefficients on TyPes,t-i, Types,t, and (Choiceo x 
Types,t) pertaining to VA schools in particular are reported in Table 2.3 (and not 
those for schools in the 'other' group), while Community schools form the reference 
category against which VA (and 'other') school types are compared. 
It is worthwhile to point out at this stage the dual interpretation of the choice dummy. 
Thus far this has been defined as being equal to 1 when a pupil moves from an 
undersubscribed to an oversubscribed school, and 0 for moves between schools of 
any other capacity level combinations. However, since regression estimation includes 
`choice x school type' interaction terms evaluated for each school type relative to the 
reference group of Community schools, this choice indicator can be considered as the 
residual interaction term, which is precisely the reference group's interaction effect 
(i.e. that for Community schools). Therefore choice equals 1 when a pupil engages in 
school change from a below-capacity school of any type to an oversubscribed 
Community school and 0 when a pupil makes any other capacity level combinations 
of moves into a Community school. This means that the choice variable acts as a 
measure of the extent of mobility into LEA-governed Community schools that might 
reflect choice exploitation. 
In column (1) the coefficient on the choice variable is estimated as being positive and 
highly statistically significant, suggesting that this regressor is an important predictor 
of pure school change. Pupils moving from under-capacity schools of any type to 
over-capacity Community schools are 4 percentage points more likely than those 
entering Community schools by any other means to change school only. While the 
KS1-2 cohort sample percentage of pupils moving once who are school only movers 
is 41.78 per cent, this parameter implies that movement from an institution with 
spare pupil places to a capacity-constrained Community school is associated with a 
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rise in the probability of isolated school change to 45.78 per cent, equivalent to an 
increase of 9.57 per cent. Thus this finding provides a preliminary indication that a 
quasi-market might be at work in Community schools during the primary school 
years. 
Pupil movement into a school of the VA type is the only other explanatory factor to 
carry statistical power in column (1) of the Table. The parameter on Types,, for pupils 
joining VA schools is a positive 7.6 percentage points and is significant at the 1 per 
cent level. What this implies is that if a pupil enters a VA school then they are more 
likely to do so by changing only their school relative to the reference group of pupils 
being admitted into Community schools. This indicates that entry into VA schools is 
less likely to depend on relative school and home geographical closeness as on other 
factors that reflect the admissions policy of these schools. 
A further point to raise in relation to the regression output of column (1) is that the 
coefficient on the interaction term between choice and movement into a VA school is 
positive — pupils moving from an undersubscribed school to a VA school that is 
filled to capacity are 0.9 percentage points more likely to make that move by 
changing only their school relative to pupils transferring from below capacity 
institutions to over-capacity Community schools (the reference group). However, it 
is interesting to note that no degree of statistical significance is attached to the 
sample parameter on this interaction variable. This is an important result, as it 
indicates that pupils coming from undersubscribed schools and entering into 
Voluntary-aided schools are statistically just as likely as those joining Community 
schools to do so by moving school only, when the entrant school is oversubscribed. 
This might be construed as evidence of the effective operation of school choice 
policies across both school types. Otherwise, it may indicate the use of proximity in 
location between the school and the home as a criterion for ranking pupil entry into 
oversubscribed VA schools, as it is for admissions into above-capacity Community 
schools. 
The next four columns of Table 2.3 develop model (2) further by additionally 
controlling for school-level features (column 2), pupil-level characteristics (column 
3), and area effects in the form of regional factors (column 4) or LEA dummies 
(column 5). It is evident from inspection of the findings across all of these steps of 
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model development that results are similar at each stage and here only the estimates 
pertaining to the final stringent model specification will be discussed. Relative to 
outcomes from regression analysis undertaken in the first column, in which strong 
and positive explanatory power was found on entry into VA schools and the choice 
dummy, coefficient estimates in column (5) are marginally higher on the former 
variable, but both lower in magnitude and statistically weaker in terms of the latter. 
The parameter on the choice indicator falls to 1.6 percentage points when the model 
with full controls is estimated. The implication of this is that for a pupil coming from 
an undersubscribed school of any type and joining an oversubscribed Community 
school, the probability that they do so by changing just their school is only 3.83 per 
cent higher relative to the reference category. The statistical power of this variable 
falls from 1 per cent significance in column (1) to 5 per cent significance in the last 
specification. Thus any potential school choice effect in operation in state 
Community schools that this indicator may be capturing has been reduced by the 
more rigorous model set-up. 
Changes in the coefficients on both entry into VA schools and the choice dummy are 
driven purely by the inclusion of school contextual effects in the model, rather than 
through the addition of variables relating to pupil-level attributes and area-based 
factors. It is unsurprising that the coefficient on the choice dummy in particular drops 
following the inclusion of school characteristics in the model. Contextual factors 
such as the size of the school that the pupil enters into will influence the amount of 
pure school change from under-capacity institutions to above-capacity Community 
schools that can occur, which is precisely the move pattern that the 'choice' variable 
captures. The main advantage of explicitly modelling these observable school-level 
attributes in the regression equation is that their explanatory power is netted out of 
the estimation process, thereby enabling analysis to more clearly evaluate if 
institutional arrangements in the form of oversubscription criteria employed by 
popular Community schools — like the catchment area occupancy rule — might be 
affecting choice-related school change. Table 2.3 reveals a high degree of statistical 
value attached to certain school-level controls. In terms of the pupil-teacher ratio, 
only that applying in the school the pupil came from impacts on the move outcome. 
Column (5) shows that a unit increase in the pupil-teacher ratio in the period t-1 pre-
move school decreases the probability of a pure school move for pupil i by 0.6 
percentage points. Both the size of the school the pupil leaves and that which they 
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enter into are relevant independent variables. Results show that there is a negative 
effect on the dependent outcome of raising the size of the former school, while in 
terms of the school the pupil enters into, a rise in pupil numbers has a positive effect 
on pure school mobility. The coefficient on the old (time t-1) school size is -2.6 
percentage points while that on the new (time t) school size is exactly 1 percentage 
point, and both of these estimates are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. 
Interpreting these parameters at the sample percentage of one-time movers who make 
pure school changes, of 41.78 per cent, they imply a fall in the probability of school 
change for a pupil coming from a school increasing in size by 100 pupils of 6.22 per 
cent and a rise in the chance of a pure school move for a pupil joining a school 
raising its size by 100 students of 2.39 per cent. 
Turning now to school-level ethnicity, and specifically the percentage of pupils in the 
leaving and joining school of non-white ethnic origin, again there are opposing 
impacts of this indicator on the move outcome by the move period. Coefficient 
estimates suggest that a 1 percentage point rise in the number of non-white pupils in 
the school the student leaves is associated with a fall in the probability of school only 
change of 0.1 percentage points. Conversely, increasing the percentage of non-white 
pupils in the joining school by 1 percentage point raises the probability of school 
only change for a pupil by 0.3 percentage points. These effects are slight, but of high 
statistical importance. Finally, the coefficient on the percentage of pupils with FSME 
in the school the pupil came from only gains statistical value in the final specification 
of the Table, and suggests that a 1 percentage point rise in the number of pupils 
eligible for FSM in the pre-move school increases the probability of a pure school 
move for pupil i by 0.1 percentage points above the sample percentage for pupils 
moving once, to 41.79 per cent, a small change of 0.24 per cent. 
In general the impact of school contextual effects on the move outcome follows an 
expected pattern. It appears that signs of disadvantage in the pre-move school, in the 
form of low teaching resources and pressure on school provisions, decrease the 
probability that a pupil leaves that school by making a pure school shift. This is 
evidenced by the negative coefficients on the pupil-teacher ratio and the school size 
in reference to the old school. Meanwhile, an increase in the percentage of non-white 
pupils in the school the pupil goes to seems to attract more school only changers. 
These results might be anticipated, since previous analysis has shown that school- 
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home moves are higher among pupils with difficult economic circumstances, who 
likely attend weaker institutions, while ethnic minority pupils frequently have good 
academic performance, suggesting that the schools they attend could attract students 
interested in exploiting the pure school mobility opportunities potentially provided 
by choice policies63. On the other hand, the finding that raised FSM eligibility in the 
pre-move school is also linked to a higher pure school move probability appears to 
contradict the established result of multi-environment changes being linked to family 
economic disadvantage. However, this outcome is a fully consistent one if 
consideration is made for the possibility that it is the pupils from better-off 
backgrounds within the school who are engaging in pure school shifts to other 
institutions, and are doing so to a greater extent if there are many FSM-entitled 
students in the school of origin. One further point of note is the finding that school 
capacity increases in the school the pupil joins are associated with pupil entry that 
involves a school only change. This evidence seems to support the notion that greater 
supply-side flexibilities in a school, in terms of pupil capacity expansion, might 
make a difference to the operation of school choice policies (Sibieta, et al., 2008). 
Descriptive analysis on the relationship between mobility and a measure of school 
choice, defined as entry into oversubscribed schools by pupils coming from under-
capacity institutions, was presented in Section 1.9 and Table 1.13 of Chapter One. 
Looking back at the findings made there and those derived from formal regression 
estimation here, clear parallels can be drawn across all results, while the statistical 
approach has also introduced additional detail on the mobility-choice relationship. In 
the first instance, a firm finding is that mobility into VA schools is much more likely 
to be associated with an isolated school move by the pupil. Descriptive work 
considered entry into oversubscribed VA schools by the mover type, for pupils 
coming from a school of any capacity level (see columns (3) and (5) of Table 1.13), 
while regression estimation has involved assessing the comparable though broader 
association between school change and general entry into a VA school (defined by 
Type„). The persistent and increasing size of the coefficient on Type,t for VA school 
joiners achieved in every regression specification shown in Table 2.3 indicates the 
strength of the association between moves into VA schools and pure pupil mobility. 
63 A report by the formerly-named Department for Education and Skills (DIES, 2006) has shown that 
pupils of Indian, Chinese and Asian ethnic origin (in addition to those of white and Irish ethnicity) 
perform better than other ethnic groups across every Key Stage. 
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A suggestion that was made in Chapter One following similar derivation of this 
effect was that VA schools use rules other than school-home proximity, such as a 
declaration of religious affiliation, when deciding on their admissions in general and 
possibly also when they are oversubscribed. Statistical evaluation has further 
reinforced this line of thought. 
Another key result that is evident throughout is the link between school only change 
and school choice, where findings have consistently shown that transfers from under-
to oversubscribed schools of both the Community and the VA type are more likely to 
feature pure school change than school and home moves. However, regression 
testing has allowed for a comparison between all school types to be made64, and this 
has indicated that the apparent greater likelihood of pure school moves from under-to 
over-capacity schools among VA school entrants relative to Community school 
joiners that was noted in the descriptive work does not have any statistical weight. 
Regression evaluation has also been able to take account of observable school 
contextual effects. These have been shown to be important to the estimation of the 
relationship between pure school change and moves from under-capacity schools of 
any type to filled-to-capacity Community schools, which is reduced by their 
inclusion. Overall it is clear that a greater depth of analysis is possible in a regression 
framework relative to that which can be achieved through descriptive examination. 
The exercise of repeating regression estimation of equation (2) using both the logit 
and the probit model specifications resulted in an almost identical set of findings 
being established as are shown in Table 2.3. Hence reporting of regression output 
relating to these models is included in Appendix 2A (see Tables 2A.5 and 2A.6). The 
linear probability model has again been shown to be an appropriate model to use for 
the purposes of evaluation undertaken here. 
64 
 The 'other' school types of Foundation and VC schools are included in regression testing, though, 
as stated at the beginning of this Section, results pertaining to this category of schools are not reported 
in this Chapter. 
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2.5 	 Assessing the Association between School Choice, Mobility and Pupil 
Characteristics 
The findings presented in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 of this Chapter suggest a further 
question to be posed at this stage, as an interesting slant on the enquiry into move 
patterns established so far. The issue of the relationship between choice-related 
school change, the form of move made, and pupil attributes is one that acts to 
combine and re-assess previous investigations from an alternative view-point, and 
serves to offer evidence on whether pupils with certain attributes are benefitting from 
choice policies more than others. A change to the focus of regression estimation 
takes place in this case, with the choice dummy becoming the dependent variable, as 
indicated in the specification set out below. 
2.5.1 Modelling the relationship between school choice, mobility and pupil 
characteristics 
An equation to describe the relationship between choice-related school change, 
mobility, and pupil-level attributes can be expressed as follows:- 
II 
9 
ChOiCeiksj,t = a + 	 + fixi,t, +Egk Agek ,, ,.2002 
k =6 
II 
9 	 3 	 3 
±Eok (Age k,t _i x KS11,t.2002 )+ E sTypes,t_l + 	 sType s,t 
k =6 	 s=1 	 s= I 
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gArl x Moveliksj,t)+ riZs,t-i + 72Z s ,t + Ew,LEALt_, E - iksj 
j=1 
(3) 
Here the dependent variable Choiceiksi,, measures the probability that pupil i of age k, 
in school s and LEA j makes a choice-type move between periods t-1 and t. This 
regressand equals 1 when a pupil moves from an undersubscribed institution to an 
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above-capacity school between the pre-and-post move periods of t-1 and t, and 
equals 0 when a pupil moves between schools of any other capacity-level 
combinations over these time periods. As can be seen from inspection of this 
equation relative to those presented previously in this Chapter, the choice dummy is 
regressed on components of the mobility-pupil attributes equation (1) and the school 
change-school choice equation (2), modelled and described in Sections 2.2.1 and 
2.2.2 respectively. Specifically, equation (3) includes all explanatory variables 
featuring in equation (1), plus indicators for the three different types of school that 
the pupil can come from or go to (Community, VA, and `other'), and controls for the 
characteristics of the pre-move and new school, all of which are contained in 
equation (2). The further dimension added here is a set of interaction terms between 
each pupil characteristic, each type of school the pupil comes from and enters into, 
and the form of move made. The latter variable is denoted by Movel,k„,t, which 
equates to 1 if pupil i of age k and attending school s within LEA j enters the time t 
school by changing only their school and equals 0 if the pupil accessed the school by 
making a combined school-home move between times t-1 and t. All interaction 
expressions are captured in the term 'II x Move Us,"  and their associated vector of 
coefficients is given by go. The purpose of these interaction terms is to allow the 
impact of pupil characteristics and the pre/post-move school type on the choice 
dummy to vary according to the form of move made. As was the case for previous 
regression analyses, sequential model building takes place in the estimation process, 
and variable inclusion follows the order denoted in equation (3). Estimation includes 
a set of LEA dummies in each regression specification, to control for area-specific 
effects that are common to all pupils attending the same pre-move school within 
LEA j. In general equation (3) indicates the relationship between choice-related 
school change, mobility and pupil-level attributes when the potential influence of 
other explanatory variables, such as school-level characteristics and area factors, 
have been taken into account. Thus estimation aims to determine whether pupils with 
particular characteristics and move patterns are more likely to engage in school 
choice and enter into popular, well-performing institutions. 
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2.5.2 Regression results: School choice, mobility and pupil characteristics 
Findings from regression evaluation of equation (3) are presented in Table 2.4 below, 
where OLS analysis uses the linear probability model specification. On the basis of 
the discussion presented in Section 1.9 (Chapter One), only those pupils moving 
once are considered here. Column (1) models the impact of the form of move made 
and all pupil-level attributes on the choice dummy. The second column adds to this 
control variables for the type of school the pupil leaves and enters into, which leads 
to very slight changes in coefficient estimates. Examination of the results presented 
in column (2) reveals that the tit parameter on Moveliki,t is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 per cent level, implying that pupils who make pure school shifts 
are 3.3 percentage points more likely to move from an under-to-oversubscribed 
school than are those students who change both their school and home. In terms of 
ethnicity classifications, there are clear signs of a higher likelihood of choice-type 
moves among pupils of non-white ethnicity in particular. For example, relative to the 
baseline category of pupils of white British ethnicity, pupils of black ethnic origin 
are 4.7 percentage points more likely to move from a below to an above-capacity 
school. 
Interestingly, findings shown in column (2) suggest that there is no association 
between the proxy measure of family poverty and choice-related school change. The 
coefficient on FSME is small in magnitude and has no statistical power, such that 
pupils who are entitled to free school meals are just as likely as non-FSME students 
to move from an under-capacity to an oversubscribed school. Meanwhile, pupils with 
SEN are statistically significantly less likely to make 'choice' moves than are their 
non-SEN counterparts: the coefficient on SEN status is negative, at -1.0 percentage 
points. Evaluating this result using as a benchmark the sample percentage of pupils 
moving once and from an undersubscribed to a filled-to-capacity school, of 19.16 per 
cent, the implication is that having SEN status is linked to a 5.22 per cent drop in the 
probability of a choice-type school transfer65. The last four rows of column (2) show 
parameter estimates and standard errors pertaining to controls for the school type. 
Only pupil entry into a VA school carries a positive and statistically relevant (at the 1 
65 The sample number of pupils moving once is 80,715. Among these, 15,464 pupils (19.16%) make a 
choice-type move transfer from a below capacity to an above capacity school, with 9,038 (58.45%) 
doing so by moving school only and 6,426 (41.55%) doing so by moving school and home. 
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per cent level) association with the choice dummy. Students joining VA schools are 
2.6 percentage points more likely to move from an undersubscribed school of any 
type to a school that is oversubscribed than are pupils joining Community schools. 
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Table 2.4: Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Relationship Between Entry 
to Oversubscribed Schools and Pupil Characteristics: One Move 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pupil moves school only (Move! = 1) 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.076*** 0.079*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.029) (0.029) 
Gender = Male 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Ethnicity = Other White 0.027** 0.025* 0.032* 0.009 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.016) 
Asian 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.039*** 0.008 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
Black 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.039*** 0.014 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Other 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.024** 0.012 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Unknown -0.005 -0.004 0.006 -0.002 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.025) 
FSME 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.003 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
SEN -0.010** -0.010** -0.003 -0.002 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Pupil moves to VA school 0.026*** 0.022*** 0.046*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Pupil moves from VA school -0.009 -0.001 -0.009 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Gender = Male x Movel -0.006 -0.005 
(0.007) (0.006) 
Ethnicity = Other White x Movel -0.022 -0.011 
(0.027) (0.027) 
Asian x Movel -0.023 -0.016 
(0.016) (0.016) 
Black x Movel 0.019 0.016 
(0.019) (0.019) 
Other x Movel 0.027 0.021 
(0.019) (0.019) 
Unknown x Movel -0.023 -0.044 
(0.043) (0.043) 
FSME x Movel -0.002 0.003 
(0.008) (0.008) 
SEN x Movel -0.020** M.016* 
(0.009) (0.009) 
Pupil moves to VA school x Movel 0.007 0.003 
(0.010) (0.010) 
Pupil moves from VA school x Movel -0.021* -0.017 
(0.011) (0.011) 
School-level characteristics No No No Yes 
Number of observations 71,836 71,833 71,833 70,421 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy indicator that equals 1 if a pupil moves from an undersubscribed 
to an oversubscribed school - that is, a choice-related move - and 0 if a pupil moves between schools of 
any other capacity-level combinations over time periods t-1 and t. Additional pupil characteristics that are 
controlled for include (i) age dummies; (ii) KS1 APS; (iii) the interaction of age dummies and KS1 APS; 
and (iv) all of (i) to (iii) interacted with Movel (see Table 2.1 and associated notes). All regressions also 
control for 'other' school types that the pupil comes from and goes to (`other' includes Foundation and VC 
schools) and their interactions with Movel. Column 4 includes controls for school-level characteristics of 
the pre-and-post move school attended by the pupil, as listed in Table 2.3. All model specifications include 
149 LEA-level dummies to account for area-based effects (coefficient estimates on all of these additional 
regressors are not reported in this Table). Robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the 
time t-1 school level. *** = statistically significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = 
significant at the 10% level. 
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Column (3) of Table 2.4 includes interaction terms between each pupil characteristic, 
the type of school the pupil comes from and goes to, and the form of move made. 
With these expressions added, the yr coefficient on Movel captures the effect of pure 
pupil mobility for the omitted category, determined by all remaining interactions 
(such as non-FSME x Movel and non-SEN x Movel and Female x Movel and pupil 
entry into a Community school x Movel, etc.). This increases by 4.3 percentage 
points from the column (2) estimate, to 7.6 percentage points. Moreover, in this 
specification, parameter estimates on pupil attributes (denoted by the vector ,8 in 
equation (3)) and on the pre-and-post move school type (symbolised by vectors 
and C., respectively in model (3)) measure the association between these variables and 
the choice dummy when the pupil shifts both school and home between periods t-1 
and t (that is, when Movel equals 0). Then the interaction terms themselves indicate 
the additional effect of pupil characteristics and the school type on choice-related 
school change when the pupil makes a pure school move. As the findings of column 
(3) show, the magnitudes of coefficient estimates on pupil attributes and the type of 
school the pupil comes from and goes to (and their degree of statistical significance) 
remain relatively stable when interaction terms are incorporated in regression 
analysis. Only in the case of the pupil characteristic of SEN status does the 18 
estimate drop in value to the extent that statistical relevance is no longer applicable 
(while the standard error is almost invariant across the regressions of columns 2 and 
3). Instead, the parameter on the interaction between SEN status and Movel is 
negative and statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. These findings imply that 
SEN pupils who move school and home are just 0.3 percentage points less likely to 
change from an under-capacity to an above-capacity school than are non-SEN 
school-home changers. Meanwhile, pupils with SEN status who move school only 
are, in total, 2.3 percentage points less likely to make a 'choice' move than are non-
SEN pure school switchers. Thus these results show how the form of move made 
matters for choice-related school change among pupils in the SEN status group. 
It is noteworthy to discuss the findings concerning pupil entry to a VA school, and 
the interaction of this variable with Movel. At 2.2 percentage points, the sample 
parameter on the former regressor remains positive and is only moderately altered 
following model expansion, while that on the latter interaction expression, although 
smaller in size, is also positive at 0.7 percentage points (column 3). What these 
estimates suggest is that, whether they move both school and home or school only, 
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pupils entering VA schools are more likely to make choice-type school moves than 
are pupils joining Community schools. Thus this evidence reinforces the notion that 
VA schools place emphasis on the satisfaction of criteria other than school-home 
proximity (such as religious ethos) when they are above-capacity. 
In the final column of the Table, the full regression specification outlined in equation 
(3) is estimated, featuring controls for both the characteristics of the school the pupil 
attended previously and that which they subsequently joined (sample parameters on 
these variables are not reported in Table 2.4). Among these additional regressors are 
the percentages of non-white pupils in the pre-move school and in the new school. 
Following the inclusion of these indicators, it can be seen that there is a fall in the 
magnitude (and a loss in the statistical significance) of each fi coefficient attached to 
the pupil-level ethnic categories of Asian, black and 'other'. The likely cause of this 
change is a high amount of positive correlation between these pupil-level variables 
and the school-level ethnicity measures. Further results of interest concern the 
coefficient on pupil entry into a VA school, which more than doubles in size under 
the model with a full set of controls, to 4.6 percentage points, while the coefficient 
derived on the interaction of Movel and entry to a VA school shrinks but remains 
positive, at 0.3 percentage points. Again, these findings points towards differences in 
institutional arrangements employed by VA schools as compared to Community 
schools in the event of oversubscription, in which entry priority based on the school-
home link can be reinstated in Community schools but in VA schools non-locational 
factors seem to matter more. Overall, it is evident that when a more detailed 
regression model is estimated, only the coefficients on pure school change 
(Moveliksp equals 1) and pupil movement into a VA school retain strong sizes and 
statistical significance, while there are no clear associations between the set of pupil 
characteristics and transfers from below-capacity to oversubscribed schools66. 
66 Equation (3) was re-estimated using both the logit and the probit model, in a pattern of sequential 
model building shown by Table 2.4. Results were similar across the various functional forms, 
suggesting that the linear probability model is an appropriate one to use for estimation of equation (3). 
For the purpose of succinctness, estimates pertaining to the logit and probit model regressions are 
excluded from Appendix 2A. 
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2.6 	 Breaking down the Relationship between Mobility and School Choice by 
Region and FSME Status 
Exploration of variations in the estimated link between mobility and school choice 
along the lines of region and pupil-level FSM eligibility forms the focus of analytical 
work presented here. Regional differences in the probability of pure school change 
among pupils moving once are examined by dividing the sample up between London 
and other areas. Likewise the characteristic of FSME status is used to split the 
sample of one-time movers into two categories of pupils that differ according to their 
entitlement to FSM, so that isolated school change probabilities by the two groups 
can be compared. 
The first angle of evaluation aims to establish more information on whether pure 
school change is motivated by school choice. Analysis that divides the sample 
between London and other regions within England might offer more detail on the 
operation of choice for several reasons. In the first place there are features unique to 
large cities such as London which might suggest that estimated school only moves in 
this region reflect factors other than a school choice system. As a densely populated 
space it is likely that education provisions are more abundant in London than in other 
parts. Additionally, geographical classifications such as postcodes cover more units 
in London. Thus there is a greater chance of the home location of a pupil being 
within the catchment area of more than one state primary school in London relative 
to elsewhere67. In this case the oversubscription criteria of school and home 
geographical proximity that is employed by LEA-governed Community schools may 
be satisfied several times over from the current place of residence. Then pure school 
moves into popular schools in this area may simply reflect the lack of need to move 
home in order to gain access to such schools rather than any indication of choice. 
Moreover, transport systems in conurbations like London are more readily available, 
making daily travel to schools that are further away from the home more accessible 
to parents of primary age children. All of these points suggest that it is necessary to 
separate out estimates of school mobility between undersubscribed schools of any 
type and oversubscribed Community schools for pupils in London relative to 
students in other regions. This is because if pure school change between schools of 
these capacity levels is evident in London but not in other regions then this suggests 
67 This notion of overlapping catchment areas was discussed in Section 1.9 of Chapter One. 
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that the estimates shown in Table 2.3 are only picking up the effect of London. If this 
is the case, then previous estimates provide little evidence of school moves motivated 
by choice. On the other hand, if moves of this kind are also taking place in other 
regions, this gives more assurance that prior estimates are indicative of choice 
polices in operation. Thus this regional breakdown aims to capture the extent to 
which the findings of Table 2.3 on the association between mobility and the school 
type, as well as school change motivated by school choice considerations, can be 
largely attributed to unique area effects. 
Assessment of the mobility-school choice relationship for FSME versus non-FSME 
pupils is the second line of enquiry that is taken as a result of the importance of this 
indicator in determining the move outcome. It was shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 that 
the attribute of pupil eligibility for FSM is negatively associated with pure school 
change for students moving once or twice. Consideration of whether this result arises 
when school-level capacity constraints in the new school are accounted for serves to 
provide information on the persistence of any limiting effect of FSME on schooling 
behaviour, including that relating to school choice exploitation. 
Table 2.5 presents regression results from the regional divide of the sample, as well 
as the split by FSME status. In all cases equation (2) is estimated using a linear 
probability model with a full set of controls, as per column (5) of Table 2.3, while, 
for simplicity, only the coefficient estimates pertaining to the Types,t-i, Types,t, 
Choice,,t and Choice,,t x Types,t variables are reported. Columns (1) and (2) of the 
Table show regression output for London and other regions (where the latter are 
defined in the notes to the Table). Focusing on the findings for London, estimation 
indicates a highly significant and positive coefficient on the choice dummy of 4.9 
percentage points. This suggests that in the London region pupils moving once from 
an undersubscribed school of any type to an above-capacity Community school are 
more likely to do so by making a pure school move than are pupils in this area who 
enter Community schools via any other capacity level combinations. So the 
probability that a pupil in London makes an isolated school change to gain entry into 
a popular Community school is 11.73 per cent higher relative to the sample 
percentage of pupils moving once who change only their school (of 41.78 per cent), 
at 46.68 per cent. However, it is evident that this situation is not repeated outside of 
London. Column (2) shows that the choice dummy carries no statistical value for 
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other regions (t-statistic = 1.25), such that there is a similar likelihood of pure school 
change into Community schools for pupils in these areas, whatever the capacity 
levels are in the schools they move from and enter into. The implication of this 
finding is that the statistically strong positive coefficient on the choice indicator that 
was estimated in column (5) of Table 2.3 largely captures the effect of the London 
region only. Thus, it appears that there is limited evidence of the potential existence 
of a quasi-market for schooling. This is true to the extent that London features 
overlapping catchment areas and good transport links that make home moves an 
unnecessary component of entry into oversubscribed schools. 
Other important regional variation that is highlighted by columns (1) and (2) is the 
greater probability that entry into VA schools (as opposed to the reference group of 
Community schools) involves an isolated school shift for pupils in London compared 
to elsewhere. The coefficient on the Typesa dummy stands at 14.1 percentage points 
for London relative to 6.9 percentage points for other regions. The fact that this 
coefficient has equally high statistical power across all areas reinforces the stated 
notion that admissions to VA schools focus on the satisfaction of criteria concerning 
issues such as religious commitment above geographical factors, making entry by 
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In terms of FSME status, regression analysis suggests that pupils who are entitled to free 
school meals are just as likely to transfer from below-capacity schools of any type to 
above-capacity Community schools by making an independent school change as are 
non-FSME students (see columns 3 and 4). While the parameter estimate on the choice 
variable for FSME pupils is not statistically relevant, that for non-FSME pupils is 
marginally statistically significantly different from zero (at the 10 per cent level of 
significance), a finding which would initially imply that the latter group make more 
choice-type school change. However, the coefficient on the choice dummy for pupils 
from worse-off backgrounds is slightly above the estimate pertaining to non-FSME 
students, at 1.7 percentage points compared with 1.6 percentage points respectively. 
Then in overall terms parameter estimation indicates similarity in the likelihood of 
choice-related school moves among pupils from better-off backgrounds and those from 
poorer families. 
Interestingly, there are signs that FSM-eligible pupils are more successful at gaining 
entry into VA schools relative to Community schools by moving school only, and this 
effect is larger for this group than for non-FSME pupils. This is indicated by the positive 
coefficient on entry into VA schools of 10.2 percentage points (column 3), which 
compares with a coefficient estimate of 7.4 percentage points for non-FSME students 
(column 4). Interpreted at the sample percentage of pupils moving once who change 
only their school, of 41.78 per cent, the probability that a pupil who is FSME joins a VA 
school by making a single school move is 24.41 per cent higher. Comparatively, for non-
FSM eligible pupils the probability is 17.71 per cent higher. Further evidence of VA 
school admissions by FSME pupils through isolated school change is shown by the 
parameter estimate on the interaction term between the choice dummy and the VA 
school type. At 4.3 percentage points, this is marginally statistically significant and 
higher than the coefficient estimate on this variable for non-FSME pupils (0.8 
percentage points). This means that if two FSME pupils move from an undersubscribed 
school of any type and one pupil enters an oversubscribed Community school while the 
second pupil joins an above-capacity VA school, the second pupil is more likely to have 
made a pure school change only. Overall, the findings from columns (3) and (4) of the 
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Table do not give rise to the notion that FSME pupils are gaining access to plausibly 
higher quality Community schooling through choice policies. 
The final four columns of Table 2.5 assess regional variation in moves by the level of 
pupil disadvantage. In other words, in this section of the Table the informative content 
of columns (1) to (4) is combined. The most notable findings derived here relate to the 
specifications that look at FSME pupils in particular. First of all, comparing across 
columns (5) and (6) of the Table, it can be seen that pupils in London who are eligible 
for FSM are more likely than non-eligible pupils in this area to move from 
undersubscribed institutions of any type to over-capacity Community schools just by 
changing their school. While estimates are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level 
for both eligible and non-eligible pupils, at 5.6 percentage points the coefficient on the 
choice dummy indicator is 1.2 percentage points higher for pupils from worse-off 
backgrounds. The sample percentage of FSME pupils in London who make one pure 
school change is 36.36 per cent, and that for non-FSME pupils is very similar, at 35.11 
per cent. Interpreted at these values, the increase in the likelihood of a choice-type move 
that is implied by the difference in these coefficient estimates is 22.90 per cent for 
FSME students relative to those from wealthier families68. If any of this measured effect 
is capturing school choice moves, rather than features such as the home being located in 
an overlapping catchment area, then this suggests that FSME pupils in this region might 
be gaining access to popular and potentially better-performing Community schools 
through the quasi-market. 
There is no evidence of school change motivated by the pursuit of improved schooling 
for FSME and non-FSME pupils in other regions. The parameter estimated on the choice 
dummy in columns (7) and (8) is not statistically relevant. This is in line with the 
68 This percentage increase is calculated using the coefficient estimates on the choice dummy pertaining to 
FSME and non-FSME pupils shown in columns (5) and (6) of Table 2.5 and the sample percentages 
indicated in the text as follows: (5.6/36.36)*100 = 15.402%; (4.4/35.11)*100 = 12.532%; and ((15.402- 
12.532)/12.532)*100 = 22.90%. The 95% confidence interval for the estimated I for FSME pupils is 
(0.0123 to 0.1000) and that for non-FSME pupils is (0.0093 to 0.0796). Overlapping confidence intervals 
on these two parameter estimates would suggest there is a similarity in the likelihood of choice-related 
school moves among pupils from better-off backgrounds and those from poorer families located in the 
London area. However, the difference in the magnitudes of the coefficients between the two groups and 
the resultant percentage effect implied by this difference indicate a stronger likelihood of choice-related 
school change among FSME pupils relative to non-FSME pupils in the London region. 
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findings of columns (1) and (2), where it was noted that pure school change from under-
capacity schools to over-capacity Community schools was largely in effect in London 
only, hence it is unsurprising that further breakdown by FSME status does not change 
the initial result. 
An enduring finding across all regions and all FSME status groups is that pupils entering 
into VA schools are more likely to do so by making a pure school move than are pupils 
joining Community schools. This impact is stronger among FSM-entitled pupils, 
whether they are in London or other regions. The coefficient on entry into a VA school 
is 17.6 (12.3) percentage points and 8.1 (6.5) percentage points for FSME (non-FSME) 
pupils in London and other regions respectively. Finally, there is no indication of 
regional or FSME status variation on the variable of choice interacted with the school 
type of VA schools. This means that pupils moving from undersubscribed schools of any 
type to over-capacity VA schools are just as likely to do so by making a pure school 
change as are movers from under-capacity schools of any type to over-capacity 
Community schools. 
Overall, regional and pupil background considerations have shown that there is not 
sufficient evidence of a quasi-market in operation in the state primary school sector, to 
the extent that its existence can be effectively measured by isolated school moves from 
under-capacity schools to above-capacity Community schools. However, regression 
estimation evidence of FSME pupils in London making these kinds of moves is an 
interesting result, as it suggests there may be some potential for less-advantaged pupils 
to gain access to improved learning in this region through choice exploitation, so long as 
some of these school changes reflect choice-related moves. 
As was the case for previous regression analysis, the practice of re-estimating equation 
(2) on the regional groups and according to pupil FSME status using logit and probit 
models produced much the same results. Thus findings from this process are reported in 
Appendix 2A (see Tables 2A.7 and 2A.8). 
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2.7 	 Limitations of the Analysis 
The empirical evaluation carried out throughout Chapters One and Two has been based 
on the NPD linked to school-level data. There are limitations placed on the effective 
analysis of mobility patterns and their link to school choice and pupil characteristics that 
are associated with the use of these data sources, particular the NPD. Here the natures of 
these limitations are addressed in detail. 
In the first instance, the focus of both Chapters One and Two has been to look at 
mobility for a single cohort of pupils as they progress through state-provided schooling 
at the Primary stage of education, given that recent government initiatives pertaining to 
the education sector involve state schools only. The PLASC dataset is an ideal form of 
secondary data to use in this respect. However, there are gaps in the coverage of the 
PLASC data which matter for the analysis of mobility patterns. One caveat is that only 
migration taking place within England features in the KS1-2 cohort sample. Complete 
patterns of moves corresponding to all years of schooling among international migrants 
(including refugees and asylum seekers), and among those pupils moving from 
elsewhere within the UK who enter a school in England for a certain length of time, 
cannot be established. At best only the test results pertaining to a single Key Stage may 
exist for such pupils. For schools in the cities and metropolitan areas of England this 
type of pupil entry and exit will make up a large proportion of their school joiner-leaver 
activity. Then all mobility measures will be understated by that amount of movement 
that reflects cross-country migration, and this shortfall of the data can produce a non-
trivial flattening of regional variation. Additionally, where households opt out of state 
provided education and buy into the schooling provisions of the private fee-charging 
sector and for those moving in the opposite direction, residential and school changes 
assessed using PLASC will be understated by the omission of independent school pupils 
in the data. Moreover, children who are schooled at home and who may or may not be 
instructed in line with the requirements of the National Curriculum will not feature in 
the data since they will not be enrolled in a publicly-provided learning institution. In the 
dataset all of these exclusions from PLASC — international migrants, independent school 
pupils, and home-tutored children — are likely to form those observations where there is 
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attrition at some point in the sample presence, as detailed in Table 1.4 and Table 1.6 of 
Chapter One69. 
In terms of the methods for estimating the amount of mobility presented in this work, in 
all approaches there is no means for assessing multiple within academic year pupil 
moves, since the administrative data on the school roll used here is collected only once 
per year. Provision of tri-annual PLASC data represents a major step forward for future 
projects concerning mobility. However, the fact that PLASC is able to provide a 
longitudinal panel of observations on the same pupil as they move through the schooling 
years does mean that multiple year-on-year moves of both school and home can be 
considered, assessment that was not readily achievable prior to NPD availability. 
A greater concern attached to the estimation of the amount of move activity is that this is 
restricted to the observations on mobility indicators within the sample window. In the 
sample frame considered here, there is the potential for some moves to be taking place 
towards the end of the KS2 phase of education that cannot be observed in the data, 
leading to the underestimation of total moves over the entire KS1-2 phase. In particular 
mobility taking place between January 2006 (when PLASC 2005/2006 is collected) and 
the summer of 2006 (when KS2 tests are taken) is unaccounted for in the data (see 
Chapter One, Table 1.5). However, this is a very small gap in the data of at most 6 
months, assuming that pupils take their KS2 tests in July at the very latest. The extent of 
these non-measured moves also appears trivial when set against the likelihood that much 
mobility actually takes place outside of the entire KS1-2 cohort sample frame altogether. 
The evidence presented in Chapter One, Table 1.1 revealed combined school-home 
mobility to be at its highest during the school year 1 to 2 transition". If pre-school entry 
mobility holds for the current sample, which is sure to be the case, such moves cannot 
presently be observed. This means that the analysis will omit important early years 
moving behaviour that matters not only for the count of cumulative moves made and 
69 See also Appendix IA: Table I A.2 reports the number of pupils in KS1 or KS2 only, and how many of 
these are classified as independent school pupils. Tables 1A.4 and 1A.5 show how many pupils in the 
KS1-2 cohort are and are not in PLASC. 
70 Child migration statistics based on the Population Censuses of 1991 and 2001 are presented in 
Appendix IA, Section 1A.A. These also reveal a high amount of residential mobility in the pre-
compulsory schooling ages of 1-4. 
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their type but also in terms of the accurate definition of non-movers in the KS1-2 cohort. 
As the longitudinal nature of the PLASC dataset widens in the future, this will increase 
the breadth of detail on cumulative mobility, including that taking place in the pre-
compulsory school-age years, given that PLASC also collects information on pupils in 
nursery schools. In this case, examination of a cohort of KS1-2 pupils for whom 
nursery-level observations are also available would serve to strengthen mobility (and 
immobility) estimation. Despite this drawback of the present study, it should be 
emphasised that the analysis undertaken here, which tracks both the extent and type of 
moves made by one cohort of pupils over a long period of schooling, has not been 
feasible on such a large scale prior to the introduction of PLASC, thus the dataset 
already acts a significant resource for researchers. 
Further limitations of evaluation concern the use of specific variables in this study, 
where there are two main problem areas. One of these is the FSME indicator, which is 
the only measure of family poverty available in PLASC. This is a means-tested 
allowance, entitlement to which depends on the receipt of certain benefits by low-
income households. Where family income sits just above the threshold of qualification 
for FSM, or where no application is made to obtain this financial support, the measure 
will not reflect the true extent of poverty among pupils contained within the dataset, and 
as such will provide an imperfect proxy indicator of difficult economic circumstances 
(Croft, 2003; Hobbs and Vignoles, 2007). Despite this being a crude measure, it is 
nonetheless a valuable source of well-collected information on the wealth of the 
household pertaining to each individual pupil featuring in PLASC. 
The other variable of concern is the school oversubscription measure. This indicator is 
calculated using the division of the total number of pupils to school capacity, details that 
are obtained from the DCSF-provided Edubase dataset. Where the result of this division 
exceeds one, a school is classified as being oversubscribed. The problem with this 
measure lies in the accuracy of the school capacity component in particular. This figure 
is based on the size and quantity of "classbases" within a school, where a "classbase" is 
"a classroom or area designated as the registration base for one class" (DfES, 2002, pp. 
5, paragraph 22). It is the responsibility of each LEA to assess the capacity of all 
140 
maintained schools under its jurisdiction. The statistic is not required to be recalculated 
on an annual basis, unless there are physical alterations to the usable space, changes 
which schools are responsible for informing the LEA of (ibid). Where there are 
unreported changes in the capacity measurement, or where there are inaccuracies in the 
assessment of the available space, there will be either an overestimation or an 
underestimation of the true capacity of the school, creating downwards or upwards bias 
in the oversubscription calculation respectively. The extent to which this is a problem is 
limited by consideration for the fact that LEAs are legally obliged to provide this 
information to the DCSF under the Education Act 1996 (ibid). Additionally, it was noted 
in the empirical work where the oversubscription variable was used, that there were 
missing observations in the annual provisions of its relevant components. In order to 
overcome this data shortfall, calculation was based on three-year averages rather than a 
single year. An important drawback to using averaged data is that the process of 
averaging masks year-on-year variation in the component indicators. Then it could be, 
for example, that within at least one of the years across which mean subscription rates 
were calculated a school may have been below capacity, and it was during this time that 
the pupil might have entered an otherwise oversubscribed school on average. Despite 
this weakness, averaged data offers the second best alternative to the provision of an 
accurate annual capacity measure, while the procedure of averaging might itself allow 
for some reduction in the margin of error in the capacity indicator, where this exists, and 
consequently in those parts of the estimation that use it. As data resources potentially 
begin to offer both quantitative and qualitative evidence of the relation between parental 
schooling preferences and actual school admissions numbers, more detailed and reliable 
measures of school capacity and oversubscription may become available in the future. 
Finally, an additional area of analysis limitation is the potential for there to be variable 
omissions in regression estimation that may matter to move patterns. It could be, for 
example, that the finding that boys are consistently more likely to engage in pure school 
change than are girls is due to the relatively higher rate of school exclusion among boys. 
In this case their school change is dominated by behavioural issues, information on 
which is not provided in the dataset utilised here. While pupil-level details such as these 
would be of immense value to the analysis, a much greater omission is the lack of any 
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qualitative data pertaining to the decision-making processes within the family. In 
particular, there are no indicators on the reasons for moving home or issues that affected 
the choice of school. Nor are there any measures of factors that influence the use of 
choice, such as the value parents attach to education and their interest in the academic 
success of their child(ren). All of these aspects likely carry substantial weight for the 
findings presented here. The decision to move home may be related to the search for or 
acquisition of better employment opportunities, for example. Where the home relocation 
involves a change of school, this represents a secondary outcome rather than the direct 
reason for the home move, but may show up as a school choice-related move if 
enhanced income from employment enables improved quality areas and schooling 
provisions to be accessed71. Additionally, variations in choice usage by families 
differing in their social background may reflect disparities in the worth they place on 
education and the characteristics that they look for in schools. In this case, the lack of 
evidence of successful choice exploitation among economically worse-off households 
may be a consequence of their lower evaluation of the educational benefits to be derived 
from accessing higher-performing schools. These areas might all be better assessed in 
the future as the potential to link the NPD to birth cohort studies and survey data rises72. 
The variable omissions of the kinds mentioned obviously matter for this study of 
mobility, since the results found may be driven by components that are unaccounted for. 
Nevertheless, the research undertaken here makes an important initial contribution in the 
direction of isolating and assessing the amount of different types of school moves made 
by pupils varying in their attributes and relating this to the concept of school choice, 
evaluation that has not been possible before the onset of a relatively new and extremely 
rich pupil-level data source in the form of the NPD. 
71 This point was also made in the descriptive work of Chapter One, Section 1.9. 
72 See the overall Conclusion to the thesis for a further discussion of the points raised here in respect of 
omitted qualitative information on decision-making processes, and the potential for this gap in knowledge 
to be filled by future research involving the use of survey data. 
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2.8 Summary and Discussion 
A rigorous evaluation of the determinants of mobility in a regression framework has 
formed the focus of this study. Empirical analysis has aimed to establish a clearer 
understanding of the relationship between school change and pupil characteristics as 
well as the association between mobility and school choice. In this respect a statistical 
approach is a useful tool in that it allows explanatory factors to have a simultaneous 
impact on the move outcome, thereby going well beyond the level of inference that can 
be drawn from descriptive bivariate assessment alone. 
It has been shown here that there is clear variation in the type of move made along the 
lines of pupil attributes. One finding that persists in all model specifications is that pupil 
eligibility for free school meals is strongly negatively correlated with pure school 
change, so that these pupils are more likely to engage in combined school and home 
moves than are non-FSME students. Whether this effect continues through to models of 
school choice has formed an important secondary question. Estimates have revealed that 
school only movement from undersubscribed institutions to Community schools that are 
above capacity is prevalent in London, while there is very little evidence of this type of 
mobility happening elsewhere. At the same time both FSME and non-FSME pupils have 
been shown to make these kinds of moves within the London region, with the former 
group doing so to a greater extent than the latter. 
While this finding might appear to indicate the operation of a quasi-market for schooling 
on some level, the fact that a measured effect is only evident in London, and not in other 
regions of England, suggests that other aspects may be at work instead. One of these is 
the likelihood of greater clustering of education provisions in densely populated areas, 
so that the home is located in the catchment area of several primary schools in the 
London region in particular. In this case the pupil admissions ranking criteria of 
proximity to the school that is employed by above-capacity Community schools may be 
fulfilled without necessitating a move of home, resulting in a reduced need for strategic 
home relocation in order to satisfy oversubscription admissions rules. Another 
explanation of the result concerns the provision of a better transport infrastructure in a 
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large city, so that home-to-school travel distances are shrunk. If all of these features are 
typical of London, then this suggests that there is at best a weak amount of school 
change during the primary education stage that reflects choice-related access to 
improved schooling. However, that these kinds of moves appear to take place among 
both FSM-eligible and non-eligible pupils in London gives some indication that family 
wealth might not act as a full deterrent to entry to popular schools. 
Research undertaken elsewhere provides further evidence to indicate the limited 
operation of school choice policies in London as for in other regions. In fact, studies 
suggest that there is a persistence of the school-home link in determining school 
admissions, shown through a relationship between school-home proximity and house 
prices, particularly in the case of houses located in the vicinity of institutions with strong 
academic performance that are likely to be oversubscribed. Recent analysis of house 
prices and school quality in the UK has shown that parents of primary school-age 
children are relocating to a residence within the catchment area of a high-performing 
local primary school in an attempt to secure a place for their child in the establishment, 
often paying significant house price premia in order to do so. Estimates suggest that a 10 
percentage point rise in the number of pupils achieving Level 4 national target grades in 
their end of KS2 tests adds around a 3 per cent property price premium to houses in 
London and the surrounding Metropolitan areas (Gibbons and Machin, 2006). This 
indicates that parents believe it to be worthwhile to make strategic home moves to assure 
a higher chance of entry to a good quality school for their child(ren). The implication of 
this is that where a pupil lives in relation to the school is still considered to matter 
among parents, so that from their perspective unconditional schooling access is 
recognised as not being fully operational. 
The implications of this study are that school choice policies have a long way to go if 
pupils are to benefit from their potential to raise access to better education services and 
reduced home location related constraints on the supply of education. One area that 
needs to be addressed is the notion that popular schools have to impose conditions on 
entry because supply-side rigidities in the form of infrastructure limitations place 
restrictions on school expansion. Allowing schools with a long-term record of failure to 
close and be taken over by schools that are doing well might help to address the issue of 
building supply inflexibilities. However, as the discussion on institutional reform in 
`Key Concepts' and in the following section (Part II) of this thesis make clear, school 
exit rarely happens and often low-performing schools face improvement strategies rather 
than closure. All-in-all, if the key policy goals of raised standards of attainment and 
equality in educational opportunity are to be addressed through a quasi-market for 
schooling that seeks to achieve these objectives through enhanced and fair schooling 
access, then substantial steps still need to be taken in order to ensure that the scheme 
delivers on its goals. 
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Part II 
Chapter Three: The Impact of Institutional Change on the 
Pupil Intake Profile of Schools: Focusing on the Academies 
Programme 
3.1 	 Introduction 
Government expenditure on education has seen real term increases averaging about 4.3 
per cent per year since 2000, with per-pupil spending in the state schools sector rising by 
6.4 per cent per year net of inflation since the Labour government came into power in 
1997 (Holmlund et al., 2009; Sibieta et al., 2008). Following the 1988 Education 
Reform Act, the administering of the vast majority of state school finances has been 
devolved from Local Education Authority (LEA) allocation among schools to direct 
central government distribution to the governing bodies of individual schools, under the 
`local management of schools' scheme. At the same time a system of pupil-led funding 
has been created, in which the monies passed on to maintained schools have been made 
to more closely take account of the background circumstances and quantity of their pupil 
base, under a 'fair funding formula' that is determined by the LEA (West and Pennell, 
1997; Sibieta et al., 2008). These changes in the way the education budget is transferred 
to schools have been implemented as a means for granting schools more autonomy over 
their financial operations, in turn allowing schools to be self-managed. 
Education policy in England has pursued the notion of equality of opportunity delivered 
through an effective and competitive education system accessible by pupils irrespective 
of their background and geographical location. The Labour government has launched an 
attack on low state school standards, adopting a "zero tolerance of underperformance" 
approach to dealing with the issue (Labour Party, 1997). Despite this political stance and 
the rise in the real value of education funding coupled with increasing school budgetary 
control, there exists a persistent tail of underperforming state secondary schools at the 
bottom end of the attainment distribution. These schools feature heavily in deprived 
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areas and are largely responsible for providing education to pupils characterised by 
social and economic disadvantage. Sustained failure in schools at the secondary 
education phase maintains the problem of education inequality and the presence of a 
pool of 'hard-to-reach' pupils whose situation of deprivation and disadvantage continues 
into adulthood (Machin and Vignoles, 2005; Machin et al., 2007). 
As part of a strategy to improve school standards, policy initiatives that revolve around 
institutional change as a means for school renewal have been instigated. One particular 
high-profile scheme that was announced in March 2000 and has been in operation in 
state secondary schools since September 2002 is that of the Academies programme. This 
initiative involves the rejuvenation of a failing secondary school in an area of 
disadvantage through delegation of school control to a private sponsor. The Academy 
sponsor is given the flexibility to adopt innovative approaches in the functioning of the 
school in return for a committed financial contribution, in an attempt to reform the 
school into a viably competitive education provider. Thus Academy schools are exempt 
from the LEA control that is characteristic of most state secondary schools and they 
instead have an independent status. On the whole the scheme has. sought to achieve three 
main aims: (1) to raise the achievement and aspirations of underprivileged pupils in 
deprived areas; (2) to enhance local choice and diversity in the provision of state 
schooling through the use of new techniques of education delivery; and (3) to feature a 
more inclusive and mixed-ability background of pupils within the Academy school. 
There are currently 133 Academies (June 2009), with plans to extend their coverage to 
15 per cent of secondary school education provision by 2015. The scheme has received a 
greater platform of significance following the 2008 government announcement of the 
National Challenge, a new target system of achievement requiring all schools to have at 
least 30 per cent of their pupils attaining five or more A*-C GCSEs (including English 
and Maths) by 2011. Under this initiative all such weak schools will be given the option 
to convert to an Academy school (DCSF, 2008; Curtis et al., 2008; see 'Key Concepts'). 
In Part II of this thesis the effectiveness of institutional transformation in the form of the 
Academies model will be assessed with specific reference to whether the scheme is 
capable of delivering inclusive access to the renewed school for pupils in disadvantaged 
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areas (aim (3)). School reconstitution can be expected to positively affect the schooling 
and life chances of pupils if it results in the provision of better quality education and 
more schooling options for all at the expense of none. On the other hand school 
improvement initiatives that result in increased stratification along the lines of pupil 
ability and pupil characteristics will worsen education inequality. The Academies 
programme is of particular significance in this respect as the popularity of these schools 
has increased over time, with applications for places frequently exceeding school 
capacity, suggesting that as these new types of schools re-establish themselves they may 
be more able to 'cherry pick' pupils to enter the school from the pool of applicants. Such 
an outcome calls into question the capability of a scheme that offers school improvement 
to a target group, through increased access to potentially better quality schooling, to 
bring about change to that audience. In turn this outcome produces uncertainty over the 
extent to which the initiative can achieve both its specific objective of more inclusion 
and the general government aims of raising standards of academic attainment and 
reducing education inequality. 
Delivery on goal (3) of the Academies programme will be assessed here by looking at 
how the pupil profile of Academies changes once they open under their renewed school 
type. In this respect, pupil-level data contained in the National Pupil Database and 
school-level data derived from various sources will be used to consider (i) how the 
academic quality and composition of pupils entering year 7 of Academy schools differs 
from both that in their predecessor versions and in other similar schools that do not 
convert to Academy status; and (ii) how the whole school composition of Academies 
differs from that in their pre-Academy versions and in comparison schools. The 
methodological approach to empirical evaluation is that of a difference-in-differences 
analysis applied to a sample of Academy and non-Academy schools over an 11 year 
period of available data, 1997 to 2007. 
The outline of this chapter is as follows: Section 3.2 presents a short history of the 
Academies programme and outlines the key features of Academy schools. Section 3.3 
sets out the objectives of the scheme that were established at its inception. Section 3.4 
presents evidence on what is known so far about the effectiveness of the programme, 
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concentrating on standards of GCSE attainment in Academy schools. In Section 3.5 the 
capacity of the scheme to achieve one of its key aims of inclusion is questioned in light 
of the conflict of interests that satisfaction of this objective creates. In particular, the 
requirement to target areas of deprivation characterised by disadvantaged pupils 
contrasts with the pressure on Academies to incorporate a diverse mix of pupils and 
deliver standards of excellence, and these issues are raised here. This sets the scene for 
the empirical focus on the effectiveness of school improvement, with details on the 
dataset used for this purpose and the results from statistical analysis laid out in 
continuation Chapters Four and Five. 
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3.2 The Academies Programme 
In this section the historical foundations of the Academies Programme are summarised 
and the key features of Academy schools as distinctive institutions differing from 
traditional state secondary schools are presented. 
3.2.1 Brief History 
As is the case for many recent education policy initiatives, the legislative origins of the 
Academies programme lie in the 1988 Education Reform Act. This Act established the 
foundations for the formation of a quasi-market in the provision of education, where the 
ultimate aim was to raise school standards and effectiveness through competition-like 
forces. Significantly, the Act also created a system of school self-management by 
allowing schools to receive their annual revenue funding direct from central government 
as opposed to through standard LEA administration (Machin and Vignoles, 2005). It was 
in this Act that a new type of state secondary school, the City Technology College 
(CTC) was introduced. These non-fee-charging institutions represented the very first 
type of specialist school of its kind as they were particularly oriented towards teaching 
the subject of technology. CTCs combined autonomy from LEA control with a path 
breaking initial implementation of public-private collaboration in state education, 
involving as they did business or voluntary sector sponsorship (Astle and Ryan, 2008). 
CTCs lay the legislative groundwork for the introduction of Academies, which were first 
launched onto the secondary schools arena in March 2000 in a speech on transforming 
the secondary phase of education by the then Secretary of State for Education, David 
Blunkett73. The first three Academy schools officially opened early on in the 2002/2003 
academic year and since then the scheme has witnessed steady growth followed by a 
more recent flourish of heightened activity. Academies, like CTCs, were originally 
described as "independent state schools" (Curtis et al., 2008, pp. 22, in reference to the 
73 The actual legislation for the formation of Academies is contained in the 2000 Learning and Skills Act 
(Astle and Ryan, 2008). 
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then Prime Minister, Tony Blair) and the key features that led to this term are set out 
below. 
3.2.2 Key Features 
(i) Autonomy — In contrast to other state schools, Academies are fully managed by their 
governing body and are independent from LEA control. As a result the LEA has no 
direct funding link to the Academy as it does for all maintained schools in its 
jurisdiction. Instead Academy funding comes straight from central government as a 
block grant, an aspect that can reduce transaction costs in the financial management of 
Academies, with the resultant savings said to enable higher per pupil funding and 
teacher salaries (Gadkowski, 2007). 
(ii) Governance — Conversion to Academy status leads to the governing body of the 
school being created afresh. Small in size, there can be anywhere between 6 to 16 
governors on the board, though it is common to have 13 members, the majority of whom 
(usually around seven) are appointed by the Academy sponsor, subject to approval by 
the central government education department (the DCSF) (Astle and Ryan, 2008)74. 
Stakeholder governors feature heavily on the governing body so that sponsor 
representatives can "determine the ethos and leadership of the academy, and ensure clear 
responsibility and accountability."75 Early Academies were not required to appoint 
elected community or staff representatives to their governing body, nor were they 
required to have more than one elected parent governor and one LEA representative 
(Rogers and Migniuolo, 2007). The operations of the governing body are contained 
within each individual Academy's Funding Agreement, legal documentation that is 
drawn up between the school and the government (Astle and Ryan, 2008). In 
comparison, in LEA-controlled schools the governing body comprises of both appointed 
and elected representatives (Gadkowski, 2007). Of these, Community schools tend to 
74 See also http://www.standards.dfes.gov.uk/academies/what are academies/organisation/?version=1  
(accessed 21 August 2008). 
75 See http://www.standards.dcsf.gov.uk/academies/what are academies/?version=l (accessed 21 August 
2008). 
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have higher LEA representation; Voluntary-controlled (VC), Voluntary-aided (VA) and 
Foundation schools with a Foundation contain representatives from the Foundation 
Body on their governing board (Goodwin, 2007). Hence the governance structure of 
Academy schools gives them management autonomy, with the majority sponsor-
appointed board of governors largely holding responsibility for steering the operations of 
the school. 
(iii) Sponsorship — Sponsors of Academies can originate from a number of different 
fields such as business, religious organisations, the voluntary and charitable sectors and 
individual philanthropy. They can either be invited by government to sponsor a school 
or otherwise they may volunteer to get involved in the scheme independently 
(Gadkowski, 2007). In return for a financial contribution to the Academy, sponsors enter 
into a schools partnership with the government and are granted management control of 
the school as well as the freedom to shape aspects of the school through the Funding 
Agreement76. Specifically, sponsors tend to influence factors such as the curriculum, 
where they may introduce innovative curriculum practices, and they can choose the 
subject(s) in which the school specialises. They also make their mark in areas like the 
pupil learning behaviour policy (which includes discipline), governance rules and 
admissions procedures in the event of place oversubscription (Gadkowski, 2007). In 
terms of the maintained schools sector, specialist schools are also sponsored, though 
their LEA control means that the influence of the sponsor is much weaker in comparison 
to that of Academy school contributors (Curtis et al., 2008). 
(iv) Financing and Buildings — Capital financing of Academies was the original means 
by which an Academy sponsor contributed to the school and justified their permitted 
input into school functioning. Sponsors put forward the lesser of £2 million or 10 per 
cent of capital costs towards the development of a new or refurbished Academy school 
building, payable over the lifetime of the building project. The substantial remaining 
construction expenses77 were initially covered by government through their school 
76 The requirement for a sponsor to make a financial contribution will no longer exist for Academies 
opening from September 2011 (see Key Feature (iv)). Funding agreements tend to omit any detailed 
targets relating to the academic performance of the Academy (Gadkowski, 2007). 
77 The National Audit Office evaluated the cost of 26 out of 27 of the Academy schools that opened 
between school years 2002/03 and 2005/06 and estimated that Academies cost around £24 million to build 
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capital expenditure scheme that provided finance for the building of 1,100 new schools 
over a decade spanning 1997 to 2007 (Astle and Ryan, 2008). Academy builds are now 
covered entirely by the Building Schools for the Future (BSF) capital programme, under 
which school constructions undertaken since 2005/06 have been financed78. The 
sponsor's capital contribution was replaced by an endowment fund that goes towards 
expenses that are unrelated to the school build, but has more recently been removed 
al together79. 
All non-capital costs that relate to Academy schools are financed entirely by central 
government. They include an initial start-up grant for books, materials and classroom 
equipment, which is calculated according to the expected pupil capacity in the Academy 
and is mostly paid during the first year of opening. Academies opening in 2008/09 
received an average funding of about £874,000 through this grant. Additionally, 
Academies are eligible for a grant to cover transitional costs and financial outlays that 
are involved in the process of Academy preparation. This fund is available over the first 
two to three years of Academy school opening, or longer if the Academy does not 
replace any predecessor school(s). For Academies opening in 2008/09 grant awards of 
this kind averaged around £969,000, but with considerable variation across Academies, 
some receiving as little as £123,000 and others as much as £3.2 million (Hansard, 
2008b). 
Running costs of the school are covered under a "general annual grant" which the 
Academy receives directly from the Secretary of State. Funding allocated to the 
on average, and around £27 million if the build is completely new. These figures compare with costs of 
£20-£22 million for other (non-academy) new secondary schools, representing as much as a near 17% 
lower cost. (NAO, 2007). 
78 
 For a further discussion of the BSF programme see 'Key Concepts'. 
79 In July 2006 an endowment model of sponsorship was introduced. Here sponsor proceeds of £2 million 
go into a charitable endowment fund, the payment of which is normally expected to be spread over 5 years 
with an initial fee of £500,000 due in the first year. According to the DCSF Standards Site, disposal of this 
endowment is undertaken by the Academy trust and is to be spent on "measures to counteract the impact 
of deprivation on education in their local communities." More recently, it has been announced that new 
Academy sponsors will no longer be required to make a financial contribution to the school, and this 
applies 	 to 	 Academies 	 opening 	 from 	 September 	 2011 	 (see 
http://www.dcsf.gov.uldpns/DisplayPN.cgi?pn id=2009 0158 accessed 8 September 2009; the quote 
made 	 here 	 is 	 taken 	 from: 
http://www.standards.dcsf.gov.uk/academies/what are academies/sponsorship/?version=1 accessed 21 
August 2008; see also Rogers and Migniuolo, 2007). 
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Academy is calculated according to the LEA's funding formula, yet it also includes an 
additional allowance that is equivalent to the money that the LEA does not usually pass 
on to maintained schools. This means that Academy school governors, as the 
administrators of the school's finances, manage a higher proportion of their budget than 
do LEA-governed schools and it appears that they receive a greater budget overall, 
factors which give them greater financial freedoms. However the government has stated 
its commitment to reaching parity of funding between Academies and other maintained 
schools in the same area facing similar circumstances to Academies. The general annual 
grant further provides a per pupil allowance for Academy schools with specialist status, 
though this is funding which all specialist schools, including maintained specialist 
schools, are entitled to80 . 
(v) Admissions — Independence from the LEA in an Academy means that the governing 
body is the school's admissions authority. Details on the admissions policy are contained 
within the Funding Agreement of each Academy school. Where an Academy replaces a 
predecessor school or schools, it is expected that most pupils from the old school(s) will 
be given the option of readmission to the Academy schoo181, Since the 2002 Education 
Act, Academies have been able to acquire specialist school status in one or more 
subjects so that, like maintained specialist schools (of which almost 90 per cent of state 
secondary schools are), they can reserve up to 10 per cent of their intake for pupils with 
an aptitude or ability in the school's specialism(s) (Gadkowski, 2007; Astle and Ryan, 
2008; Smithers and Robinson, 200982). However, selection of this kind is only permitted 
where the school specialises in particular subjects, namely sports or physical education 
(PE), the visual arts, the performing arts, modern foreign languages, information 
technology and design and technology83. In practice most specialist schools, including 
Academies, do not undertake admissions selection based on some indicator of talent in 
80 See http://www.standards.dcsf.gov.uk/academies/what are academies/funding/?version= I (accessed 21 
August 2008). The funding that the LEA withholds from maintained schools reflects expenses that go 
towards the payment of central services such as Pupil Referral Units (PRUs) and costs associated with 
SEN provision (Sibieta et al., 2008). LEAs do not control Academy schools and it is likely that any central 
services required by the Academy can be paid for directly. Therefore the Academy school share of these 
withheld funds can go straight into Academies, increasing their budget. 
81 See http://www.standards.dcsf.gov.uk/academies/faq/?version=1#582283 (accessed 21 August 2008). 
82 Between 1994 and 2008 a total of 2,688 out of 3,073 state secondary schools were designated as 
specialist, representing 87.5% overall (where the figure of 3,073 schools excludes those with a sixth form, 
CTCs and Academies) (Smithers and Robinson, 2009). 
83 See http://www.standards.dcsf.gov.uk/academies/faq/?version=1#582277 (accessed 21 August 2008). 
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the specialism (Smithers and Robinson, 2009). Gadkowski (2007) reviewed the Funding 
Agreements of 46 Academies that opened between September 2002 and September 2006 
and found that, of these, only 6 operated priority entry to the school according to 
specialism knowledge. Academy schools are described as being "fully inclusive all 
ability schools" that must comply with the School Admissions Code, where enforcement 
of this is the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Education". 
In comparison, in Community and VC schools admissions decisions are in the hands of 
the LEA, while VA and Foundation schools are, like Academies, their own admissions 
authority. All LEA-maintained schools are also required to comply with the School 
Admissions Code, enforcement of which is carried out by the schools adjudicator. While 
Academy schools are only required to be involved in local admissions forums, 
Community, VA, VC and Foundation schools must all participate in coordinated 
admission systems across the LEA (Goodwin, 2007). In the event of oversubscription to 
the school, Academies, like Foundation and VA schools, set their own oversubscription 
admissions conditions and this is done according to ranking categories that are 
determined by the Academy sponsor(s). Preferential entry based on measures of 
proficiency in the school's specialism and place allocation through the grouping of 
pupils into admissions bands are two commonly identified procedures that can be used 
alone or conjunctionally (Gadkowski, 2007; Hansard, 2008a). 
The two distinct aspects of Academy schools mentioned here — namely their 
independence from LEA control and their discretion to set their own admissions 
arrangements within compliance of the legal requirements of the Code85 — suggest that 
there is room for variation in intake patterns once a school converts to Academy status. 
This is because predecessor schools were not organised along these more autonomous 
84 	 See 	 http://www.standards.dcsIgov.uk/academies/what are academies/management/?version=1  
(accessed 21 August 2008). 
85 For the sample of Academy schools (as well as their predecessors and non-Academies) to be analysed in 
the Chapters that follow, the applicable School Admissions Codes are those of 1999 and 2003, which 
cover the admissions period September 2000 to August 2007, after which point the 2007 Code came into 
effect for September 2007 admissions. As was discussed in Chapter One, Section 1.4.1, the 1999 and 2003 
Codes came attached with fewer statutory adherence requirements than subsequent versions. Thus schools 
who were their own admissions authority had more discretion to decide on who to admit to the school, 
both under normal conditions and in the event of oversubscription, so long as procedures adopted were not 
unlawful (see also West et al., 2009). 
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lines. These specific features, together with the stated aims of the Programme, provide 
the motivations for comparing the composition of pupils entering Academy schools with 
that of pupils entering the predecessor version(s) in particular. 
(vi) Staffing — In Academies the school principal is appointed by the sponsor(s) initially 
and after that by the governing body, while school governors take full responsibility for 
the employment of school staff. In maintained schools there is more LEA involvement 
in both head teacher and staff appointment, though governor input in these matters takes 
place in VA and Foundation schools (Goodwin, 2007). Academy schools have a far 
greater degree of flexibility over staff employment contracts relative to LEA-controlled 
schools. The governing body of the Academy can authorise any changes to the terms and 
conditions of employment relating to hired personnel and has ultimate responsibility for 
the approval of personnel practices concerning matters such as staff development and 
discipline86. Academies are not required to follow national frameworks relating to staff 
pay and conditions". However, despite these freedoms, most staff from the predecessor 
school(s) are expected to transfer to the new Academy school under the 1981 Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) or TUPE regulations, in which case their 
existing terms and conditions of employment hold. Otherwise, a common variant of staff 
terms used by Academies involves lengthening the working day, or year, or both 
(Rogers and Migniuolo, 2007) Additionally, Academies can operate performance related 
pay measures including the payment of bonuses to their staff for good performance; they 
can also offer other financial incentives such as childcare subsidies and contributions to 
relocation expenses (Astle and Ryan, 2008). 
(vii) Accountability — Academies governing bodies are directly accountable to the 
Secretary of State for Education in the main, though they are additionally answerable to 
86 see  
http://ww w . stand ards .dc sf. gov.u1c/academies/what are academies/organi sationn version=1#1576175  
(accessed 21 August 2008). 
87 Specifically, Academies do not have to follow the School Teachers' Pay and Conditions Document 
(STPCD) or the national framework of service conditions for school teachers in England and Wales, 
known as the Burgundy book. The STPCD is a legally enforced document that establishes teacher pay 
scales, rules for promotion and working time, professional tasks, and absence cover conditions, among 
other issues. The Burgundy book additionally sets out illness pay, maternity pay and notice to leave 
requirements. In practice pay scales in Academies tend to closely replicate those in the STPCD (Sibieta et 
al., 2008). 
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local parents. The Secretary of State must approve any policy change requests by the 
Academy that relate to its admissions, SEN, learning behaviour or terms of governance, 
as contained in each Academy's Funding Agreement. The governing body of a 
maintained school is considered to be more accountable to local parents. As for all state 
schools, Academies are inspected by the Office for Standards in Education (OfSted) 
school inspections body whose job it is to monitor and ensure their compliance with 
national standards of education provision. Once opened, the Academy is fully inspected 
within one to three years, more commonly in their third year (Gadkowski, 200788), 
although less formal monitoring visits do take place soon after the initial open date of 
the Academy (Curtis et al., 2008). 
(viii) Curriculum — Earlier cohorts of Academies (those existing prior to the Summer of 
2007) were not required to adhere to complete teachings of the National Curriculum as 
are other state schools. Instead their curriculum was to be broad and balanced, only 
requiring teaching and assessment in the core subjects of English, maths and science at 
Key Stage 3 (when pupils are aged 13/14). Curriculum innovation is encouraged in 
Academies, and the governors and senior managers of the school are given the flexibility 
to develop a curriculum catering for the needs of individual low-attaining pupils. 
Additionally Academy schools are specialist schools and as such their curriculum 
includes a focus on the chosen specialist subject(s) (Gadkowski, 2007). 
Overall, there are many and varied differences between Academies and other schools in 
the state sector, which revolve in the main around the concept of independence, and give 
rise to the classification of Academies as "independent state schools". In the next section 
the aims of Academies are set out in detail and the means by which the features of these 
schools are expected to help them deliver on their goals are discussed. 
88 	 See 	 http://www.standards.dcsf.gov.uk/academies/what are academies/cucciculum/?version=1  
(accessed 21 August 2008). 
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3.3 Aims and Objectives 
In February 2003 the DfES commissioned PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to undertake 
an independent five-year evaluation of the Academies programme and to produce a 
report for each year, the first of which was available in November 2003 (Rogers and 
Migniuolo, 2007). This report sets out the three "ultimate" objectives of the scheme 
from its inception:- 
(1) "Academies will contribute to driving up standards by raising achievement levels 
for their own pupils, their family of schools and the wider community by 
breaking the cycle of underachievement and low aspirations in areas of 
deprivation with historical low performance; 
(2) Academies will be part of local strategies to increase choice and diversity in 
education. They will have innovative approaches to one or more of governance, 
curriculum, staffing structures and pay, teaching and learning[,] structure of the 
school day and year[,] using ICT [Information and Communications 
Technology]; and 
(3) Academies will be inclusive, mixed ability school[s]"89 
Originally, the Academies programme concerned the replacement of "seriously failing 
schools"9°, in which the underachieving predecessor school or schools that went before 
were rebuilt and rebranded into an Academy. In this respect Academies were established 
"where significant changes in the nature and management of schools were needed" 
(DfES, 2000). Otherwise the initial Academy set-up involved a new school development 
89 PwC (2003, pp. Al). See also Curtis et al. (2008). Note that the formerly named Department for 
Education and Skills (DfES) is now known as the Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF). 
9° Curtis et al., 2008, pp. 14, quoting a speech by the then Education Secretary David Blunkett in March 
2000. Failing schools were initially defined as those "which are either in special measures or 
underachieving" (DfES, 2000). One Academy school can replace more than one pre-existing failing 
school at a time, though the rebuild usually uses the existing land site of either of the failing schools being 
replaced. Originally, the Academies model was applied to cities; hence the term "City Academies" was 
used in reference to these new types of school. The prefix 'city' was dropped in the 2002 Education Act, 
when the policy was extended to include non-urban areas (Curtis et al., 2008; Education Act, 2002). 
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in an area of sustained low educational attainment. Hence objective (1) emphasises that 
Academy schools play a key role in community regeneration. These schools are posited 
as a means for tackling educational underperformance and "establishing a culture of 
ambition to replace the poverty of aspiration that was generally there before" (Adonis, 
2008, pp. 15). Their formation is in areas characterised by a historic trend of 
disadvantage and decline, with Academies considered as having the capacity to 
transform the education experiences of children in these areas. More specifically, 
Academies are largely intended to cater for pupils most exposed to the local area 
deprivation that is a feature of Academy school establishment, so that it is likely that the 
social background and educational attainment of these pupils will reflect the relatively 
deprived circumstances of the area they inhabit. 
Objective (2) places Academies in the realm of choice-oriented government education 
policies, as schools of innovation that are designed to generate institutional competition 
resulting in a diversification in the supply of state-funded education at the local level. 
This implies an inadequacy in existing provisions, a gap that is to be filled by a new type 
of school run along more autonomous lines than those afforded to traditional state 
schools. 
Elaboration on the meaning behind objective (3) is given in the 2002 Education Act, 
where it is stated that an inclusive, diverse-ability Academy school is one that "provides 
education for pupils of different abilities who are wholly or mainly drawn from the area 
in which the school is situated" (Education Act, 2002, Section 65, 2(b)). Like the first 
objective then, aim (3) emphasises that Academy schools are to be at the forefront of 
local improvement. Academies are to incorporate a varied spectrum of pupil types, with 
pupil admissions taken predominantly from the local supply pool, so that the 
characteristics of their composition should largely reflect the demographics of the local 
pupil population. 
The nature of the Academies programme is such that it is perceived as being able to 
attain the first objective. The new school building that results from the scheme is 
considered a flagship feature of symbolic value that contributes to raised expectations of 
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change and provides a visible demonstration of local community investment and reform 
taking place (Curtis et. al., 2008; Astle and Ryan. 2008). This redevelopment of school 
facilities is aimed at fostering a pupil's motivation to learn, encouraging both their own 
and their parents' commitment to and involvement in maintaining standards of quality 
and performance in the school. Sponsorship of the school by private business, voluntary 
or religious sector members is also considered a means by which standards can be 
raised. The sponsor is assumed to bring a vision and values to the school that define and 
renew its ethos. His or her business experience, expertise and network of contacts serve 
to strengthen the integration of the school into the local community, and position the 
academy sponsor as an adult role model for pupils in economically and socially deprived 
areas. In terms of the functioning of the school, academy autonomy from LEA control is 
seen as a way to allow sponsors the "freedoms and flexibilities" (Rogers and Migniuolo, 
2007, pp. 27) to challenge traditional lines of schooling operations and introduce 
innovative practices into the school in a bid to raise performance. The sponsor can shape 
the way things are done in the academy through his or her personal and potentially 
unique contribution to the Funding Agreement, in which the organisation of the school 
in relation to aspects such as the curriculum, governance, admissions and discipline are 
outlined (Gadkowski, 2007). In general, it is the various institutional arrangements of 
Academies — such as their curriculum innovation, accountability, staffing and funding 
autonomy, their new school building, and the unique input of an Academy sponsor into 
the school — that policy-makers expect will provide the mechanisms through which 
performance improvements are triggered. 
In terms of objective (2), the independence of an academy, its use of innovative 
techniques and the collaboration with non-government organisations that the programme 
involves all serve to create a new approach to education provision and an alternative 
type of state-funded education in the secondary schooling arena. The notion that an 
academy school can inject further choice and a diversity of supply into state education 
thus relates to the ability of this new schooling model to rejuvenate a failing, unpopular 
pre-existing school with spare capacity and reintroduce it to the quasi-market place as a 
viable, in demand, education provider. An increased diversification in the local mix of 
schools brought on by the successful Academy status restart of a predecessor school is 
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presumed to encourage "more competition and contestability which can lift performance 
in an area" (PSA Delivery Agreements, 2008, pp. 9), suggesting another means by 
which Academies can also achieve the local area benefits of the first aim. 
In respect of goal (3), a potentially higher pupil capacity in an Academy provides one 
channel through which the school is expected to incorporate a more inclusive and 
socially diverse range of pupils. Places offered at the Academy may be greater in 
number to the extent that the new school building or the remodelled version can 
accommodate a larger quantity of pupils than the predecessor school(s). Another means 
for achieving this goal comes through the admissions rule of 'banding', which 
Academies can apply only when they are oversubscribed (DIES, 2003). This method of 
ranking place allocation "is generally taken to mean selecting an intake so that its spread 
of ability is representative of a wider population. This wider population could be all the 
applicants to a particular school or group of schools, or the whole pupil population in a 
geographical area such as a local authority or nationally" (Tough and Brooks, 2007, pp. 
19). The process "involves testing all children applying for a school place and placing 
them into ability bands as a result of the test" (DIES, 2003, pp. 16, paragraph 3.27). This 
is therefore an additional aspect of academy school functioning that should enable them 
to cater to the final objective. 
A system of expanded school capacity and over-subscriptions rules that intend to offer 
fair chances of admission to pupils from across the ability range might ensure a more 
balanced academic intake into an Academy and allow the school to be more inclusive 
without changing the quality distribution of its pupil entrants. On the other hand the 
requirement of Academies to raise achievement standards might create an incentive for 
these schools to try to adopt more 'exclusive' normal admissions practices and skew 
their intake distribution towards students of a more favourable background, including 
pupils of higher ability and better composition quality. Indeed the fact that Academies 
are their own admissions authority sets in place the potential for intake patterns to differ 
from those in the previous LEA-governed schoo191. 
91 In Appendix 3A, Section 3A.D, the prior school types of schools that converted to Academies are 
discussed, in reference to the sample of 33 Academies that will form the basis of this research. About 72% 
and 3% of Academy predecessors were Community and Voluntary-controlled schools respectively in this 
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The aim of this study is to compare the pupil profile of Academy schools to that in both 
predecessor institutions and similar schools that do not turn into Academies. Evaluation 
will consider the prior attainment and background composition of year 7 entrants, and 
aspects of whole school-level composition, in Academies relative to these other schools. 
Thus the purpose of evaluation is to determine the extent to which aim (3) of the 
Academies Programme in particular has been satisfied. To date no previous research 
exists in this specific area. In terms of objective (1), preliminary analysis that considers 
the academic performance of early cohorts of Academies at the GCSE stage relative to 
achievement levels of their predecessors has been conducted. The competition effects of 
Academies, implicated by aim (2), have not yet been assessed. As the number of 
Academy schools increases it may be that their competitiveness with other local area 
schools becomes more relevant (depending on the relative success of Academies) and 
this type of analysis provides one possible area for future research. Findings from the 
research into GCSE attainment changes in Academies are summarised at the start of the 
next section, in order to provide some initial information on what is known about the 
effectiveness of the programme so far. 
sample. These schools are characterised by majority-LEA representation on the school governing body, 
such that the LEA was the admissions authority for most of the Academy predecessors. 
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3.4 Academy schools and GCSE performance 
Recent co-authored research (Machin and Wilson, 2008) conducted a school-level 
analysis of changes in GCSE performance in Academy schools, in order to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the scheme in delivering its explicit aim of raising standards in 
education. This goal, as was mentioned above, is presumed to be delivered through the 
private sponsorship aspect of the Academies Programme in particular and the freedoms 
granted to the Academy sponsor to introduce innovative techniques into the running of 
the school, including a business-like system of school management and governance. 
The study considered Academy schools opening under their new status between 
September 2002 and September 2005, thus including four cohorts of 27 Academies in 
total. The methodological approach taken was that of statistical difference-in-differences 
estimation, in which the pre-policy school-level GCSE attainment of Academy 
predecessors was contrasted with the GCSE performance of these schools in the 
effective years of the policy, and this difference was set against that in two groups of 
comparison schools. The first group consisted of matched schools, one per Academy, 
where the matching school was identified as one within the LEA of an Academy, 
sharing similar pre-policy levels and trends in GSCE performance as the Academy, but 
without itself acquiring Academy status. The second group included all other state 
secondary schools in the Academy school's LEA. The purpose behind establishing a 
unique group of matched schools in particular was to enable assessment of the impact of 
a school becoming an Academy on GCSE achievement with unobservable school-level 
components that might explain some of the measured result netted out. 
Estimation utilised 11 years of school-level records of GCSE attainment, covering the 
period 1995/96 to 2005/06, where attainment is measured by the percentage of pupils 
getting 5 or more A*-C grades at the GCSE stage (when pupils are aged 15/16). Table 
3.1 below shows the results from difference-in-differences regression analysis that 
compares changes in GCSE outcomes over the pre-policy and post-policy years in 
Academies relative to that in both matched schools (Panel A) and other LEA secondary 
schools (Panel B):- 
164 
a) 00 00 c,c.4 
--4 
s. 
- Cn (NI 0  
M c•i •-• (1) ›.q 
›-4 



















" 71- (- 066' r, c. w . 4:), nc. . 
C=) 5 c„, s•-, 	 tr, 0	 ,I.) 
ao I..n a) 0  
v)0 
.2  
E 4--, G.) ra, 	 ,..„--- G' Eh' 	 .1. 
_ 	 ,,,.., 	 c, ....... , ....... 0 ,..0  VI . c-' 
o c) 	 s../ C.') 	 • Cl) ''' Z 	 • ,•0 ,..mi 0$ Crl WI 
o ...r. 	 6 .71- C1) 1).1 




c.) .5 	 ,-. 00 a, 
11 00 ,..„, ',"1-' co  ^r - ..--.; s"--ru ›.41 
 5 E .5 o 
W. CU CA 
3 0 CLo $.4 CU 
Cl) PO 
1:1 .4). E . o /1 ,....., 
• ml 
rA 
I 	 ...1 00 nts 
<1.) C:11 ,...-.. 0 .."1 .--.1 - 	 °C) 
"0 ° er) C)° ,..-4 s••••' , ,--9 n0 '-,,., 
czi VI •--, c.,-; c,-; 6 6 4-. 6 -. 
§ c) < 	 `' ›-4 >I  
L.) 
N 00 	 Cl) Ej.,-N 




EN, 0 c)  
Cc/I) 	 1: 	 z 00. N 
•-•• 	 v.; a) a) 	 0 
›. 4 
6-NN 00 \0 00 	 VI C\ 
to Zr 
	 Cr) 	 ,t1) °°. (.,•; N a) n?-1 oo 
 0 	 ›.4 N 
C:14 0 4.) 
.5, -8 
	 r)'-‘ 	 \r-ED Cl) 





el 	 (.., -. ,__, G,  CA 
01) cn C*1 1n1 N ........ 0 0
N
0 Glt 
a) •-n 	 •-• 4 (-4 6 tu 
1.0 a) C) 4-) 	 N 	 le' 
0 0  c=I4 I-4 C..) 
.0.),.  go..1 	
0 
T. , 
4_ 	 * 	 ....... ,_,
_,  a.) 0,-,  * N 	 .._, 0 "1- 
-0 a) ,-1 tr) In ••n•, Cl) Ox 00 •-' 
CtS C4 '' 71- 
. c•1 v) cl) "--' 0 -- oo s---' 





0 co) CI) 	 •-••n tk0 









,2 •E) 0 20  
c..) 
,D> ..1 8 o  4_, 
75) CI 0 0  o 
,4 0 C.) •S 
,h) 4 c 
v] "5 8 0 4,r: a) .2 to 	 1,71 
.4 	 ")„, 
E 0 S3 U 2 ett 
. l 
.0 • 'a 
	
(1) 	 Id1) 
•S 	 C5 
.F1c v 
1.8 ;-• 0 0 
co) 0 0 0 
0 C.) • 
8 




• 0 WI 
	
,o) 	 (I) 
0 3 













.a 8 15 t 
t & 
	
ce) 	 • CU "C:2 
* to* 
	
,4 5 	 • 1. * 
-6  § 0)18 E  -4 4
-` 8 > t c4 r4 o 0  0 a) cn  





















In If') •.--4 ........ V) 71" 
,-.4 
s.-.., 	
00 6  ,,, a) On N 0 0 ..	 oo o 0 	 C3 cr; cal ti) 	 6  a) 
	 >4 f=0 ;-n 0 0 
cn 4)  
.2 e, E 
'0 




























Across almost all cohorts there is no evidence of a positive 'Academy effect' on 
GCSE performance for schools that switch to Academy status. This is not the case 
for cohort 3 Academies (opening from September 2004), when they are compared to 
the matched set of schools (columns 5 and 6). The percentage of pupils achieving 5 
or more GCSEs graded A*-C is 10 percentage points higher in the effective policy 
years for this cohort (and is 8.95 percentage points higher when school-level time-
varying controls are added to the regression), suggesting that GCSE attainment 
improves relative to the predecessor years of the schools. However, given that there 
are only five Academy schools in this cohort, this finding provides at best a weak 
indication of performance improvements in the renewed schools as a whole. 
In the study reviewed above, the GCSE attainment of all four cohorts of Academy 
schools largely consists of pupils who sat for their GCSE exams in the Academy but 
who entered the school at the beginning of their secondary phase of education five 
years earlier, when the school was in its predecessor years92. Thus the estimated 
`Academy effect' reflects the outcome of pupil learning in both school types and, 
importantly, is based on a pupil intake that was determined by the predecessor 
school(s). It is plausible to suggest that, once a school has converted into an 
Academy, it faces a strong incentive to make compositional changes in the school in 
order to increase its likelihood of higher GCSE performance in the long-run. In 
particular, gains might be sought through changes to the academic quality and social 
background composition of pupil intake into the Academy school relative to the 
profile of pupil admissions into its predecessor(s) so that, five years after re-opening 
as an Academy, that more favourable pupil intake will yield higher levels of GCSE 
attainment. In this case the 'Academy effect', which is entirely attributable to pupil 
learning in the Academy, will appear improved relative to that attached to earlier 
cohorts admitted by the predecessor school(s). This will boost the chances of the 
Academies Programme as a whole delivering on aim (1) of the policy, where this 
goal requires the schools to contribute to driving up standards through increasing 
levels of achievement among their own pupils. In fact, Curtis et al. (2008, pp. 16-17) 
92 The GCSE performance of Academies will also include those pupils who were not in the school 
(and its predecessor) for all five years leading up to the GCSE exam stage. The first cohort of 
Academies opened in the academic year 2002/03 and their GCSE attainment as Academies can be 
tracked for four years under the sample window of the reviewed study, until 2005/06. Pupils who took 
their GCSEs in the Academy in 2005/06 will, in most cases, have entered the school in 2001/02, as a 
year 7 entrant of the predecessor version of the school. Hence, even among the earliest cohort of 
Academies, the sample window includes the GCSE attainment of pupils who attended both versions 
of the school. 
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note that "[o]ne of the intermediate objectives related to...[aim (1)]...was for 
Academies to achieve the national average for attainment (at various levels) within 
four years of opening." If changes in intake 'quality' take place immediately after 
conversion, raised pupil performance at the GCSE stage after five years of Academy 
opening can certainly be more easily achieved, resulting in a greater chance of the 
accomplishment of this intermediate aim, albeit with a delay of one year. However, 
employing a strategy of this kind may have implications for delivery on goal (3) of 
the Academies Programme, suggesting a conflict of interest in the "ultimate" 
objectives of the scheme. This situation provides the key motivation behind the focus 
of evaluation in this research, which will consider the capability of the policy to 
satisfy aim (3) in light of the requirements of aim (1), and in the section that follows 
this research focus is discussed in further detail. 
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3.5 	 Focusing on Pupil Profile Changes in Academy Schools 
The school reform initiatives discussed in the 'Key Concepts' section of this thesis 
are concerned to differing degrees with raising the educational opportunities of 
socially disadvantaged pupils above all, in recognition of "the impact that 
disadvantage has on reading, performance, attendance, achievement, further 
education and lifelong learning" (Matthews and Kinchington, 2006, pp. 104). In this 
respect, the role of Academies is profound, with these schools having recently been 
hailed as engines for upward social mobility and justice, capable of transforming 
education and "providing a ladder, in particular, for less advantaged children to get 
on, and gain the very best education and qualifications, irrespective of wealth and 
family background" (Adonis, 2008, pp. 3). Academies are seen as having a critical 
role to play in the eradication of failure in general, a situation that is characterised by 
the long tail of underperforming schools at the bottom end of the performance 
distribution. At the same time, these renewed schools are expected to be centres of 
excellence in their localities, able to compete at the highest levels of academic 
attainment and producing outstanding results. Quality gains are to be spread among 
existing pupils and are proposed as a means for Academies to attract new pupils 
(Adonis, 2008). 
The responsibility of Academies to both turn around circumstances of failure and 
pursue academic excellence presents something of a dichotomy for these schools. 
Eradication of failure requires them to target underachievement among pupils from 
deprived backgrounds. On the other hand, in order to satisfy their drive for 
excellence, a more favourable intake that draws in pupils with a historically high 
level of attainment and associated social characteristics may be sought, so that the 
task of raising performance in the Academy school is made easier, as was discussed 
previously. If they are to achieve these opposing outcomes, then Academies must 
necessarily aim to attract new pupils to the school who are of higher academic 
quality, whilst at the same time reserving enough places for pupils from deprived 
backgrounds with lower historical educational performance. If access for the latter 
group is to be fair, then the Academy school needs to retain places in comparable 
proportions to the share these pupils would have accounted for in the predecessor 
school(s). 
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In recent times Academy schools have become increasingly popular, with their 
admissions demand exceeding available places at the school. The DCSF notes that 
"Academies overall are three times oversubscribed. The brand new Academies, 
without an underperforming predecessor school, have nearly six applicants for every 
place. Academies directly replacing previously underperforming schools have more 
than two applicants for each place, and are now filling nearly 25% more places than 
the schools they replaced."93 Oversubscription has brought with it interest in 
Academy admission by a different class of pupils, a new direction that has been 
openly welcomed by the former Minister responsible for the programme: "The 
popularity of academies extends across all classes and I welcome this. I want 
academies to be socially mixed schools attractive to the middle class" (Adonis, 2008, 
pp. 8). Thus it would seem that Academy schools are broadening their appeal to a 
wider mix of pupils while at the same time facing capacity pressures as a direct 
consequence of their heightened status. 
Conflicts of interest in Academy school objectives and responsibilities, combined 
with the expanding popularity of these schools, raise the issue of the effectiveness of 
institutional change in the form of school renewal in delivering equality of 
educational opportunity, as a general intention of government education policy of 
this type. The reporting that Academies are vastly oversubscribed suggests that some 
pupils miss out on the opportunity to attend them and also implies that rejuvenation 
of a failing school may result in that school no longer serving the education needs of 
particular types of pupils with which it has traditionally been associated. In this 
context it appears important to understand the extent to which Academy schools 
`refresh' their pupil intake and composition as a result of the freedoms afforded to 
them by their renewed status. 
To date no empirical evaluation of the changing pupil profile of Academy schools 
relative to both their predecessor counterparts and to schools in similar circumstances 
who do not undergo any form of school renewal has been conducted. This would 
seem to be a valuable exercise, given the growing prominence of the Academies 
scheme as one kind of catalytic system of school renewal that aims to generate 
education reform and promote education equality as a means for raising the chances 
93 	 See 	 http://www.standards.dcsf.gov.uk/academies/what are academies/working/?version=1  
(accessed 21 August 2008) 
169 
for pupils in underprivileged areas to succeed. Hence this forms the purpose of 
Chapters Four and Five that follow. 
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Chapter Four: Evaluating the Changing Pupil Profile of 
Academy Schools: Initial Steps in the Empirical Process 
4.1 	 Introduction 
The ultimate question that the empirical work undertaken here and in Chapter Five 
aims to address is whether school renewal in the shape of the Academies scheme 
serves to reinforce social selection, extending it to certain schools within deprived 
areas, or whether this policy might provide an effective means for tackling 
underachievement among hard to reach pupils who often only ever have access to 
poor quality schooling. Data on Academies and comparable schools is extracted 
from a national administrative data source in order to assess whether Academy 
schools are more 'exclusive' following their change in status, catering for 
disadvantaged pupils less than previously. 
Section 4.2 introduces and explores the data to be analysed in this Chapter. Sub-
section 4.2.1 presents details on Academy schools that opened between the academic 
years 2002/03 and 2006/07, which form the five cohorts to be assessed. Information 
is included on the area in which these schools are located, their subject specialism(s) 
and their predecessor history. Sub-section 4.2.2 briefly describes the principal data 
source that is used for the empirical evaluation undertaken here and in Chapter Five, 
this being the National Pupil Database, from which annual pupil-level observations 
on year 7 intake into state secondary schools are derived. School-level data files also 
provide supplementary details on composition and attainment in the whole school 
and the indicators taken from these files are described here. In sub-section 4.2.3 the 
process of dataset construction is set out. This includes the formation of a balanced 
panel of observations that can be used to analyse intake composition changes in state 
secondary schools over 2001/02 to 2006/07 and intake quality and whole school 
composition patterns over the 11 year window of 1996/97 to 2006/07. 
Section 4.3 describes the methodological approach of difference-in-differences 
estimation that is used here. This is combined with propensity score evaluation and 
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the subsequent estimation of an 'Academy effect' relative to a set of control schools 
contained within an identified region of common support. All of these processes lay 
the foundations for empirical analysis, the results from which are presented in 
follow-up Chapter Five. 
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4.2 	 Describing and Exploring the Data 
In this section, the construction and evaluation of an empirical dataset is outlined. In 
the first instance details on open Academy schools for which data is available to date 
are presented. The main sources of pupil and school level data are then discussed, 
together with the procedures that are undertaken in order to arrive at a final reduced 
sample of Academy and non-Academy schools for whom all necessary variables 
required for evaluation exist in all years of data availability. 
4.2.1 Academy schools sample 
Prior to describing the data sources that are to be used for the purposes of empirical 
evaluation, it is necessary to set out details on the sample of Academy schools that 
the analysis refers to. As noted earlier, the first cohort of Academy schools came into 
being since September 2002 and additional cohorts have arisen in each academic 
year following on from then. There are currently 133 open Academy schools 
dispersed across 65 LEAs (June 2009), of which a total of 46 (in 34 LEAs) can be 
traced in the available pupil-level and school-level datasets. Table 4.1 below lists 
each of these 46 Academies that opened between the school years 2002/03 and 
2006/07 and also provides facts on their date of opening, their geographical location, 
the relative deprivation ranking of the area in which each Academy school is 
situated, the amount of finance the sponsor(s) have committed to contributing to the 
school, and the subject area(s) in which each Academy specialises. The Table also 
includes other information relevant for the empirical work, as will be discussed in the 
results section, such as whether the Academy school represents a completely new 
school or simply a new building, the number of predecessor schools that the 
Academy replaces, and if such replacement involves a school that was formerly a 
CTC. 
As can be seen from Table 4.1, the majority of Academies featuring in the sample 
period opened during the 2006/07 academic year, when a total of 19 were launched, 
as compared with 3 opening in 2002/03, 9 in 2003/04, 5 in 2004/05 and 10 in 
2005/06 (column 2). Most of these Academies are located in London, in line with the 
government's goal of establishing 60 Academies in this region by 2010. Altogether 
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23 Academy schools were set up in London in the five years since the programme 
began, corresponding to half of the aggregate amount, of which 13 were formed in 
inner London and 10 in the outer London regions. Following behind Greater London 
is the area of Yorkshire and the Humber, containing a far fewer sum of 6 Academies. 
At the Local Authority District (LAD) level, Middlesbrough (in the North East) and 
Southwark (in Inner London) each had three Academies in them by 2006/07, more 
than in any of the other LADs (column 3). These Academies are situated in districts 
that are characterised by high levels of deprivation, ranking 9th and 26th respectively 
(out of 354 LADs) on the 2007 Indices of Deprivation94. In fact, the vast majority of 
Academy schools shown in the Table have been formed in disadvantaged areas: 
column 4 reveals that 34 Academies (out of the 44 with an available deprivation 
ranking for their area) feature in the 100 most deprived localities. This conforms with 
the notion that the scheme should target weak schools in areas of decline, and 
therefore the underprivileged pupils that frequently attend these schools and inhabit 
such areas95. 
Moving on to address Academy school sponsorship, both the United Learning Trust 
and the Harris Federation of South London Schools Trust are prevalent in the 
programme as multi-Academy sponsors, the former being involved in whole or in 
part with nine of the listed Academies and the latter with four. Sponsor financial 
pledges to the listed Academies average £1.69 million so far, which is about 6.3 to 
7.0 per cent of the overall cost of recreating a school into an Academy, depending on 
whether the school is an entirely new build or a refurbishment (column 5)96. The 
most frequently chosen subject of specialism is that of Business and Enterprise, 
either as a sole specialism or in conjunction with another field of study. Otherwise, 
94 The 354 district-level authorities comprise 36 metropolitan districts, 32 London boroughs, 284 non-
metropolitan districts, the Isles of Scilly, and the City of London (see the section on district 'types' in 
particular from http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/districts+of+England (accessed 3 March 
2009)). The Indices of Deprivation for 2007 is based on seven domains, namely income deprivation, 
employment deprivation, health deprivation and disability, education, skills and training deprivation, 
barriers to housing and services, crime, and the living environment deprivation (The English Indices 
of Deprivation, 2007). 
95 According to the DCSF Standards Site the expectation was that by September 2008 around 50% of 
the 100 most deprived Local Authority Districts (LADs) in England would feature at least one 
Academy school, where deprivation is measured according to The English Indices of Deprivation 
2004 and concerns a ranking system for all 354 LADs. 
See http://www.standards.dcsf.gov.uk/academies/what are academies/working/?version=1 (accessed 
21 August 2008). 
96 See Chapter Three, Section 3.2.2. part (iv) for the estimated costs of Academy formation according 
to the NAO. There is information available on the committed financial contributions of the sponsor(s) 
for 43 of the listed Academies, totalling £72.55 million, or about £1.69 million on average. 
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sponsors have tended to opt for sports as their Academy's area of expertise (column 
6). 
Table 4.1 additionally highlights specifics pertaining to each Academy school and 
reveals interesting patterns of change to the stock of schools in LADs resulting from 
the introduction of Academies (column 7). Looking again at Middlesbrough and 
Southwark, though these areas each contained three Academies by 2006/07, in 
Middlesbrough two of the Academies actually replaced four predecessor schools. 
Thus 2 pre-existing schools were amalgamated into each Academy, while the 
remainder Academy in Middlesbrough replaced just one school. This suggests a fall 
in the quantity of schools in this LAD based only on the stock changes brought on by 
the Academies programme. By contrast, in Southwark, two Academies each replaced 
a single predecessor school and one Academy provided a brand new institution for 
the area, such that the Academies programme in isolation increased the school supply 
(by one school) here. Overall the LAD of Hackney gained the greatest number of 
completely new schools as Academies, with its two new developments generating a 
rise in the school stock in this area due to the Academies scheme. Unique to the LAD 
of Westminster has been the replacement of one predecessor school by two Academy 
schools, resulting in a one unit growth in the number of schools in the LAD that can 
be attributed to the onset of Academies. To summarise the remaining facts contained 
in column 7, a total of five new schools were set up as Academies from 2002/03 to 
2006/07, raising the number of available schools and therefore school places in their 
respective localities. For seven predecessor schools a change to Academy status 
resulted in capital expenditure on a school rebuild rather than the use of the existing 
school facilities. And finally, five Academy schools had formerly been a CTC, with 
the largest conversion of this kind taking place during 2005/06 when 3 CTCs 
changed to Academy school status. This conversion has been described as natural, 
given the close connection in design between CTCs and Academies (Curtis et al., 
2008) and it is likely to be a more prominent feature of future Academy cohorts, as 
one recent extension of the model has been to encourage successful schools, such as 
CTCs, to become Academies97. 
97 For further details see Curtis et al. (2008). section 4 (pp. 50-67). Government interest in converting 
all 	 CTCs 	 to 	 Academies 	 is 	 expressed 	 on 	 the 	 following 	 website: 
http://www.standards.dfes.gov.uk/academies/ctcs/?version=1 
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Though the Academies listed in Table 4.1 are spread across several LEAs, and their 
magnitude and dispersion is on the rise, Academy schools are not expected to 
account for a significant fraction of state secondary education provision until around 
2015, by which time 400 such schools should be in existence (around 15 per cent of 
the total). Table 4.2 indicates that by 2006/07 Academy schools held just a 1.4 per 
cent share in the overall stock of state secondary schools. Their allocations of pupils 
and teachers at this time are equally low, at 1.3 per cent and 1.5 per cent respectively, 
while within Academies this slight over-balance of teachers has allowed for a 
relatively smaller pupil-teacher ratio (15.06) compared to that in all maintained 
secondary schools (16.47). 
Table 4.2: Share of Academy Schools in All State Secondary Schools, 2006/07 
All state 
secondary Academies Academies share 
Number of schools 3,178 46 0.014 
Number of FTE pupils 3,110,347 41,437 0.013 
Number of FTE teachers 188,794 2,751 0.015 
Pupil-teacher ratio 16.47 15.06 n/a 
Sources: DCSF-provided Edubase dataset (on the Register of Educational Establishments (REE) in 
England) and Annual School Census (ASC) dataset, both for 2006/07. The abbreviation FTE stands 
for full-time equivalent. 
4.2.2 Data description 
Information on pupils who have been or currently are enrolled in the state-
maintained English education system is contained within the National Pupil Database 
(NPD), a centrally collected longitudinal data source that consists of the Pupil-Level 
Annual School Census (PLASC) and Key Stage (KS) data files. Details on this 
dataset and its components were described in Chapter One, Section 1.5 and those 
descriptions also act as the point of reference here. 
PLASC contains some indicators on the background characteristics of each pupil, 
such as whether the pupil is eligible for free school meals (FSME), whether the pupil 
has Special Educational Needs (SEN), the ethnicity of the pupil, their gender and 
their first language. These details are provided alongside more administrative items 
such as the school year group to which the pupil belongs, the code of the school that 
they are currently in, and the LEA within which that school is contained. Annual 
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collation of PLASC data in January of each academic year has more recently been 
replaced by a tri-annual system of information provision in both September and May, 
though for researchers the year-on-year January collection is the most available and 
consistent and therefore the most widely used version. At the time of writing (August 
2008) six PLASC waves of data have been issued, covering the academic years 
2001/02 to 2006/07 inclusive, all of which are used in this empirical work. 
Analysis undertaken here utilises pupil test performance at KS1 (when pupils are 
aged 6/7) and KS2 (aged 10/11), the latter corresponding to the end of the primary 
school phase of education. Information on the code of the school attended by the 
pupil at the time of their KS3 tests (aged 13/14) is also exploited here. KS1 and KS3 
data are provided in the NPD from the academic year 1997/98 onwards; those for 
KS2 are available from 1995/96. PLASC and KS records can be matched together 
using the distinct and anonymous pupil identifier contained in each of these data 
files. 
Statistics on school-level characteristics are contained within the Edubase, School 
Performance Tables (SPT), and Annual School Census (ASC) data sources, which 
are collected by the DCSF. Edubase is a register of all schools in England and Wales 
that is available from the academic year 1999/00. Details on the number of pupils in 
the school and the school type (such as Community, Independent, etc.) can be 
obtained from this source. League tables of the performance of secondary schools 
were established since 1994 and contain information on the percentage of pupils 
getting nationally recognised GCSE qualifications at the age of 15/16 in each school. 
The consistent indicators of GCSE attainment that are available in all years of SPT 
data are those of the percentage of pupils attaining five A*-C grades at GCSE and the 
percentage of pupils getting five A*-G GCSE grades at the school-level. Pupils not 
achieving any GCSE passes are those with grades lower than the G level in all 
subjects; therefore the annual percentage of pupils with no GCSE passes can be 
calculated as 1 minus the percentage of pupils getting five A*-G GCSEs. ASC data 
covers all schools in England and provision of these statistics by schools is a 
legislative requirement of the 1996 Education Act. School-level information 
provided by this source includes the percentage of pupils who are eligible for free 
school meals, the percentage of pupils with special educational needs with and 
without a statement, the percentage representation of different ethnic groups of 
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pupils in the school and the pupil-teacher ratio. All annual school-level factors 
derived from the three data sources outlined here are matched to the NPD dataset by 
the school code. 
4.2.3 Dataset Construction 
The empirical analysis made in this Chapter and Chapter Five looks at changes in the 
academic quality and composition of pupils entering year 7 of secondary school in 
each year and whole-school level year-on-year compositional changes. These angles 
of enquiry can be assessed using a dataset compiled from the above sources, as set 
out here. 
Changes to intake composition in secondary schools can be examined over the 6 
PLASC waves only. PLASC provides a sole source of information on the 
background characteristics of pupils joining each school, with the indicators as 
outlined above being available for each pupil in each wave. The variable contained in 
PLASC on the national curriculum year group to which each pupil belongs can be 
used to identify and extract pupils entering year 7 of each school per year from the 
full PLASC population98. Of this year group, only those pupils entering secondary 
schools situated in the 34 LEAs in which the sample of 46 Academy schools are 
situated are kept. This sample restriction is imposed because one purpose of the 
analysis is to define a control group of schools whose intake patterns and changes in 
school composition can be compared with those in Academies and their predecessor 
counterparts. If they are to provide an accurate comparison, schools in the control 
group should resemble Academy predecessors by sharing similar characteristics to 
these schools, but being differentiated by the fact that they do not acquire Academy 
school status. One such attribute is the geographical location of comparison schools. 
Elimination from the sample of those pupils entering schools that are not located in 
98 As Table 4.1 showed, Academy schools generally open in September, and schools start their new 
school year in this month, while PLASC information on the pupil roll that is used here is collected in 
January. This gap of approximately 4 months in the data collection point does create the potential for a 
discrepancy to exist between the recorded details on pupil enrolment and who actually entered the 
school. However, it is likely that the amount of the discrepancy is too small to have any discernable 
impact on the findings, and it should be emphasised that the unit of analysis in empirical evaluation is 
the school rather than the pupil. Then the year-on-year variations that are witnessed in the data can be 
considered to be quite accurate, even with pupil entry and exit potentially occurring in these 4 months. 
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an LEA in the vicinity of an Academy represents an initial movement towards 
developing an adequate set of comparison schools. 
Changes in the academic intake quality of new secondary school pupils can be 
assessed by linking in Key Stage 2 records to the PLASC sample of year 7 pupils 
using the anonymous pupil identifier. KS2 outcomes provide a measure of the 
academic achievement of each pupil before secondary school entry, so that the social 
background details of pupils entering secondary schools over 2001/02 to 2006/07 are 
adjoined to the end of primary school prior attainment of these pupils over 2000/01 
to 2005/06. One way to lengthen the window of information on pupil intake quality 
changes so that the years before PLASC are covered is to exploit details on the 
secondary school attended by each pupil when they sat for their KS3 exams and track 
this information back to establish which pupils entered year 7 of that same school in 
each year. Information on the KS2 performance of these pupils can be linked in using 
the pupil code, as it was for the PLASC year 7 sample. In this case pupils who took 
their KS3 exams in year 9 of secondary school at the age of 13/14 should have 
entered the first year of that secondary school, year 7, two school years earlier when 
aged 11/12, and should have sat for their KS2 tests in primary school one year before 
then when aged 10/11. Given that pupil-level KS3 attainment data is available in the 
NPD from 1997/98 onwards, this allows for the potential expansion of the sample 
frame pertaining to the assessment of intake quality changes by a full 6 academic 
years at the front. However, as was said earlier, KS2 data is provided in the NPD 
from 1995/96. Pupil-level results from this year can be matched to the 1998/99 KS3 
outcomes of the same pupils, so that there are no KS2 records that link up to the 
initial KS3 year, making it redundant to the analysis. Then the overall sample can be 
expanded by at most 5 years at the front, to provide 11 years of data on changes in 
the academic intake quality of pupils joining secondary schools, beginning in the 
academic year 1996/97. 
The assumption that underlies the use of the KS3 data in this way is that pupils do 
not move schools between year 7 and year 9 of secondary school. If pupils who were 
in the school in year 7 have left by year 9, then KS3-derived information on the set 
of pupils who were in the school two school years earlier will be smaller than the 
actual figure. Conversely, if pupils who took their KS3 exams in the school were 
attending a different school in year 7, the sample size will be larger than it should be. 
Mobility of this type will matter for the analysis if pupils exhibiting certain 
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characteristics are more likely to engage in moves around this period, a situation 
which will affect the accuracy of empirical estimation. Recent research has shown 
that school mobility during the secondary phase of education is actually lower than 
that during the primary phase; 6.4 per cent of pupils make non-compulsory changes 
of school over the entire KS1 period (when aged 5/6 to 6/7) and 5.0 per cent move 
schools during KS2 (aged between 7/8 and 10/11), compared with mobility of just 
3.4 per cent at KS3 (when pupils are in secondary school and are aged 11/12 to 
13/14) (Machin et al., 2006)99. At this point it is worthwhile to note that the 
reliability of estimates obtained using KS3 details to derive year 7 cohorts in years 
prior to PLASC availability will be considered in Chapter Five (Section 5.3), and it 
can be stated here that the KS3-derived part of the sample does appear to act as a 
valid proxy for determining actual pupil entry to each school in the years before 
PLASC. 
Table 4.3 below highlights the number of years over which the longitudinal panel of 
observations on pupils entering the same group of secondary schools has been 
created using both the PLASC dataset and extrapolated KS3 information. The Table 
also shows the year-on-year number of pupils entering the sample of secondary 
schools, plus the number and percentage of these pupils that have been successfully 
linked to their previous KS2 attainment records. As can be seen from the Table, 
between around 120,500 and 129,000 pupils join year 7 of the set of secondary 
schools sampled here in each year. For the majority of these pupils their prior 
attainment records at the end of primary school are available: the match on KS2 test 
scores lies between 89.6 per cent and a very high 97.6 per cent. This provides 
assurance that intake quality changes can be effectively analysed with the 
information contained in the constructed dataset. 
99 Non-compulsory school moves have been defined in Chapter One and refer to those taking place at 
non-standard times, thus they exclude expected transitions such as from Primary to Secondary school, 
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Implicit throughout the discussion of the sample formation so far has been the notion 
that the unit of analysis is the school rather than the individual pupil. Extracted pupil-
level information on entry to year 7 of secondary school is cross-sectional in nature 
and the consistent longitudinal component here is the sample of schools these pupils 
enter into. Though they are pupil-level files, both the PLASC and the KS3 parts of 
the NPD indicate the secondary school to which each pupil belongs, enabling them to 
be collapsed in order to generate a sample that is at the level of the individual school. 
In creating the school-level dataset, all characteristics pertaining to pupils entering 
year 7 of secondary school become expressed as fractions, totals or averages at the 
level of each secondary school, depending on the background indicator in question. 
Whole-school level compositional changes can be examined by adding to the dataset 
indicators on the school that are provided in the centrally-collected Edubase and 
ASC files. These files can be linked to the school-level dataset created so far using 
the school code. The Edubase data source is available from the academic year 
1999/00 onwards, while ASC data is provided for each academic year of the entire 
sample period spanning 1996/97 to 2006/07100. This step in dataset development is 
an important one for enriching the evaluation that is carried out as it allows for a 
better-defined comparison group of schools to Academy predecessors to be 
established, as will be outlined in 'Methodology' section 4.3. As for intake quality 
changes, whole school compositional changes can be assessed over the 11 year 
period of 1996/97 to 2006/07101. 
The final stage of dataset construction involves various procedures that are applied to 
the sample of schools in order to arrive at a balanced panel of school-level 
observations. Creating a balanced panel ensures that the findings from analysis into 
variations in intake patterns and school-level compositional changes across schools 
are not distorted by attrition in specific variables or in an entire set of annual 
observations in the sample of schools. The routes taken to create this final dataset are 
set out in detail in Appendix 3A, Section 3A.A. Table 4.4 indicates the size of this 
1® Whole school-level variables that are linked in from Edubase for the school years 1996/97 to 
1998/99 make use of the Edubase information for 1999/00. This is a feasible practice because the 
extracted indicators are relatively time-invariant at the level of the school. It should be noted that 
school codes differ between the predecessor years and the Academy years of each Academy school. 
Linkage of both Edubase and ASC information via school codes is therefore done according to the 
relevant code applying to the school in each year. 
101 From here on academic years will be referred to by their end year, such that where 1997 is written 
in the text, for example, this should be interpreted as referring to the academic year 1996/97. 
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sample of schools before and after corrections and imputations have been made. 
Panel A shows that the sample of Academies drops from 46 to 33 schools, while the 
total number of all other state schools located in an LEA that features at least one 
Academy school (henceforth termed the sample of "non-Academy schools") falls 
from 1,699 to 389 schools following the process of data cleaning102. The entire 
schools sample is contained within 25 LEAs, rather than 34 LEAs as was originally 
the case, which is a direct consequence of some Academy schools being lost from the 
sample, an issue that is discussed further in Appendix 3A, Section 3A.A. It is worthy 
to note here a total of 5 Academies are dropped because they are new schools that 
have no historical pre-policy observations and 2 Academy schools fall from the 
sample because their predecessors opened later than the start of the sample period, of 
1997. The difference in the drop in the number of Academies (of 13 in total) as 
compared with the loss of LEAs (9 altogether) reflects the fact that some LEAs 
contain more than one Academy. 
Panel B of Table 4.4 shows when the switch to Academy status occurred for each of 
the 5 cohorts of Academies for which details are available to date, as well as how 
many schools are in each cohort. As per the original sample of Academy schools 
(shown in Table 4.1 above), in the final sample the largest cohort of Academies are 
those opening from September 2006, cohort 5. This is also the group from which the 
most Academies are lost in reaching the balanced panel — seven Academy schools 
drop out in this year, as compared with none from cohorts 1 and 4 and three each 
from cohorts 2 and 3 (see Appendix 3A, Section 3A.A). 
Academy school cohorts are divided between their predecessor years (P) and their 
Academy years (A), depending on the timing of their institutional conversion. It is 
anticipated that this break in the status of these schools is marked by a change to 
their pupil intake patterns and whole-school composition; these within-Academy 
school policy responses form a further aspect of the analytical enquiry to follow. For 
102 The original number of non-Academy schools in the sample, of 1,699, is inflated by the presence 
of schools that cannot be directly compared with Academies because their institutional arrangements 
differ (such as independent schools) and also by the unusually high number of small schools that are 
contained in the dataset in 2006. The latter likely reflects an error in records that is unique to this year, 
since across all other years of school-level data assessed here (1997-2005, and 2007), there are around 
600 non-Academies. These and other errors were corrected for, as detailed in Appendix 3A. Section 
3A.A. 
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non-Academy schools their status remains unchanged (U) throughout the periodic:13. 
Contained within this group is a subset of control schools whose attributes most 
closely resemble those of Academy predecessors and whose trends in pupil profile 
are to be compared with those of Academies and their predecessor(s), as set out in 
Section 4.3. 
103 In fact some schools in the non-Academy group do change their status over the period, but the 
percentage doing so is negligible. Therefore the categorisation of these schools as `1..r is valid (see 
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To summarise, the nature of the constructed dataset allows for changes to intake 
composition among secondary schools to be analysed over the 6 year window of 
2002 to 2007, while intake quality and whole school compositional patterns can be 
examined for 11 years encompassing 1997 to 2007. The amount of predecessor 
school information will therefore be lower when intake composition effects are 
addressed, since these details are only available in PLASC, and neither KS3 
extrapolation nor the use of school-level Edubase or LEASIS/ASC files can be used 
to extend the window of this pupil-level dataset. 
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4.3 	 Methodology 
The main methodological approach adopted here is that of a 'difference-in-
differences' analysis applied to the constructed longitudinal dataset which contains 
school-level factors that are tracked through time. This technique involves comparing 
the difference in an outcome measure in the 'treated' group of schools (those that 
switch to Academy status) with that in an appropriate comparison group in the years 
before and after the school status change was implemented. Observed changes reflect 
the pre-and post-policy excess in the average of the outcome measure in the 
treatment group vis-à-vis the comparison group. This method is known in the 
economics literature as a 'natural experiment approach' to the evaluation of policy 
interventions 104, in which the aim is to gauge the impact of an exogenously occurring 
policy shift in some time period on a sub-population that receives treatment as a 
result of the policy change and to set this against behaviour in the untreated 
population. Estimation produces a parameter that identifies the average impact of 
treatment on the treated, or the ATT (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2008). Equation (1) 
below indicates the basic difference-in-differences model that is applied to the 
sample of schools here and the key coefficient of interest that derives from model 
estimation. The relationship between an outcome measure y in secondary school s in 
a certain time period t and model covariates can be specified in an equation as:- 
yst = a + Ms + (Rs * PolicyOnt,k + es, 	 (1) 
The term A in this equation refers to the 'Academy' dummy variable. This takes the 
value of 1 for schools that become Academies, and covers all 11 years of the school 
(their pre-policy predecessor school years and their post-policy Academy school 
years); otherwise the variable assumes the value of 0 across all 11 years in non-
Academies. The constant or intercept is denoted by a and s is the error term, a 
variable that incorporates all unobservable components that are associated with the 
particular outcome measure. The main parameter of interest is 6 on the 
As*PolicyOnt>k variable. PolicyOnpk is the treatment variable, a dummy indicator that 
equates to 1 over the time periods (t > k) in which the Academy school policy is in 
104 The principles of experimental design are originally attributable to the fields of the natural sciences 
and psychology, and the term 'natural experiment' was coined in the early 1960s by the psychologists 
Julian C. Stanley Jr. and Donald T. Campbell. 
192 
effect in school s and 0 at all other times (so that k is the year that a school opens as 
an Academy). The coefficient 6 captures the average change in the outcome measure 
within the treated group of schools relative to the comparison group, after the school 
status change occurs. Hence 6 measures the average effect of the 'treatment' of 
changing to Academy school status on the set of Academy schools, and is therefore 
an estimate of the ATT parameter. Throughout the analysis that follows the 
coefficient expression '6', and the terms 'ATI", and 'academy on' will be used 
interchangeably to all refer to this estimated treatment impact. 
A more detailed model specification is set out in equation (2) below, which includes 
regressors that additionally account for observable attributes of schools that may 
relate to the outcome. Explanatory variables that further exploit the nature of the 
fixed-effects method in being able to control for unobservable time-invariant factors 
that may impact on outcomes directly or via correlation with assignment to the 
treatment group are also modelled here (Emmerson et al., 2003)105:- 
y„ = 64,* Policy0n,„+TZ„ + s  + + Est 	 (2) 
In the above equation Z represents a vector of observable school-level characteristics, 
with associated coefficients V. The term At refers to a set of year dummies that are 
incorporated in the model so as to net out unobservable year-specific effects that are 
common to all schools in each year (and differ across years). SS  indicates a set of 
school dummies that are added to the difference-in-differences regression in order to 
account for time-constant observable and unobservable characteristics that are unique 
to the individual school. That is, the term SS  controls for the impact of school fixed 
effects on ys:. In this case all observable features of schools that are unchanging over 
105 Unobservable factors consist of time-constant and time-varying components. The difference-in-
differences method accounts for the impact of time-constant unobservable effects on the outcome 
measure. In terms of time-varying unobservable effects, these could take the form of (i) an unexpected 
one-off event, such as a sudden change in the composition of a neighbourhood, which affects 
Academy schools simultaneously opening in that area at the time of its occurrence; or (ii) a change 
that occurs through time, for example the process of neighbourhood gentrification, which will impact 
on the neighbourhood composition and on Academies within the area over time, and therefore will 
display a time-trend. The impact of random events such as case (i) cannot be netted out using the 
difference-in-differences approach, a limitation of the method that is likely to be small given the 
unlikelihood of these events happening. The effect of case (ii) can be modelled through fitting a time-
trend to the data over all available years and estimating whether the policy effect is attributable to 
patterns, or 'trends', that were already present in the outcome measure over the pre-policy period. This 
exercise is carried out as a robustness check of empirical findings on changes to intake ability in 
Academies, the results of which are presented in Chapter Five, Section 5.3. 
193 
time become absorbed in the school fixed effect term, including the Academy 
dummy variable (the flAs part of equation (1) above). The regression now models the 
within-school effects of Academy status on each outcome measurel°6. 
Defining a suitable comparison group of untreated schools constitutes an important 
part of the process of empirical evaluation. This set of schools provides the closest 
possible counterfactual scenario, illustrating patterns of behaviour that might have 
existed in Academy schools had they not participated in the policy of status 
change107. So far a sample of non-Academy schools has been established for this 
purpose, where this group contains only those state-maintained schools of the 
traditional type that feature in an LEA in which there is at least one Academy (see 
Appendix 3A, Section 3A.A for further details). While these untreated schools may 
represent an adequately defined control group, reaching a well-defined set of non-
Academies enables more accurate sample estimation of the ATT parameter, bringing 
that estimation closer to the true value. Better definition can be achieved by reducing 
the heterogeneity between the characteristics of non-Academy schools and those of 
Academy pre policy predecessor schools as much as possible, such that Academies 
and non-Academies share a similar probability of being subjected to the policy 
treatment based on their attributes and only differ according to their actual treatment 
status. Resemblance in the pre-policy characteristics of the two groups of schools 
matters because it is on factors such as these that the status change is likely to be 
based. 
Of course the heterogeneity that exists between Academies and untreated schools 
reflects both observable and unobservable dimensions, and the dataset used here 
provides information on schools that allows for only certain observable differences to 
be taken into account. Even if data pertaining to every aspect of schools were 
106 More specifically, the regression with school-fixed effects models deviations from school-specific 
means. Thus deviations of the dependent and independent variables for each school from the school-
specific average of these variables over the time period concerned are estimated. In this case any time-
constant terms in the regression equation that involve grouped schools are no longer separately 
identified since they become subsumed within the school fixed effect. As the model with school 
dummies provides estimation at the lowest hierarchical unit, that of the individual school, it gives a 
much more unique and informative ATT coefficient than models estimated at a more aggregated 
levels. 
107 Construction of the counterfactual outcome on the basis of a well-defined comparison group of 
control schools is designed to tackle the 'missing data problem', in which a school is either subject to 
the Academy policy or is not, but that school cannot be observed in both states at the same time 
(Blundell and Costa Dias, 2008). 
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collected and freely available, the selection rules governing assignment to the 
Academy programme are not precisely stated, making the task of netting out 
heterogeneous differences less clear. In general Academy school 'treatment' has 
been shown to depend on the partially observable features of schools that concern 
their performance and their levels of disadvantage. As was pointed out in the 'Key 
Concepts' (part ii, point c) the National Challenge definition of an underachieving 
school (as one where 30 per cent of pupils or more do not attain five good GCSEs in 
the A*-C range, including in English and maths) has been used as one qualifying 
criteria for school replacement by an Academy since 2008. In terms of the data 
sources used here (discussed in section 4.2.2), the percentage of pupils not getting 
any GCSE passes can be used as an indicator of poor school performance, while a 
crude measure of school-level disadvantage is provided by the percentage of pupils 
eligible for free school meals in the school. Though they are incomplete determinants 
of eligibility for Academy treatment, the availability of statistics on these observable 
treatment participation components allows for some of the variation between the 
treated and untreated schools to be separated out. Therefore some control schools 
that do not have observable attributes resembling those of Academy predecessors can 
be excluded from the analysis. In fact, the advantage of the constructed dataset is that 
it contains school-level details stretching as far back as 1997 and incorporates 
available information in the year just prior to the decision of each Academy school to 
convert to Academy status. Then historical and recent trends in these observable 
factors that likely influence assignment to treatment among schools can be put to use 
as a means for strengthening the analysis findings108. 
The procedure that is employed in order to determine a distinct control group of 
schools who share similarity in observables in the pre-policy years to Academy 
predecessors is that of estimating a statistical propensity score for each school and 
then restricting the entire sample of schools to those contained within a common 
support region under which only Academy and non-Academy schools with similar 
propensity scores feature. The propensity score for a school is the [0, 11 conditional 
predicted probability of assignment to the treatment group for that school, that is, the 
likelihood that the school becomes an Academy given the available set of pre-policy 
observable factors relating to it. This conditional assignment probability can be 
108 In fact, a whole host of school-level observable variables are tested for their ability to predict 
assignment to the Academy treatment group, as will become clear in the discussion that follows. 
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estimated in a parametric non-linear logit or probit model or through a linear 
probability model, where the parametric specification expresses a relationship 
between the actual treatment status of the school and their observable pre-policy 
variables. Hence the parametric equation models the Academy dummy variable 
given by AS in equation (1) on the left hand side and all pre-policy observable 
covariates of schools considered to determine assignment to Academy status 
`treatment' on the right hand side. The coefficients derived under the process of 
parametric estimation are used to predict a propensity score for each school. The 
region of overlap in the distribution of the propensity scores of the treatment and 
control groups indicates those Academy and non-Academy schools who share 
similar treatment probabilities. This area of the distribution is known as the 
`Common Support Region' (CSR). Schools that are excluded from this region are 
those displaying a very different set of observable characteristics, such that their 
likelihood of becoming an Academy, as summarised in their propensity score, is 
either above or below the threshold points of common supportl°9. 
Restricting the estimation sample to schools within the CSR strengthens the 
alignment of the counterfactual situation to that which Academy schools may have 
experienced had they not converted to Academy status. Thus this procedure serves to 
produce more exact treatment effect estimates by generating a more stringent testing 
sample. The construction of a reduced sample of schools is carried out as a 
preliminary stage to the analysis and acts as a subsidiary to the main method of 
empirical difference-in-differences regression estimation under which the treatment 
impacts themselves are gauged11°. Empirical estimates presented in Chapter Five 
pertain to the sample of schools within the CSR and the sensitivity of findings to the 
relaxation of this constraint is included as a category of robustness checking. In the 
section that follows the process leading up to the generation of the CSR sample is set 
out in detail, beginning with the presentation of descriptive statistics on the entire 
109 In practice both treatment and control schools may be discarded from the empirical analysis if their 
propensity scores do not fall within the common support region. It will be seen from the logit models 
presented in Table 4.6 (see also Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2) that none of the 33 Academy schools are 
excluded from the difference-in-differences evaluation process since each of their propensity scores 
are featuring in this region of overlap. 
110 As a precursory stage to the regression analysis the propensity score (and subsequent common 
support) approach has the major advantage of being able to make use of all observable school-level 
characteristics for which data is available, while not all of these can be included in the difference-in-
differences equations as independent variables on the right hand side because many constitute the left 
hand side outcome measures. Thus the combination of this initial step and difference-in-differencing 
means that as many observable and unobservable dimensions of schools as possible are controlled for. 
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sample of schools prior to CSR formation and tracking how disparities in the 
characteristics of treated and control schools are narrowed down following restriction 
to the CSR. 
In Panel A of Table 4.5 shown below, indicators on the composition of Academy 
predecessors and all non-Academy schools are presented in the form of school-level 
averages covering the pre-policy window that is common to all Academy cohorts, 
1997 to 2002. These descriptive variables illustrate statistically significant 
differences in the pre-treatment observables of Academy predecessors and the full 
control group of schools. In line with the tendency of Academies to be set up in areas 
of decline, the Table shows that their predecessor versions are characterised by a far 
higher proportion of pupils eligible for Free School Meals (FSM) than is the case in 
non-Academy schools, where this measure is a proxy for family disadvantage. Over 
the 6 year period just above 40 per cent of pupils are entitled to FSM on average in 
the pre-Academies, as compared with about 25 per cent in the whole non-Academy 
group. 
Schools with poor attainment standards are most likely to convert to Academy status 
and the tabulated statistics reveal that this holds in the schools sampled here. On 
average almost one-quarter of the predecessor school population completes their 
compulsory schooling years achieving no GCSE qualifications (22.25 per cent), 
while about the same percentage acquire five or more GCSEs graded A*-C (25.45 
per cent). Non-Academy schools fare better all round, with just 12.46 per cent of 
pupils not gaining any GCSE passes across all 6 years on average and 38.34 per cent 
acquiring the nationally recognised standard of achievement at the GCSE stage. This 
latter percentage of 38.34 is important as it crudely indicates that non-Academies 
achieve a sufficiently high enough level of GCSE performance to sit outside of the 
definition of an under-achieving school ripe for conversion to an Academy that has 
been determined since 2008. Of course, this recent definition would in no way have 
influenced conversion to Academy status among the schools featuring in Table 4.5; 
also the qualifying criteria for conversion focuses on attainment in English and maths 
in particular, while an historical breakdown of per subject GCSE attainment at the 
school-level is not available in the utilised data sources. 
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Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics of School-Level Characteristics 
Panel A: School-level characteristics of predecessor and non-Academy 














% eligible for Free 41.31 25.18 16.13 5.84* 
School Meals (15.81) (15.19) 














% white 69.18 77.53 -8.35 -1.73 
(27.19) (26.51) 
School size 910 1020 -110 -1.93 
(number of pupils) (345) (312) 
Pupil-teacher ratio 15.13 15.60 -0.47 -1.93 
(1.59) (1.32) 
% 5+ GCSEs, A*-C 25.45 38.34 -12.89 -4.33* 
(19.61) (16.11) 
% no passes at 22.25 12.46 9.79 6.55* 
GCSE (11.98) (7.85) 
Number of 
secondary schools 33 389 
n 
Panel B: Characteristics of Primary schools attended by pupils entering into 
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Mean number of 
primary schools 36 34 
Note: The standard deviation of each variable is shown in parentheses. * indicates statistical 
significance at the 5% level, or better. SEN stands for Special Educational Needs. 
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Panel B of Table 4.5 shows the average characteristics of primary schools at the time 
when they were attended by pupils subsequently entering year 7 of the secondary 
schools sample in each pre-policy year. It appears that the compositional differences 
between Academy predecessors and non-Academies stem in part from compositional 
variations in the primary schools from which these secondary schools get their pupil 
intakern. Indeed pupils joining predecessor secondary schools over 1997 to 2002 
tend to come from primary schools with higher levels of social disadvantage. The 
percentage of pupils eligible for FSM in the primary schools from which predecessor 
schools sample is 39.14 per cent, as compared with 26.83 per cent in the primary 
schools that non-Academies sample from, a statistically significant difference of 
12.31 percentage points. Interestingly, pupils entering pre-Academy schools are apt 
to come from a larger number of lesser-performing primary schools. Predecessor 
schools spread their year 7 intake over 36 primary schools on average with a mean 
KS2 primary school performance of 71.00 points. This compares with non-
Academies sampling their year 7 intake from 34 primary schools averaging a higher 
KS2 quality of 74.56 points. The government target of attainment at Key Stage 2 is 
that of Level 4 in each of the three tested subjects of English, maths and science, the 
points score equivalent of which is 81 (27 points in each subject). Though school-
level averages mask individual variation, it is likely that more pupils entering non-
Academies achieved the target level of KS2 attainment in all subjects than did pupils 
being admitted into Academy predecessor schools. 
The pre-policy observable characteristics of Academy and non-Academy secondary 
schools shown in panel A of Table 4.5 are mapped into implied probabilities of each 
school becoming an Academy using the non-linear logit models as set out in Table 
4.6. The distribution of propensity scores obtained from a logit specification fits well 
to this sample of schools in particular as the logit function displays wider tails and a 
smaller central distribution than does the probit function as an alternative model. 
Therefore the logit model is better able to estimate implied propensities in the 
extremes of the [0, 1] space for a given set of observable characteristics, areas around 
which the predicted probabilities of non-Academies (close to zero) and Academies 
(close to one) can be expected to lie. Although it was highlighted in Table 4.4 that 
cohorts of Academy schools have been set up in different time periods so that 
111 The reader should note that the statistics in Panel A of Table 4.5 are at the whole school-level; they 
do not indicate school-level averages of pupils entering year 7 only. 
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Academies differ by their predecessor and policy on years, logit estimation 
undertaken here is based on averaged variables across the 6 pre-policy years (1997 to 
2002) that are shared by all Academy cohorts. This process of defining a single pre-
policy period into which all Academy predecessors are grouped results in the 
identification of a single common support region and one control group of non-
Academies that acts as the counterfactual for all Academy schools. Given that some 
cohorts of Academy schools are very small in size, derivation of a cohort-by-cohort 
common support region and control set of schools where variations in pre-Academy 
and Academy policy on years are taken into account can add little to the process of 
estimation of treatment effects. Hence throughout the empirical analysis that follows 
testing uses the restricted sample of schools contained within this single CSR and 
involves a comparison of intake behaviour changes and changes in whole school 
composition within all Academies and separate Academy cohorts relative to the 
unique group of non-Academy schools. 
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Table 4.6: Models of Academy School Probability: Pr(Academy) = 1, logit 
marginals and percentage effects, 1997-2002 averaged characteristics 
Variable 
Model 1 : Full Controls 
(1) 	 (2) 
Marginal 	 % effect on 
effects 	 Pr(Academy)=1 
Model 2 : Selected Controls 
(3) 	 (4) 
Marginal 	 % effect on 
effects 	 Pr(Academy)=1 
% eligible for Free 0.0016 5.39 0.0013 3.90 
School Meals (0.0011) (0.0009) 
[0.0013] [0.0012] 
% with SEN, with -0.0037 -12.94 
statement (0.0027) 
[0.0027] 






% white 0.0005 1.90 0.0005 1.67 
(0.0005) (0.0005) 
[0.0005] [0.0005] 
School size 0.0000 0.00 0.0000 0.01 
(number of pupils) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
[0.0000] [0.0000] 
Pupil-teacher ratio -0.0077 -26.82 -0.0080 -24.75 
(0.0068) (0.0084) 
[0.0073] [0.0086] 
% 5+ GCSEs, A*-C 0.0008 2.79 
(0.0012) 
[0.0013] 
% no passes at GCSE 0.0034* 11.64 0.0031* 9.42 
(0.0017) (0.0014) 
[0.0017] [0.0014] 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.2692 0.2560 
% correctly predicted, 
Academy schools 98.35 97.80 
% correctly predicted, 
Non-Academy schools 92.97 93.11 
Notes: The Table shows marginal effects from logit models based on whole school-level controls 
averaged over 1997-2002; robust standard errors are shown in round parentheses, clustered standard 
errors (clustered at the LEA level) are shown in square brackets. Models are based on 422 schools, of 
which 33 are Academy schools and 389 are non-Academies. * indicates a statistically significant 
marginal effect at the 5% level of significance, or better. The dependent variable is a dichotomous 
indicator, taking the value of one if a school is an Academy and zero otherwise, where the dummy 
covers all five Academy cohorts (see Table 4.4 (here) and Table 5.1 (Chapter Five) for the number of 
Academy schools in each cohort). The predicted probabilities of a school being an Academy are 
2.88% and 3.24% for logit models 1 and 2 respectively. This compares with 7.82% of schools that are 
Academies in the sample. Both specifications additionally include LEA dummies to control for time-
invariant, LEA-specific factors that have the same impact on all schools within an LEA. 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4.6 are based on estimation of a fully-specified logit 
model (model 1), in which all the observable pre-treatment factors in Panel A of 
Table 4.5 are used as regressors. The results from this model suggest that averaged 
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school-level variables on the fraction of pupils in the school with Special Educational 
Needs with a statement, the pupil-teacher ratio and the percentage of pupils getting 
no GCSE qualifications are good predictors of the likelihood of school conversion to 
Academy status according to their percentage effects. However only the last of these 
variables retains any statistical significance in the estimation process and otherwise 
all other explanatory components are redundant to the analysis. Model 2 of Table 4.6 
represents a more parsimonious version of the full logit model, in which indicators 
that could be endogenously determined by the school (SEN status) or that are highly 
correlated with another covariate (the percentage of pupils gaining five or more 
grade A*-C GCSEs) are excluded from the equation112. Once again the only 
statistically significant independent variable is the percentage of pupils with no 
GCSE passes at the age of 15/16113. 
The implied probabilities of school change to the Academy type that are derived 
from the logit model with full controls (model 1) display a distribution as shown in 
Figure 4.1 below. The common support region pertaining to this model includes the 
full sample of Academy schools (33) but a smaller number of non-Academies (266 
out of 389), so that 123 non-Academy schools are discarded from the comparison 
group. 
112 See Table 3A.2 in Appendix 3A, which shows the correlation coefficients among all pre-policy 
school-level variables averaged over 1997 to 2002. The coefficient of correlation between the 
percentage of pupils gaining five or more grade A*-C GCSEs and the percentage of pupils getting no 
passes at the GCSE stage is a statistically significant -0.8023. This very high inverse relationship 
between these two indicators suggests that at least one of them should be excluded from the logit 
model, as their informative content is the same. The former indicator was chosen to be dropped 
because poor school performance, which is signalled through variables such as the percentage of 
pupils attaining no GCSE qualifications, is one important dimension of the decision of a school to 
change to an Academy. 
113 Various other logit model specifications were tested for their predictive capabilities, and none were 
found to improve on the predictive power of the models presented here (see Appendix 3A, Section 
3A.B). 
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Figure 4.1: Propensity Scores for Academy and Non-Academy Schools: Logit 
Model with Full Controls (see Table 4.6, Model 1)  
n IN IN n 	 n .  
0 	 .2 	 .4 	 .6 	 .8 
Propensity Score 
Untreated schools (non-academies) 	 Treated schools (academies) 
Note: Diagram plots histograms of the implied probability of treatment for Academy and non-
Academy schools, where the probability estimates are predicted using the full logit specification as 
shown in Table 4.6 (model 1; see also Table 5.1. column 3, Chapter Five). The common support 
region of (0.0115 0.8068) includes 33 Academy schools (out of 33) and 266 non-Academy schools 
(out of 389). 
A similar graphical interpretation of the region of common support derived from the 
propensity scores achieved under estimation of logit model 2 is given by Figure 4.2. 
While this area of overlap also includes all 33 Academies, fewer non-Academies are 
excluded from the region than was the case for the CSR associated with model 1. A 
total of 63 non-Academy schools drop out of the counterfactual set, leaving 326 
control schools that share similar pre-treatment observable features to Academy 
predecessors over the 1997 to 2002 window. Despite the relatively weak explanatory 
power of these pre-policy observables in determining whether a school becomes an 
Academy, the subsequent process of defining a CSR does generate more stringent 
testing by reducing heterogeneity in the characteristics of treatment and control 
groups114. It is the restricted sample of schools contained within the CSR linked to 
114 More specifically, the statistically significant differences in the pre-treatment attributes of 
Academy and control schools shown in Panel A of Table 4.5 are reduced in the formation of a 
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logit model 2 on which difference-in-differences regression estimation is to be based 
overall. The logit model with selected controls is marginally better able to predict 
schools that are to remain as non-Academies (93.11 per cent correctly predicted, as 
shown in column (3) of Table 4.6) than the logit model with full controls (92.97 per 
cent, column (1)). Logit model 1 can instead better identify future Academy schools 
(98.35 per cent correctly predicted compared with a slightly smaller 97.80 per cent 
under logit model 2). Given that neither of the CSRs originating from logit models 1 
or 2 exclude any Academy schools, it would appear that the somewhat stronger 
predictive capabilities of logit model 2 in relation to the non-Academies sample 
constitutes sufficient justification for the use of schools in the CSR relating to it. 
Thus regression estimation covers all Academy schools and a wider and more 
flexible comparison group of non-Academy schools than would be the case were the 
CSR of the full logit model used115. 
It is worthwhile to briefly highlight the value in the finding that the CSRs pertaining 
to logit models 1 and 2 both include the full set of 33 Academy schools. Accurate 
definition of the propensity scores used to define these CSRs requires that all factors 
affecting assignment to the treatment group are known, can be observed, and that 
data on these factors are available to the researcher. Inaccuracies in treatment 
probabilities will therefore reflect unobservable components and/or unavailable data 
on variables that determine treatment assignment. In the present case, the fact that 
propensity scores correctly predict actual Academy school status among all 
Academies featuring in the sample therefore suggests these probabilities are well-
defined by the set of observable characteristics on schools that are available in the 
dataset. 
Following on from the initial steps to evaluation that have been set out here, in 
Chapter Five the results deriving from the process of estimation are presented and 
their implications discussed. 
common support region under both logit model 1 and the logit specification with selected controls 
(see Appendix 3A, Section 3A.0 (including Tables 3A.4 and 3A.5)). 
115 The empirical results section that follows (Chapter Five) includes as a robustness check of the 
sensitivity of difference-in-differences estimation to variations in the CSR, where one such variation is 
to use the CSR established under the fully-specified logit model. It will be evident from this analysis 
that the sample ATT parameter is unaffected by changes to the CSR (see Table 5.3, column 3, Chapter 
Five). 
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Figure 4.2: Propensity Scores for Academy and Non-Academy Schools: Logit 
Model with Selected Controls (see Table 4.6, Model 2)  
0 	 .2 	 .4 	 .6 	 .8 
Propensity Score 
	  Untreated schools (non-academies) 	 Treated schools (academies) 
Note: Diagram plots histograms of the implied probability of treatment for Academy and non-
Academy schools, where the probability estimates are predicted using the selected logit specification 
as shown in Table 4.6 (model 2). The common support region of (0.0056 0.7919) includes 33 
Academy schools (out of 33) and 326 non-Academy schools (out of 389). 
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Chapter Five: Are England's Academy Schools More 
Inclusive or More 'Exclusive'? Empirical Results from 
Evaluation 
5.1 	 Introduction 
In this part of the evaluation of the Academies Programme, results are presented on 
the intake ability and composition of pupils entering Academies, and how these 
profile dimensions of the schools compare with those of their predecessors and the 
control group of non-Academies. Analysis also addresses whole school 
compositional changes following conversion to Academy status. 
Section 5.2 presents empirical findings on KS2 intake quality changes in Academy 
schools as compared to their predecessors. Section 5.3 explores whether the jump up 
in intake quality post-conversion that is revealed through difference-in-differences 
regression estimation captures the actual policy effect, by subjecting the results to a 
host of robustness checks. In Section 5.4 the notion of heterogeneous responses to 
the policy by the Academy cohort is examined through a series of dynamic effect 
model specifications. Section 5.5 looks at the possible mechanisms driving the 
change to intake quality, and introduces evidence on changes in the dispersion of 
intake that indicate the reduced admission of pupils of lower ability in the Academy 
years. This suggests that Academies are not delivering on one of their main aims of 
being more inclusive and mixed ability schools. With this in mind, Section 5.6 
assesses other dimensions of compositional changes in Academies and finds that 
these schools also take in fewer pupils from underprivileged backgrounds. Finally, 
Section 5.7 includes a summary and discussion of the work presented across 
Chapters Three to Five and delivers some thoughts on the effectiveness of schemes 
of institutional change such as the Academies Programme in enhancing equality in 
educational opportunity through fair access. 
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5.2 	 Empirical Results: Main Findings 
The outcome measure that most illustrates the extent to which schools switching to 
Academy status are more inclusive and mixed ability, and therefore have the 
potential to enhance equality in educational opportunity, is that of the average KS2 
performance of pupils entering year 7 of all sampled secondary schools in each year. 
As an indicator of the prior attainment of pupils joining the school, this outcome 
measure might be expected to be inversely correlated with Academy school 
conversion, given that Academy schools tend to be set up in areas of disadvantage 
often characterised by pupils with low levels of academic achievement. In the 
available data changes to intake quality in predecessor versus Academy schools and 
in control schools compared to 'treated' Academies can be gauged from information 
on the average KS2 total points score of pupils joining each school across the 11 
years of 1997 to 2007. This then forms the dependent variable yst in equations (1) and 
(2) of Section 4.3 (Chapter Four). 
Table 5.1 below shows the evolution of the average value of this indicator in each 
year for the 33 Academy schools overall, separate cohorts of Academies and the 
restricted control group of non-Academy schools contained within the common 
support region identified from logit model 2 in Table 4.6 (Chapter Four). According 
to each category of schools the Table also indicates the change in the outcome 
measure between the initial year (1997) and most recent year (2007) for which data 
is available (see column 12). The difference-in-differences estimates of this change 
in the outcome measure between the first and last year are highlighted in column 13 
of the Table. Here the progression in school-level KS2 intake quality in both grouped 
Academies and each Academy cohort is compared to that in the restricted 
counterfactual group of 326 non-Academy schools within the CSR. The estimation 
equation is given by:- 
yst = /3A, + 	 PolicyOnt,k + At  + Est 	 (3) 
That is, the outcome measure is regressed against the academy dummy variable As 
(with associated coefficient fl), an interaction term that distinguishes the Academy 
years from the predecessor years in each Academy school (i.e. PolicyOn equals 1 in 
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those years at and following the policy of conversion (t > k) in Academy school s), 
and a set of year dummies which control for within-year effects that are common to 
all schools and are denoted by A,. 
In line with the notion that Academy schools frequently feature pupils with a 
relatively weaker background of educational achievement, Table 5.1 shows that the 
KS2 total points scores of pupils entering grouped Academies (which includes their 
predecessor counterparts) are consistently below those for pupils joining the sample 
of non-Academy schools in each of the 11 years shown. Although the gap in the 
outcome measure between these two groups of schools narrows over the period, by 
2007 Academies still sit below non-Academies in their intake quality distribution. 
However, Academy schools as a whole experience a sharper rise in their pupil intake 
quality across 1997 to 2007 than do non-Academies. Column 12 of the Table 
indicates that the prior attainment of year 7 pupils jumped up by 15.95 KS2 total 
points in all 33 Academies combined between the end-points of 1997 and 2007 as 
compared with an increase of 13.56 in the outcome measure among the restricted 
sample of control schools. The difference-in-differences estimates of column 13 
reveal the relative change between the treated and comparison group to be 
statistically significant, with an estimated 6 coefficient of 2.38 on the interaction 
expression of equation (3). When estimation used the full sample of 389 non-
Academy schools, the outcome measure changed by 13.08 KS2 total points, from 
66.97 in 1997 to 80.05 in 2007. The 6 parameter increased to 2.87 (with a standard 
error of 0.89) in this case (note that these results are not reported in Table 5.1). 
Therefore the process of restricting the estimation sample to those Academy and 
non-Academy schools within the CSR results in more precise and conservative 
estimation of the relative change in pupil intake quality because observable 
heterogeneity between the two groups of schools is reduced in this region. 
Looking at individual cohorts of Academies, the prior academic performance of 
pupil entrants went up the most amid those schools opening under the new status in 
the school years 2002/03 (cohort 1) and 2004/05 (cohort 3), with their KS2 total 
points rising by 16.63 and 17.52 respectively. Changes in the outcome measure 
among these cohorts seem to be the main drivers of the grouped change, given that 
statistical significance only holds for their estimated coefficients on the interaction 
term. It is worthwhile to point out here that caution should be exercised in the 
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reading of these findings. Cohort-by-cohort estimates in general, and those already 
mentioned in particular, are based on a very small number of Academies (cohort 1 
features only three Academy schools; cohort 3 contains just two Academies). Thus 
difference-in-differences estimation that uses these small sample sizes possesses little 
informative statistical content as compared with results that pertain to the larger 
sample of grouped Academies. 
Academy schools that opened in 2005/06 (cohort 4) stand out as the group for whom 
average KS2 intake quality is high throughout the 11 year period and in most years 
(except 1999 and 2002) lies above that in non-Academy schools. As was noted in 
Section 4.2.1 (see also Table 4.1) it was in this year that Academy school conversion 
was undertaken by several former CTCs. The CTC scheme, as a forerunner to the 
Academies programme, involved much the same process of replacing 
underachieving schools in disadvantaged areas with refreshed set-ups specialising in 
technology that were independent of LEA control and were sponsored by private 
business. By 1994 this initiative reached its peak with a total of just 15 CTCs formed, 
half the original anticipated amount. CTCs are often reported to out-perform other 
schools within their areas in terms of the number of pupils getting GCSE passes in 
the A*-C range (Astle and Ryan, 2008)116. While raised attainment may be a product 
of improved standards of teaching and learning in CTCs, the evidence presented here 
also points towards a more favourable policy of admissions into these schools of 
pupils with a stronger ability background, the upshot of which may be higher school 
performance in the long-run. Overall, as an initial step in the analysis of intake 
quality changes in Academies, the results of Table 5.1 suggest that these schools 
admit a different quality of year 7 pupil once they switch status relative to both their 
predecessor school(s) and the non-Academies. It would appear that in general 
students of a higher academic ability are more likely to enter into the renewed 
school. 
116 In 2007 CTCs averaged 91% of pupils gaining 5 GCSEs in the A*-C range, compared to a 60% 
average among comprehensive state schools. Including the subjects of English and maths in this 
category, CTC performance dropped to 70%, though this was still much higher than that in other state 
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In Table 5.2 below, the findings established so far from simple difference-in-
differences regression estimation that uses data from the end years of the sample 
period only are subjected to further testing. Here information contained in all 11 
years of the sample frame is fully exploited, while stringent testing based on the 
restricted sample of schools contained within the CSR is upheld. In the first two 
columns of Table 5.2 the Academy dummy variable of equation (1) is broken down 
into cohort dummies that distinguish and group Academy schools by their academic 
year of opening. In this case the estimation equation becomes:- 
5 
y„ = {I AA„ + gAs * PolicyOnt,k + + cosi + E „ 	 (4) 
Where c ranges from 1 to 5 depending on the cohort to which the academy school 
belongs; /1, is the set of year dummies; and cosi are a set of LEA dummies, one for 
each of the 25 LEAs in the sample. These are included so as to capture unobservable 
factors that are specific to each LEA (j) and affect all schools (s) within the 
respective LEA in the same way over time117. With cohort dummies added to the 
regression equation the coefficient b gives the average change in the dependent 
variable when the effective policy on period is allowed to vary by the Academy 
cohort. 
c=1 
117 With LEA dummies modelled, regression analysis estimates deviations of the dependent and 
independent variables for each school from the LEA-specific average of these variables across all 
schools in the LEA over the entire time period (see column (2) of Table 5.2). This represents a higher 
level of aggregation than when school fixed effects are added (columns (3) and (4) of Table 5.2), in 
which case the regression models deviations from school-specific means. 
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Table 5.2: School-Level Difference in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of 
Academy Status on Key Stage 2 Intake (1997-2007)  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Academy on effect (all academies) 2.460* 2.460* 2.460* 2.409* 
(academy*policyon) (0.547) (0.549) (0.574) (0.575) 
Cohort 1 -6.486* -7.168* 
(0.508) (1.766) 
Cohort 2 -7.588* -7.863* 
(1.048) (0.820) 
Cohort 3 -4.786* -8.745* 
(0.988) (1.183) 
Cohort 4 0.222 -0.141 
(2.471) (2.301) 
Cohort 5 -4.123* -4.650* 
(1.507) (1.368) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LEA dummies No Yes No No 
School fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
School-level controls for school size 
and pupil-teacher ratio 
No No No Yes 
Note: The Table reports difference-in-differences regressions in which the dependent variable is the 
average annual KS2 total points score of year 7 pupils and explanatory variables for each specification 
are as listed. Robust standard errors (clustered at the school level) are shown in parentheses. All 
regressions use Academy and non-Academy schools belonging to the common support region 
determined by the logit regression as defined in Table 4.6, model 2 (see also Figure 4.2), Chapter 
Four, so that regressions are based on 3,949 observations covering 359 schools, of which 33 are 
Academies and 326 are non-Academies (see Table 5.1 for the number of Academy schools in each 
cohort). * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, or better. The mean of the dependent 
variable in the common pre-policy year across all Academy cohorts (2002) is 73.577. 
As can be seen from columns (1) and (2) of Table 5.2, Academy schools and their 
predecessors tend to intake year 7 pupils of a lower prior ability than non-Academy 
schools. Findings from the estimation of equation (4) show that almost all of the 
coefficients on the cohort dummies are negative and statistically significant, whether 
controls are added for year dummies only (column 1), or both year dummies and 
LEA dummies (column 2). The exception is the fourth Academy cohort, whose 
average KS2 intake quality over the 11 year period sits above that of all other non-
Academy schools in the sampled LEAs (though this difference is not significant). 
Estimation of how intake quality changes in schools once the Academy policy comes 
into effect reveals there to be a sharp jump up in the outcome variable in the 
conversion years. The statistically significant and positive ö coefficient indicates that 
when schools switch to Academy status their KS2 total points score is on average 
2.460 points higher than in their predecessor years and compared to non-Academy 
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schools. Benchmarking this against the sample average value of the dependent 
variable in the pre-policy year that is common to all Academy cohorts of 2002, the 
interpretation of this result is that the average KS2 total points score increases from 
73.577 to 76.037 when schools re-open as Academies, a rise of some 3.34 per 
cent118. 
Further disaggregation of the cohort-by-cohort analysis to the level of the individual 
school is enabled through the inclusion of controls for school fixed effects and the 
results deriving from this estimation method are shown in the final two columns of 
Table 5.2. In this case the more detailed specification of equation (2) in Section 4.3 
(Chapter Four) is followed. Column 3 of Table 5.2 excludes the vector of observable 
school-level characteristics that are present in equation (2) from regression 
estimation, while column 4 takes these into account. Assessment of the within-school 
effect of Academy status on KS2 intake quality reveals a largely unchanged sample 
ATT parameter from that estimated at the cohort level; the 6 coefficient remains 
statistically significant throughout and is only marginally reduced by the inclusion of 
observable school-level controls, falling from 2.460 to 2.409. That this finding 
remains even after controlling for the size of the school (in terms of the numbers of 
pupils it contains) is significant, as it suggests that the result is not explained away by 
the potentially larger pupil capacity of Academy schools, as might have been 
expected. Schools that become Academies do not simply increase their admissions of 
pupils with a stronger ability background whilst maintaining constant intake numbers 
of pupils from the rest of the ability distribution as before. Instead the results found 
here are indicative of changes to the pupil profile in Academy schools, such that the 
entry of higher ability pupils to these schools is made possible by changes in the 
distribution of intake patterns elsewhere. Likewise even after consideration for the 
capability of Academies to have a lower pupil teacher ratio through their freedom to 
offer reward schemes that can attract more teachers to the school, the substantial 
increase in the prior attainment of year 7 entrants holds119. With the coefficient 
118  This is an approximate effect since schools convert into Academies in different years; therefore 
there is variation in the actual final pre-policy year applying to each cohort and the 2002 benchmark 
value represents the true final predecessor school year for the first cohort of Academies only. Taking 
into account the differing final pre-policy year mean values of the outcome measure by cohorts just 
changes the level at which the average KS2 total points score sits for each cohort following their 
conversion to an Academy, but the end result that there is an average jump up in KS2 intake quality 
across all Academy cohorts still remains. 
119 The notion that Academy schools may be able to accommodate a larger pupil capacity than their 
predecessor version(s) is suggested in Section 3.3 ("Aims and Objectives") of Chapter Three and the 
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(standard error) on the school size standing at 0.002 (0.001) and that on the pupil-
teacher ratio being 0.002 (0.032), only the first of these variables is statistically 
significant but neither of them add enough explanatory power to the estimation 
equation to change the end result12°. 
Overall these regression findings tally with those from the descriptive analysis of 
Table 5.1, and reaffirm that Academy schools sit below non-Academies in their 
intake quality distribution throughout the 11 year period (except for the fourth 
Academy cohort) but there is a significant narrowing of the gap in the outcome 
measure between these two groups of schools. This is particularly evident in the 
effective years of Academy school status, as the more rigorous regression testing 
presented in Table 5.2 has now shown. 
flexibility that Academy schools have to set their own pay and conditions and to offer reward 
packages to teachers according to aspects such as their performance is discussed in Section 3.2.2 
("Key Features", in particular see point (vi) on staffing) of Chapter Three. 
120 These coefficient estimates are not reported in Table 5.2. Further school-level controls for the 
percentage of pupils getting 5+ GCSEs in the A*-C range and for the percentage of pupils without any 
GCSE passes were added to estimation equation (2), both separately and together. Including the 
former variable reduced the Academy on effect (standard error) from 2.409 (0.575) to 2.249 (0.573), 
while including the latter variable reduced the policy on effect to 2.307 (0.563). Including both 
variables, the 6 coefficient fell to 2.208 (0.563). In all cases the statistical significance of this 
coefficient estimate remained. This suggests that their inclusion adds little to the findings and, given 
that these GCSE performance indicators refer to a different cohort of pupils from those entering year 7 
of the school, they have been omitted from further analysis where a vector of observable school-level 
controls is used. 
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5.3 Robustness Checks 
The existence of an Academy effect on KS2 intake quality found in the regression 
analysis discussed above may be due to the nature of the sample restrictions and 
methodological approaches applied to the sample of schools, or due to some as yet 
unaccounted for pre-policy differential trends in this outcome measure across 
treatment and control schools. In order to establish whether the impact on the 
outcome measure of school conversion into an Academy has been correctly 
identified various robustness checks are carried out and the findings from this 
process are presented in Table 5.3121. The specific equation on which robustness tests 
are conducted is that which delivers the most conservative estimate of the Academy 
effect, namely equation (2), where the regression results relating to this model are 
given in column 4 of Table 5.2. If rigorous testing leaves these results unaffected, 
then this gives assurance that the analytical procedure utilised here identifies the 
effect of the policy. 
121 Unless otherwise stated all robustness tests are based on Academy and non-Academy schools 
contained within the common support region determined by the logit regression as defined in Table 
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To begin with, column 1 of Table 5.3 explores the notion that the positive 6 
coefficient is biased downwards by the presence of CTCs that converted to 
Academies in the sample of Academy schools. The CTC programme of school 
conversion into an LEA-independent technology focused institution was developed 
in England in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and culminated in the creation of 15 
CTCs by 1994. As an early take on what now constitutes the Academies programme, 
the Conservative government's CTC scheme and the schools that it established have 
increasingly become an integral part of the New Labour government's Academy 
schools agenda. A total of five CTCs changed to Academies between the school 
years 2002/03 and 2006/07. Of these, four remain in the restricted set of 33 Academy 
schools for which all observable data over the 11 year sample period is available, 
three of which switched to Academies during 2005/06 (cohort 4). The discussion 
surrounding Table 5.1 drew attention to the relatively greater KS2 intake quality of 
this cohort, a pattern that is evident across 1997-2007, indicating that predecessor 
CTCs were already admitting pupils of a higher prior ability than other pre-Academy 
schools. This observation points towards the potential underestimation of the 
Academy effect achieved so far due to the sample incorporation of CTCs-turned-
Academies; for these schools the change in the outcome measure between 
predecessor and Academy school years appears lower than that among other 
Academy schools122. 
Removing former CTCs and their respective Academies from the common support 
region sample of schools reduces the set of Academies from 33 to 29. Two such 
schools represent the only Academies in their separate LEAs and when they are 
dropped all other non-Academy schools also featuring in these LEAs and forming 
part of the control group become redundant to the analysis. Thus the sample of non-
Academies falls from 326 to 294 schools (a loss of 34 schools) following this 
adjustment. Re-estimation of equation (2) on the smaller set of Academy and non-
Academy schools produces a larger status change effect; the 6 coefficient increases 
from 2.409 to 3.046 KS2 total points scores. While the larger sample size relating to 
122 The average KS2 total points score of pupils entering CTCs during the pre-policy period that is 
common to all Academy cohorts (1997 to 2002) is 83.917, and in the Academy school years of these 
CTCs post-conversion (2003 to 2007) this average increases to 88.374, a rise of 5.312%. Among other 
Academy schools, their predecessor years average is 67.635 and this increases to 74.402 during the 
Academy years, a gain of 10.005%. Hence this reveals a potentially higher KS2 total points score 
level in CTCs compared to other Academy predecessors that is followed by a lower change in this 
dependent variable once CTCs convert into Academy schools relative to once other predecessor 
schools have made the change. 
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the initial coefficient estimate is favoured over that with sample exclusions, this 
exercise has shown that the impact on the outcome measure of school renewal is 
actually stronger than that first estimated when CTCs that became Academies are left 
out of the sample. Overall, the move of the coefficient in the anticipated direction 
following sample redefinition of this kind indicates that the findings from evaluation 
achieved up to this stage are being consistently estimated throughout. 
In columns 2 to 4 of Table 5.3 the main regression result is tested for sensitivity to 
changes in the groups of treatment and control schools, or, more precisely, 
consideration is made here for the impact on estimation of changes to the common 
support region from which these groups derive. Thus the target of these tests is to 
understand whether the obtained coefficient relies heavily on the structure of the 
particular sample of schools on which it is estimated. In column 2 of the Table, 
equation (2) is applied to the complete sample of Academy and non-Academy 
schools with a full set of observations in all 11 years of data, and not just to those 
schools falling within the overlapping region of common support. This is equivalent 
to removing from the methodological approach the procedure used to progress from 
an adequately determined to a well-defined comparison group of schools that was set 
out in 'Methodology' Section 4.3 (Chapter Four). 
As can be seen from the Table, relaxing this sample restriction leaves the set of 
Academy schools unaltered and increases the set of non-Academies by 63 schools, to 
389 schools. The end results that this produces on the ATT parameter are to maintain 
its statistical significance and to increase its estimated size by 0.138 KS2 total points 
scores, from 2.409 to 2.547, so that there is an increase in the Academy effect 
implied by the differences in these two coefficients of 5.74 per cent123. That 
conditioning estimation to the sample of schools within the CSR generates a lower 6 
coefficient is a finding which is in line with expectations. The process of identifying 
a common support region aims to improve the precision with which the 
counterfactual scenario is defined, leading to the sample elimination of non- 
123 This percentage increase is determined as follows: (2.409/73.577)*100 = 3.274%; 
(2.547/73.577)*100 = 3.462%; and ((3.462-3.274/3.274)*100) = 5.74%. Here the value 73.577 is the 
average KS2 total points score in 2002, the common pre-policy year for all Academy cohorts (see the 
notes to Table 5.2); 3.274% is the percentage change in this average when the common support 
restriction is applied to the sample; 3.462% is the equivalent percentage change in this average when 
the common support restriction is dropped; and therefore 5.74% gives the percentage increase in the 
Academy effect as a consequence of the difference in the two estimated coefficients. 
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Academy schools differing greatly in their observable pre-policy characteristics (and 
hence their implied propensity of treatment) from Academies. The design of a more 
stringent sample frame that ensues delivers more conservative policy effect estimates 
because heterogeneity between treatment and control schools, in terms of variation in 
their observable attributes, is reduced by this method. Thus the outcome of this initial 
sensitivity analysis is in accordance with the main regression result. 
The resilience of the Academy impact to variations in the common support region is 
tested in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.3. Column 3 uses the propensity scores and 
CSR pertaining to the logit model with full controls, shown as model 1 in Table 4.6 
(see also Figure 4.1) of Chapter Four. In column 4 the likelihood of conversion to 
Academy status for each school and the CSR are re-estimated using a non-linear 
probit model on the same set of selected controls as for logit model 2 in Table 4.6 
(Chapter Four)124. In both of these cases the overlapping region of common support 
includes fewer non-Academy schools than does the CSR associated with logit model 
2, the preferred logit specification, while all 33 Academy schools remain. For the 
logit regression with full controls the CSR is smaller by 61 non-Academies, 60 of 
which feature in the CSR determined under logit model 2, and one of which does not. 
The probit model that uses selected controls is smaller by 57 non-Academy schools, 
all of which are contained within the CSR of logit model 2. The distribution of the 
propensity scores derived under the probit model is illustrated in Figure 5.1 below:- 
124 The probit model, like logit model 2, only estimates a statistically significant marginal effect on the 
percentage of pupils getting no passes at the GCSE stage. The percentage effect contribution of this 
observable variable on predicting the probability that a school becomes an Academy is 9.42% using 
logit model 2; in the probit model the equivalent percentage effect is higher, at 12.06%. The logit and 
probit models are equally good at correctly predicting which schools are to remain as non-Academies 
(93.11% are correctly predicted under both models), but the probit model is marginally better at 
predicting which schools are to become Academies (98.35% versus 97.80% under logit model 2 — see 
also Table 4.6, Chapter Four). In this respect the results from probit model estimation support the 
notion of the relative importance of poor school performance in determining school conversion into an 
Academy. 
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Figure 5.1: Propensity Scores for Academy and Non-Academy Schools: Probit 
Model with Selected Controls (see Table 5.3, column 4)  
0 	 .2 	 .4 	 .6 
Propensity Score 
Untreated schools (non-academies) 	 Treated schools (academies) 
Note: Diagram plots histograms of the implied probability of treatment for Academy and non-
Academy schools, where the probability estimates are predicted using the selected probit specification 
as discussed in Table 5.3, column 4 (for the list of selected controls used in the probit model see Table 
4.6, model 2. Chapter Four). The common support region of (0.00917 0.7243) includes 33 Academy 
schools (out of 33) and 269 non-Academy schools (out of 389). 
Interestingly, the reduction in the number of schools in the comparison group of non-
Academies that results from common support area changes makes little difference to 
the size of the estimated Academy effect and leaves the statistical significance of this 
effect unchanged. The use of a fully-specified logit model cuts the 6 coefficient by 
just 0.009 KS2 total points scores. This suggests that employing a more 
parsimoniously expressed logit model that consumes less degrees of freedom by 
requiring the coefficients on fewer explanatory variables to be evaluated represents 
an effective technique. The 6 coefficient relating to the probit model is smaller by 
0.051 points, at 2.358. It was noted in Section 4.3 (Chapter Four) that the logit model 
produces a distribution of implied probabilities that exhibits wider tails than the 
probit model, so that the former non-linear specification is better able to estimate 
extreme propensity scores on the edges of the [0, 1] space. This aspect of the logit 
model makes it better suited to the schools sample used here, given the clear division 
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in assignment to treatment status for Academy schools versus non-Academies. The 
logit model is more likely to group the probability of assignment to the treatment 
group around one for Academy schools and close to zero for non-Academies than the 
probit model, which instead generates a larger central distribution of treatment 
propensities. The fact that the logit regression identifies more non-Academy schools 
in the CSR than does the probit, even if modelling uses the same set of selected 
observable controls, provides evidence of the relatively stronger capabilities of the 
logit model in predicting extreme probability values, and hence the better application 
of this non-linear form to the current dataset. Overall the sensitivity tests carried out 
in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.3 indicate that the estimated Academy effect is not 
responsive to variations in either the specification or the functional form of the non- 
linear model used, nor to the resultant changes in the CSR that re-estimation of 
propensity scores produces. Given that a smaller sample of comparison schools is 
contained in both of the alternative non-linear expressions, the preferred logit model 
has the comparative advantage of allowing estimation to utilise a greater number of 
observational units. 
The final three columns of Table 5.3 assess whether the witnessed Academy effect is 
attributable to the nature of the trends that the outcome measure was following in 
schools in the years prior to Academy status introduction. Column 5 looks for 
differential trends in KS2 intake quality between Academy and non-Academy 
schools in the pre-policy period that continue into the effective years of the Academy 
policy and that can account entirely for the estimated ATT coefficient. The 
difference-in-differences regression models the policy impact assuming that a 
discernable gap in the outcome measure between Academy and non-Academy 
schools displays a common and parallel trend across all 11 years of data. In the 
effectual policy years the expression (6As*PolicyOn f?j,) in the difference-in-
differences equation allows for the size of this gap to change, but the parallelism of 
the outstanding distance in KS2 intake quality between treated and control schools is 
assumed to remain. If instead there is evidence of differential trends in the outcome 
measure between the two groups then the estimated 6 coefficient may just be 
capturing these. Hence this part of the robustness analysis amounts to an explicit test 
of the validity of the common trends assumption on which identification of the ATT 
parameter using the difference-in-differences estimation procedure relies. If the 
common trends assumption does not hold then this introduces bias into the ATT 
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parameter so that the difference-in-differences method does not consistently estimate 
the ATT coefficient (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2008)125. Differential trends can be 
accounted for by including in equation (2) additional controls that interact the 
individual school fixed effects (modelled as school dummy variables126) with a term 
that counts the school years (m), where m equals 1 to 11 for each year of data (1997 
to 2007) pertaining to school s. The regression equation then becomes:- 
359 
yst = d4s * Policy0r6k tliZst + s  + {Ems *ins} ± -Fe„ 
s=1 
(5) 
As shown in column 5 of Table 5.3, the (5 coefficient is robust to the inclusion of 
school-specific trends in the difference-in-differences regression; the Academy effect 
is positive (at 2.136 KS2 total points scores) and statistically significant. This means 
that there is no evidence of differential trends in the outcome measure between 
Academy and non-Academy schools that can account for the policy effect. The 
common trends assumption is not violated here and as a consequence the sample 
ATT is consistently estimated using the difference-in-differences approach. 
In columns 6 and 7 of the Table a falsification exercise takes place that involves 
testing the robustness of the main regression result to the notion of trends in the 
outcome measure in treated and control schools exhibiting a similar historical pattern 
in the years prior to the Academies scheme as that displayed by the two groups in the 
pre-post policy period. If there is evidence of an analogous evolution in the 
dependent variable occurring at some previous time interval, then the jump up in 
KS2 intake quality that is attributed to the impact of school change to Academy 
status simply reflects unaccounted for pre-existing variations in the outcome measure 
between treated and control schools. An effective way to assess whether this is the 
case is to run an experiment where, for each Academy cohort, their total numbers of 
years of school status as an Academy are shifted to an earlier time period. If re-
estimation of the Academy effect in this 'fake' policy set up gives a similar result to 
125 Consistency is a large sample property. The sample ATT parameter will be a consistent estimator if 
in the limit of the sample size (that is, when the sample size increases indefinitely) the distribution of 
this estimator collapses to a single point (with zero variance around that point) that represents the true 
ATT value (Gujarati, 1995). 
126 Notice that coefficients on a total of 359 school dummies interacted with the school year count (m) 
are estimated, corresponding to the sum of 326 non-Academies and 33 Academies contained within 
the common support region. 
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that in the true policy framework then the measured impact is fully accounted for by 
historical trends. In this test the policy period should be moved so that the alternative 
Academy school era does not overlap with the real policy on phase of any of the 
cohorts. If overlap does happen then the fake experiment may contain treatment 
contamination in the explanatory variables. Also, the experimental scenario should 
include observational points in which schools were not Academies, to allow a pre-
versus-post policy evaluation to take place. Given the abundance of historical 
information on schools contained within the dataset used here, there are enough years 
of data available to make this testing method viable. In particular, the six years 1997 
to 2002 represent a universal pre-policy period across all Academy cohorts to which 
the experimental setting can be applied. Table 5.4 below indicates the practicalities 
behind this testing process and how the 'fake' trial situation compares with that 
which actually exists for each wave of Academy schools:- 
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As can be seen from the Table the fake policy experiment does not use data from any 
of years corresponding to those where schools had converted to Academies (2003 to 
2007), instead difference-in-differences estimation is based on the six pre-policy 
years that are common to all Academy waves. In this respect the experimental setting 
uses a reduced number of predecessor annual observations for each Academy cohort 
with respect to previously. Two issues relating to this change in the sample frame 
warrant discussion here. The first is whether the actual Academy effect that was 
estimated on the full set of 11 years of data is also evident if only 6 years of data are 
utilised. The second is whether this Academy effect exists if the pattern of 
predecessor and Academy school observations on which it is based is made to 
resemble that in the falsification exercise. If these conditions are satisfied then the 
outcome of the fake test can be directly compared to the actual case, since the 
difference in the number of years used in each regression and the change in the pre-
post policy set-up do not affect the estimated result of the policy. 
The outlined sections of the 'actual' rows in Table 5.4 illustrate how the pre-post 
policy pattern and number of annual observations in the experimental test can be 
mirrored in the actual situation. It can be seen that the years 1997 to 2001 are no 
longer drawn on in this shortened sample period. Column 6 of Table 5.3 shows what 
happens to the sample ATT parameter in the true policy period when it is re-
estimated using just 6 annual observations covering 2002 to 2007. This reveals there 
to be a positive and statistically significant change in KS2 intake quality among 
Academy schools even when a reduced number of years of data are employed (8 = 
2.388). This means that the outcomes from the falsification experiment and the actual 
result are comparable. Column 7 of Table 5.3 presents the change in the dependent 
variable arising from school conversion into an Academy when consideration is 
made for a similar evolution in trends in this indicator between treatment and control 
schools in an earlier time period. The finding from this falsification test is that the 
Academy effect is not evident in the pre-policy interval; the 6 coefficient stands at a 
small and statistically insignificant 0.148 KS2 total points scores in the experimental 
scenario. Therefore the rise in pupil intake quality in Academy schools relative to 
both their predecessors and non-Academies that is found in the actual policy setting 
reflects a genuine impact of school conversion into an Academy rather than a repeat 
of historical patterns. 
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To summarise, all of the robustness checks carried out in Table 5.3 provide 
qualification for the correct identification of the impact of Academy school status on 
patterns of intake ability, where the measured effect is indicated in column 4 of Table 
5.2. The outcome of re-estimating this effect using only 6 years of data (as discussed 
above and shown in Table 5.3, column 6) also provides assurance about one 
particular aspect of the evaluation process. It was noted in 'Dataset Construction' 
section 4.2.3 of Chapter Four that pupils joining year 7 of Academy schools, their 
predecessors and other non-Academy schools (featuring in the same LEAs as 
Academies) in each year from 2002 to 2007 could be identified using PLASC data 
that is available annually from 2002 onwards. The academic quality of these pupils 
could be established from their record of prior attainment in KS2 exams taken at the 
end of the primary school stage, and these were linked to the PLASC data using a 
pupil identifier. Over these 6 years a complete record of the academic ability of 
pupils entering the sample of secondary schools could thus be determined from the 
available PLASC data. In order to establish which pupils were entering this set of 
secondary schools in the years prior to PLASC a process of extrapolation that 
exploited KS3 pupil-level records was employed and discussed in Section 4.2.3 
(Chapter Four). More specifically, the code of the school attended by the pupil at 
KS3 (when pupils are aged 13/14) was used to infer which pupils were in the schools 
two academic years earlier as new entrants (aged 11/12), and KS2 records of the 
prior attainment of these pupils were then linked in. This method of extrapolation 
enabled the sample window to be lengthened from the 6 PLASC years of data 
covering 2002 to 2007 to an eleven year period, that of 1997 to 2007. 
One concern about this extrapolation procedure was the potential for pupil mobility 
between the start of secondary school and the time when KS3 exams are taken to 
generate inaccuracies in the inferred records of pupil entry into the secondary schools 
of interest. A plausible way to check whether pupil mobility is an issue is to compare 
difference-in-differences regression estimation of the Academy effect when all 11 
years of the data are used with that derived from a sample window based around only 
the 6 years of PLASC data (2002 to 2007). The outcome of the latter regression 
using the 6 PLASC years is exactly that shown in the robustness exercise of column 
6 in Table 5.3, and, as was discussed, this yields only a fractional downwards change 
in the estimated policy effect in comparison to regression analysis that exploits the 
full sample period. Hence estimation that uses all eleven data points is reliable 
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according to the checking approach carried out here. Pupil mobility does not appear 
to affect records of intake into secondary schools in the years 1997 to 2001 and the 
KS3-derived part of the sample acts as a valid proxy for actual pupil entry into each 
secondary school in the years before PLASC. 
A further point that warrants discussion at this stage is the potential for changes in 
intake behaviour among Academy schools to affect the intake patterns of other non-
Academies, so that the measured Academy effect stems from the use of an 
inappropriate comparison group. In particular, if Academy schools compete with 
non-Academies for pupil intake from the same supply pool, then the increased entry 
of more academically able pupils into Academies may come at the expense of a 
reduced quantity of this pupil type for non-Academy schools to admit. In this case, 
the introduction of the Academies programme in an area results in a 'crowding out' 
effect in the pupil admissions supply for other local schools. Then this raises the 
issue of the validity of using similar schools in the LEA that do not become 
Academies as a comparison group, given that they may not be unaffected by the 
programme. 
There are two lines of argument to suggest that policy spillovers are not a major 
cause for concern in the present scenario. Firstly, of the 25 LEAs sampled here, there 
is on average one Academy school featuring in a single LEA, with the highest 
number being three. In terms of the control group of non-Academies, the mean 
number per LEA is 13 schools127. Given these statistics, it is unlikely that intake 
behaviour changes in one post-conversion Academy school can have an impact on 
pupil admissions in all 13 control schools within the LEA of that Academy. 
Therefore any contamination effects of treatment on the untreated group are likely to 
be too minor to cause concern. Secondly, the average annual KS2 total points scores 
of pupils entering year 7 of the set of non-Academies were reported in Table 5.1, 
where it was shown that the comparison group still experience intake quality growth 
127 Inspection of the data revealed there to be on average one Academy school within an individual 
LEA, and only 2 LEAs feature a maximum total of 3 Academy schools. The per-LEA control school 
averages reported in the text are calculated by dividing the total number of non-Academy schools 
within the CSR (326) by the total number of 25 LEAs. Without the common support region restriction 
applied, there are on average 16 non-Academy control schools within the LEA of one Academy 
school (389 non-Academy schools are present in the full sample). In fact, the original dataset 
contained even more non-Academy schools relative to the sample of Academies, some of which were 
dropped in the process of deriving a balanced panel of school-level observations (see Appendix 3A. 
Section 3A.A, including Table 3A.I). Thus all figures discussed here understate the actual number of 
control schools within the LEA of an Academy. 
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between 1997 and 2007 but to a lesser degree than do all predecessor-turned-
Academies. It can be seen from inspection of the figures shown in this Table that 
year-on-year changes in intake quality in the non-Academy group are always 
positive, even in the period of conversion into Academy status by other schools 
(2003 to 2007). The fact that pupils entering non-Academy schools are of an 
increasingly stronger academic quality throughout the 11 year window implies that 
intake into these schools has not been substantially altered by the presence of 
competing Academies in the local area. Taken together, the arguments raised here 
provide justification for the use of non-Academies as an effective control group, 
given that there appear to be no significant indications of policy spillovers occurring 
from Academy to non-Academy schools that might be affecting pupil admissions for 
both parties. 
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5.4 Dynamic Effects 
School conversion to Academy status has thus far been shown to be generally 
characterised by these schools admitting year 7 pupils with a higher record of prior 
attainment. The stringent model estimated in column 4 of Table 5.2 revealed a 
statistically significant 2.409 rise in the KS2 total points scores of pupils entering 
Academy schools, a finding that stands up to a whole host of robustness checks. This 
policy effect estimate is assumed to be unchanging over time in the Academy years 
and indicates the average instantaneous response of all 33 Academy schools to 
treatment. In Table 5.5 that follows tests are carried out that look for evidence of 
dynamic reactions to the Academy schools policy, such that the outcome measure 
continues to change among Academies as the length of exposure to the scheme 
increases with time. Testing also asks whether any dynamic or otherwise static 
effects are coupled with heterogeneous impacts of school conversion by each 
Academy cohort. Here the aim is to understand if the estimated ATT coefficient is 
attributable to the policy responses of a particular cohort or cohorts of Academy 
schools. 
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Table 5.5: Testing for Dynamic Effects: Key Stage 2 Intake Changes during the 
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Time on effect (all academies) 0.208 0.194 
(academy*policyon*timeon) (0.240) (0.251) 
Academy on effect, cohort 1 2.351* 1.770 2.784 
(cohort 1 dummy*policyon) (0.582) (1.066) (1.571) 
Academy on effect, cohort 2 2.777* 2.297 1.356 
(cohort 2 dummy*policyon) (0.985) (1.227) (1.311) 
Academy on effect, cohort 3 3.701* 3.319* 3.181 
(cohort 3 dummy*policyon) (1.223) (1.349) (1.917) 
Academy on effect, cohort 4 1.596 1.313 1.697 
(cohort 4 dummy*policyon) (1.490) (1.511) (1.508) 
Academy on effect, cohort 5 2.627* 2.443* 2.639* 
(cohort 5 dummy*policyon) (0.852) (0.886) (0.853) 
Time on effect, cohort 1 -0.145 
(cohort 1 dummy*policyon*timeon) (0.421) 
Time on effect, cohort 2 0.570* 
(cohort 2 dummy*policyon*timeon) (0.255) 
Time on effect, cohort 3 - - - 0.264 
(cohort 3 dummy*policyon*timeon) (0.354) 
Time on effect, cohort 4 -0.060 
(cohort 4 dummy*policy-on*time-on) (0.594) 
Testing "academy on" effects by 
cohort jointly equal zero (p-value) 0.000 0.022 0.003 
Testing "academy on" effects by 
cohort are jointly equal (p-value) 0.824 0.780 0.883 
Testing "time on" effects by cohort 
jointly equal zero (p-value) 0.227 
Testing "time on" effects by cohort 
are jointly equal (p-value) 0.438 
Note: The Table shows difference-in-differences regressions in which the dependent variable is the 
average annual KS2 total points score of year 7 pupils and explanatory variables consider different 
specifications of dynamic effects as listed, for years 1997-2007. All regressions include additional 
controls as follows: year dummies, school fixed effects and school-level controls for school size and 
the pupil-teacher ratio. Robust standard errors (clustered at the school level) are shown in 
parentheses. All regressions use Academy and non-Academy schools belonging to the common 
support region determined by the logit regression as defined in Table 4.6, model 2 (see also Figure 
4.2) of Chapter Four, so that regressions are based on 3,949 observations covering 359 schools, of 
which 33 are Academies and 326 are non-Academies (see Table 5.1 for the number of Academy 
schools in each cohort). * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, or better. 
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In the first column of Table 5.5 all schools that become Academies are assumed to 
have the same initial change in their KS2 intake quality on average (as per column 4 
of Table 5.2), but this immediate policy reaction is additionally tested for further 
changes over time. A non-flat slope in the effective policy years would suggest that 
there are gradual year-on-year changes in intake quality that add to the instantaneous 
post-conversion rise. Column 1 of the Table preliminarily models this growth rate as 
being identical for all Academy schools, such that estimation follows equation (2) 
but with a control for time effects inserted as follows:- 
Y s t = Ms * PolicyOnt,k + ii[As * PolicyOn * (t —k +1)]+ 
TZst + + At  + est 	 (6) 
Here the coefficient ;7 measures the average change in the outcome measure for each 
incremental year of Academy school status (t-k+1, where t is the year and k is the 
year in which the school became an Academy). The results of regression estimation 
suggest that accounting for more adjustments in KS2 intake quality as schools 
continue their Academy experience does little to change the average treatment effect, 
with the 6 coefficient remaining statistically significant and just above 2 KS2 total 
points scores, at 2.009. This unchanging result arises because there is no significant 
time-on effect (II = 0.208; standard error on = 0.240), with the implication being 
that the null hypothesis of an initial average rise followed by flat growth in the 
dependent variable as Academy school exposure carries on cannot be rejected. Thus 
it would appear that there is only a one-off augmentation in pupil quality that 
happens as soon as schools re-open as Academies. 
The notion that different cohorts of Academies may exert varying degrees of 
influence on the 6 coefficient is considered in column 2 of Table 5.5, where this 
average initial policy response is allowed to differ by the cohort. In this case some 
Academy waves may change the intake quality of their new entrants by more than 
others once they become Academies, so that they drive the immediate jump up in the 
outcome measure. Estimation of the following equation establishes a separate 6 
sample parameter for each Academy cohort, c, where c ranges from 1 to 5:- 
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y„ = i gcAsc * PolicyOnt,k + WZ„ + js + At + Est { 
c=1 
	 (7) 
As can be seen from the findings in column 2, Academy cohorts respond in much the 
same way to the policy, with a per cohort effect ranging between positive KS2 total 
points score changes of 1.596 (cohort 4) and 3.701 (cohort 3). While the former 
estimate is not statistically significant, there is sufficient overlap in the confidence 
intervals on these sample coefficients to suggest similarity in cohort reactions to 
Academy status on KS2 intake quality changes. This cohort-common policy 
consequence is formally checked through F-tests that set two separate null 
hypotheses, one of a zero effect on the outcome measure from conversion to an 
Academy, where this non-effect is equal for all Academy cohorts (8c = 0 for all c), 
and the other of a cohort equal effect (61 = = 83 = .64 = 65). These F-tests reconfirm 
the findings that there is a positive, non-zero equal initial change in the outcome 
measure among the five Academy groups, suggesting that no Academy cohort or 
cohorts in particular are generating the average response over and above others (see 
the rows in italics in Table 5.5, where the p-value on the first F-test in column 2 is 
0.000 so that the null hypothesis is rejected and that on the second F-test is 0.824, so 
that the null cannot be rejected). 
Taking the analysis of column 2 to the next level, column 3 of Table 5.5 combines 
heterogeneous policy impacts with a non-flat growth in the outcome measure that is 
common to all Academy schools during the post-policy period. Thus the testing 
procedures of columns 1 and 2 are combined and jointly assessed in this evaluation 
stage, so that the estimation equation becomes:- 
y 
 = {
5 E ScAsc * PolicyOnt,k }+ IAA,* PolicyOn*(t — k + l)]+ 
c=1 
klfZsts+At + est 	 (8) 
In line with the findings from the earlier tests, there is no evidence of either 
prolonged responses to treatment among all Academy cohorts or differential impacts 
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of status change on the dependent variable by the Academy cohort. The i7 coefficient 
is not statistically significant and the F-statistics suggest a rejection of the null 
hypothesis that be = 0 for all c, instead indicating that be > 0 and is equal for the 
sample of 33 Academies. 
In the final column of Table 5.5 the most flexible pattern of responses to Academy 
conversion is considered, in which all possible facets of cohort heterogeneity are 
allowed to occur; Academy cohorts are tested for differential initial changes in the 
outcome measure upon switching to Academy status as well as for further policy 
reactions through time that likewise vary by the cohort. Then equation (8) shown 
above is adapted slightly and is written as:- 
5 	 5 
y = 	 gcAsc * PolicyOnt,k }+{ltic [Asc * PolicyOn * (t — k +1)]}+ 
c=i 	 c=1 
tliZ st -E s +At +est 	 (9) 
It should be emphasised that estimation of all of the parameters in equation (9) using 
a sample of just 33 Academy schools is a very demanding exercise. Nevertheless, 
regression findings reveal that the results pertaining to all other columns of the Table 
remain; there is a homogenous cohort response to the Academy policy and no 
changes to the outcome measure after the average positive change which happens 
initially when schools convert to Academies. Conclusions deriving from the F-tests 
on the .6 coefficients of column 3 are unchanged when extended model specification 
(9) is estimated in column 4. Further tests for joint significance of the r7 coefficients 
across Academy waves indicate that time-on effects take the value of zero and are 
equal in all five cohorts; the p-value on HO: tic = 0 for all c is 0.227 so that the null 
hypothesis is not rejected and that on HO: r7t = '72 = 173 = 774 = qs is 0.438, again 
suggesting that the null hypothesis holds (see the last two rows of Table 5.5). 
Overall, the dynamic equation models (6) to (9) estimated in Table 5.5 give weight to 
the persistent regression finding that there is an immediate increase in KS2 intake 
quality once schools become Academies. Beyond this initial rise there are no more 
changes in this outcome measure, though the jump up is a constant impact that is 
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neither reversed nor reduced over time in the effective policy years. Moreover this 
pattern of behaviour is not witnessed among non-Academy schools nor is it evident 
at some earlier point in time, as the pre-policy robustness test highlighted in column 
7 of Table 5.3 showed. Thus the estimated Academy conversion effect shown in 
column 4 of Table 5.2 and derived using regression equation (2), which excludes 
cohort-specific controls, binds in all tested circumstances. All Academy schools 
intake pupils with an average 2.409 higher KS2 total points score as soon as they 
open as Academies, and this sample ATT coefficient is statistically significant and 
robustly identified. The lack of evidence of dynamic effects may reflect the small 
size of the Academy schools sample utilised here. As the Academies Programme 
expands, a useful future research exercise would be to determine whether 
heterogeneous cohort responses to the policy can be found in a larger sample. 
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5.5 	 Possible Mechanisms behind Changing Intake Ability 
In the final part of the evaluation process to be concerned with KS2 intake quality 
changes, Table 5.6 presents findings from analysis that looks into the mechanisms 
behind the positive jump in this dependent variable among schools that become 
Academies as compared to other schools in the sample. To start with, in the first four 
columns of Table 5.6 regression estimation exploits available information on the pre-
KS2 performance of pupils. Data on the KS1 test outcomes of the sample of year 7 
pupils were linked in to the pupil-level file already containing their KS2 attainment 
scores prior to the collapsing of the pupil-level dataset to the level of the individual 
school. KS1 tests scores are available in the NPD from the academic year 1997/98 
onwards; KS1 tests are taken in primary school when pupils are aged 6/7, and are 
followed up by KS2 tests which are taken four school years later in the final year of 
primary school when pupils reach the age of 10/11. 
Further details on the historical academic ability of pupils entering the secondary 
schools sample are added in because much can be learnt about the types of higher 
ability pupils that are entering Academy schools from their KS1 records combined 
with their KS2 outcomes. It may be, for example, that Academy schools admit pupils 
showing signs of improved learning over time, so that their value-added test score 
increase between KS1 and KS2 is high. Or pupil intake into Academy schools may 
comprise of pupils showing consistently strong levels of attainment, in which case 
their KS1 and KS2 total points scores may be high but remain at a similar level 
between the two tests so that value-added gains are low. If intake patterns are more 
reflective of stronger growth in value-added then this suggests that Academy schools 
prefer to admit pupils who have attended primary schools that are more likely to be 
effective in raising educational performance and attainment. On the other hand, 
higher KS levels (and lower value-added increases) among new entrants to 
Academies implies that admissions are geared more towards pupils with a higher 
`innate ability'. This is true if early measures of attainment, such as KS1 test score 
outcomes, are perceived to capture pre-determined learning capacity that derives 
from factors like the influence of family background on the pupil rather than 
academic skills acquired in the immediate years of exposure to primary school 
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education. Hence further analysis of this kind helps in understanding more about the 
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The addition of KS1 records of attainment to the dataset reduces the number of 
pupils in each secondary school in the sample because details on both KS1 and KS2 
performance are not available for every pupil entering these schools128. Records of 
the year-on-year school-level average KS2 total points scores are consequently raised 
or lowered, depending on the implications that missing combined KS1-KS2 data has 
on changes to the pupil intake sample for secondary schools. Also, the number of 
annual observations on the secondary schools sample is reduced because KS1 data 
records existing from 1998 link to KS2 records from 2002, and pupils who took their 
KS2 tests in this year began secondary school in 2003. The starting point of KS1 to 
KS2 analysis is therefore cut to 2003 among all secondary schools and the years 
1997 to 2002 can no longer be exploited for their pre-policy informative content on 
historical intake patterns in these schools. This means that for the first cohort of 
Academy schools opening from September 2002 and completing their first academic 
year in 2003, there is no KS1 data available to match to the KS2 outcomes of pupils 
entering their pre-policy, predecessor schools in the years before 2003. This makes 
pre-post difference-in-differences analysis infeasible for the initial Academy cohort 
and for this reason the three Academy schools in the cohort are dropped from the 
sample. All other non-Academy schools featuring in the LEA of a dropped Academy 
school are also excluded so long as that Academy school represents the only one in 
the LEA. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5.6 check the sensitivity of the estimated impact of 
Academy school conversion on KS2 intake quality to changes in the sample structure 
associated with the use of KS1 data matched to KS2 records. In column 1 the 
trimmed nature of the changed sample structure is imposed on the original schools 
sample. Hence this testing procedure amounts to re-estimating equation (2) using the 
original form of school-level annual average KS2 total points scores (in which not all 
pupils may have a matching KS1 record), a reduced number of years (2003 to 2007), 
and a smaller set of Academy and non-Academy schools (cohort 1 Academies and 
associated control schools for sole Academies in the LEA of this cohort are 
dropped). The 6 coefficient falls marginally from 2.409 to 2.339 KS2 total points 
128 Table 3A.3 in Appendix 3A shows the annual drop in the sample of year 7 pupils when records on 
both KS1 and KS2 attainment are required, as well as the percentage of the year 7 sample with a 
matching KS1 record in each year, over the period 2003 to 2007. 
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scores in this case, so that the smaller sample frame has little effect on the estimated 
policy impact. 
In column 2 of the Table, equation (2) is again estimated on the reduced sample 
structure that uses fewer annual observations and secondary schools, but this time all 
pupil entrants are required to have a full record of KS1 and KS2 outcomes. Thus here 
the dependent variable has differing average annual values from the original case 
depending on how many pupils drop out of each school in the sample because they 
lack both KS1 and KS2 records. As can be seen from the Table, the Academy effect 
estimate is lower when this sample is used: 6 drops by 0.651 KS2 total points scores 
to 1.758. So the dependent variable changes to an extent where the estimated policy 
impact falls by more than when the number of years and schools on which estimation 
is based are reduced (as can be seen by comparing the coefficient results shown in 
columns 1 and 2 and the Academy school dependent variable averages in the pre-
policy year of 2003). It is likely that some of this reduction in the estimated effect 
stems from conditioning the sample of pupils within schools to have both KS1 and 
KS2 outcomes. Pupils of this kind may be of stronger academic ability, to the extent 
that a regular record of attainment indicates greater motivation and commitment to 
learning. The KS1-KS2 sample also excludes recent immigrants who, by definition, 
do not have a continuous record of education in the country, and who may account 
for a large share of the lower levels of KS2 attainment. Indeed, higher standards of 
attainment in the group of pupils with KS1 and KS2 outcomes are evident from the 
higher level of pre-policy KS2 intake quality in this sample, resulting in a decrease in 
the measured policy impact129. Although the coefficient estimate is lower in column 
2, a positive and statistically significant jump up in KS2 intake quality among 
Academy schools remains the dominant finding, suggesting that, in general, this 
result is not sensitive to sample structure alterations. 
Having tested whether the estimated Academy effect persists following sample 
changes, the next 2 columns of Table 5.6 use the matched KS1 and KS2 sample to 
consider if schools admit more of a particular pupil type once they become 
Academies: either pupils with a stronger innate ability background or improved 
129 The mean of the dependent variable for Academy schools in the pre-policy year of 2003 is 75.01 
KS2 total points under column (2) of Table 5.6, which is greater than that under column (1), of 73.69 
points. 
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learners who likely attended more effective primary schools. Regressing school-level 
annual average KS1 levels in the first case and school-level value-added in the 
second case on the right hand side components of equation (2) produces 6 estimates 
as shown in columns (3) and (4) respectively. The findings suggest that Academy 
schools admissions steer marginally towards the direction of inherent pupil academic 
ability over and above the incorporation of pupils with strong value-added gains 
between the key stages. While the 8 coefficient on KS1 to KS2 value-added is 
positive but not statistically significant, that on KS1 levels is higher and has 
statistical significance at the 10 per cent level (t = 1.70, compared with a t-value of 
1.645 at the 10 per cent level of significance). This is not a result that stands out and 
it is important to note that it is not clear how well informed state secondary schools 
are about the prior attainment of pupils applying for (year 7) entry to the school. 
Nevertheless, this finding has raised the issue of a potential change to the types of 
pupils that comprise Academy school intake relative to what went before. 
Exploration of the processes governing intake quality changes in Academy schools 
now moves on to look at variations surrounding the sources of pupil intake into these 
schools. In column 5 of Table 5.6, consideration is made for whether the number of 
primary schools from which secondary schools get their pupil admissions differs 
among schools that convert to Academy status versus non-Academies. Then column 
6 asks if schools that receive Academy 'treatment' subsequently intake their pupils 
from relatively higher performing primary schools than did their predecessors or the 
comparison group of schools. These issues are examined by re-estimating equation 
(2) using as a dependent variable the number of intake primary schools or the 
average annual KS2 performance of these intake primary schools respectively. The 
results shown in column 5 indicate that Academies increase their primary school 
supply pool following their status switch relative to control schools13°. The size of 
the 6 coefficient in this case is estimated as a statistically significant 4.427 intake 
primary schools. Thus the mean number of primaries from which predecessor 
Academies get their intake in the common pre-policy year of 2002 is 33 schools and 
130 The number of primary schools from which secondary schools get their year 7 intake in each year 
is determined using information on the code of the school attended by each intake pupil at the time 
that they took their KS2 tests (where these are taken in the last year of primary school). Each different 
primary school code is assigned the value 1 and values are then summed at the secondary school level. 
The average annual performance of the primary school attended by each pupil entering year 7 of 
secondary school is averaged again at the secondary school-level in order to establish the mean quality 
of intake primary schools. 
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after conversion this rises to almost 38 schools, a gain of 13.42 per cent. This 
increase is found even though the regression equation includes a control for the 
potentially larger pupil capacity of each Academy school compared to their 
predecessor(s)131, therefore it is not simply a reflection of school size changes. 
Turning now to primary school performance, the findings in column 6 of the Table 
show that pupils entering Academies also come from academically stronger primary 
schools. The average school-level KS2 performance of intake primaries is 0.865 total 
points higher in the Academy school years, suggesting that while predecessor 
schools get their intake from primary schools with an average performance of 75.62 
KS2 total point scores (in 2002), the quality of primary schools from which 
admissions come once these schools are Academies is about 1.2 per cent higher, at 
76.49 total points. 
In columns 7 and 8 of Table 5.6 the auxiliary informative content provided by the 
above lines of enquiry into changes in the sources of pupil entry is explicitly 
modelled in the main difference-in-differences regression (equation (2)) with average 
annual KS2 total points scores as the outcome measure. Column 7 highlights what 
happens to the estimated 6 coefficient when the indicators used to measure these 
issues are included as supplementary explanatory variables in the regression and 
column 8 adds to this further controls for observable primary school-level 
characteristics, listed in the notes to the Table. 
As can be seen from the results presented in Table 5.6, these extra regressors do help 
in explaining which factors shape the rise in pupil intake quality among schools that 
convert into Academies. About 34.70 per cent of the measured boost in KS2 intake 
ability can be accounted for by the fact that post conversion, and with school 
capacity changes controlled for, Academy schools tend to admit pupils from a larger 
number of primary schools and from primary schools that perform better on average 
at KS2 than did either their predecessors or other non-Academy schools. This shows 
that the Academy effect partially reflects changes to intake sampling among 
Academy schools. The policy effect estimate drops from 2.409 to 1.573 KS2 total 
points scores once consideration is made for the influence of these extra controls (see 
column 4 in Table 5.2 and column 7 in Table 5.6 respectively). With the 
131 Note that school size changes in the sample of secondary schools are captured in the vector of 
observable school-level controls that are expressed in equation (2) by the term rz„. 
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characteristics of primary schools added, the estimated 6 coefficient is marginally 
reduced again, to 1.567 KS2 total points scores132. While these changes in the 
measured Academy effect are important, the 6 coefficient is still positive and 
maintains its statistical significance even after all of these factors have been taken 
into account. This is a result that has substantial implications. In particular, the 
sustained finding of an increase in intake quality among Academy schools once 
average primary school performance has been conditioned out suggests that these 
schools not only admit more academically able pupils once they switch status, but 
some of these pupils attain KS2 standards of achievement which are above the 
average for their primary school. As has been the case for all previous regression 
analyses, this outcome remains even after controlling for potential pupil capacity 
increases in Academy schools. Therefore, this provides further evidence of a 
changing intake ability profile in Academies that appears to reflect more pupil entry 
by higher ability pupils, including those with above primary-school average 
performance, at the expense of changes to pupil intake at other points in the 
attainment distribution. 
The crucial question that has yet to be answered is where along the ability 
distribution intake changes into Academy schools are happening which are then 
allowing their intake to include more pupils with a relatively stronger average prior 
ability. In the final column of Table 5.6 results from an attempt to evaluate this issue 
are presented. Here estimation considers how the annual dispersion of KS2 intake 
ability into Academy schools compares with that in predecessor and control schools. 
In other words regression analysis looks at whether the year-on-year KS2 attainment 
range of pupils entering Academy schools is narrower or wider than it was for their 
pre-Academy counterparts and non-Academies. Given that Academies raise their 
admissions of pupils with higher prior attainment without this effect being fully 
absorbed by school size growth, then mean intake quality can be pushed up in one of 
two ways. Either Academy schools might intake pupils of a wider ability range once 
they switch status and raise their mean intake ability by sampling different fractions 
of pupils along the ability distribution, with a likely increase in the percentages 
admitted from the mid-points and above. Otherwise, following conversion, 
132 Adding observable primary school characteristics to the regression leads to only a slight change in 
the coefficient because it is likely that the annual average KS2 performance of the primary school 
captures much the same information as is contained in the school-level attributes, since attainment is 
influenced by school-level contextual factors. 
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Academies may instead lower the spread of their pupil intake ability, cutting the 
proportion of pupils that they intake from the bottom end of the attainment 
distribution in particular, so that average intake ability into the school rises. In the 
second case, raising average pupil entry quality through reducing the intake ability 
spread will always be associated with a cut in the proportion of lower attaining pupils 
entering the school, while at the higher end of the performance distribution different 
scenarios could take shape. More specifically, one of three situations could occur that 
would allow for a reduced dispersion and higher mean ability among pupil 
admissions in post-conversion Academy schools. These are: (i) Academies could cut 
only the proportion of lower-attaining pupils admitted to the school, leaving the 
intake composition along all other parts of the ability distribution unchanged; (ii) 
Academies could reduce intake ability proportions at both ends of the performance 
spread, but cut off relatively more pupils from the bottom than the top end; or (iii) 
Academies could lower admission shares at the bottom end and raise the pupil entry 
proportion at the upper end of the attainment distribution, but with an increase at the 
top end that is relatively smaller than the cut at the bottom end. In all cases a rise in 
mean intake quality and a reduction in intake ability dispersion occurs, an outcome 
that is achieved through slicing the entry share of pupils into the Academy school 
that are of an academically weaker background. 
In practice, dispersion changes can be assessed by re-estimating equation (2) using 
the annual standard deviation in KS2 total points scores as the outcome measure, 
rather than the annual average of this variable. The results derived from this process 
are given in column 9 of the Table. It is interesting to find that once schools convert 
into Academies they reduce their intake ability dispersion: the 6 coefficient estimated 
on the effective years of Academy school status is measured as -0.514 standard 
deviation units and is statistically significant at the 10 per cent significance level. 
Thus it would appear that there are proportionally fewer pupils with poor prior 
attainment in Academy schools than in their predecessors, a situation that will have 
been reached by one of the three means set out above. Determination of the exact 
way in which this change in intake ability dispersion happens is beyond the scope of 
the current analysis, but forms an interesting area for future research exploration. 
This important result goes some way towards answering the key question behind this 
research, namely whether Academy schools are more inclusive or more 'exclusive' 
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than their pre-treatment counterparts. The evidence shown here suggests that the 
attainment profile of pupils entering Academy schools reflects a more 'exclusive' 
intake, in which there is a reduction in the admission of pupils with a weaker KS2 
performance record in Academies relative to in their pre-Academy versions. 
Empirical evaluation has also revealed that Academy schools cater for pupils of 
above average ability in the primary school from which they came and there is some 
indication that innate ability features more among admitted pupils than does learning 
progression. Thus it seems that school conversion into an Academy is characterised 
by stratification in intake along the lines of the ability distribution relative to the 
prior situation. However, the raised academic quality of pupil admissions into 
Academy schools represents just one dimension of their changing pupil profile. In 
the section that follows further categories of composition are assessed in order to 
gain a fuller picture of the impact that this particular policy of institutional reform 
has on the constitution of schools to which it is applied in contrast to other 
`untreated' schools. 
244 
5.6 	 Assessing Other Dimensions of Intake Quality and Examining Changes 
in Whole-School Composition 
Panel A of Table 5.7 presents findings from difference-in-differences regression 
estimation in which various attributes of pupils entering year 7 of Academy schools 
are compared with those among pupils joining predecessor and non-Academy 
schools. Information on aspects of pupil background pertaining to new secondary 
school joiners is contained within PLASC, a data source that has been collected 
annually since January 2002 with a total of 6 waves available at the time of writing, 
covering 2002 to 2007. Panel B of the Table looks at whole school compositional 
changes in the effective policy years and not just variations at the year 7 entry level. 
These details are given in the DCSF-provided school-level files (as described in 
Chapter Four, Section 4.2.2), which stretch further back than PLASC and here 11 
years of data on secondary schools comprising the period 1997 to 2007 are used. The 
shorter time frame of PLASC availability reduces the window of pre-policy 
observations that can be utilised to determine changes in the intake composition of 
Academies by 5 years (1997 to 2001). Therefore for the first cohort of Academies 
only one year of pre-policy data on the characteristics of pupil entrants exists. 
Throughout the entire analysis equation (2) is estimated on a different dependent 
variable as shown in the column headings to Table 5.7. 
Column 1 begins by looking at changes in the fraction of pupil intake that is eligible 
for Free School Meals (FSM) in schools that turn into Academies. This indicator is 
frequently used as a proxy for social disadvantage, given that eligibility is means-
tested and depends on family earnings falling below a certain minimum income 
threshold (see Appendix 1A, Section 1A.G for further details; for a discussion of the 
drawbacks of this variable see Chapter Two, Section 2.7). As can be seen from the 
findings of this regression, intake into Academy schools consists of a lower 
proportion of FSM eligible pupils than was previously the case. In the common pre-
policy year of 2002 the average percentage of FSM eligible pupils in year 7 of 
predecessor schools was 44.17 per cent. In the Academy years of these schools, the 
mean falls by 5.563 percentage points to take the benchmark average to 38.61 per 
cent, a drop of 12.59 per cent. This suggests that the intake composition of Academy 
schools has moved away from consisting of pupils from relatively deprived 
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backgrounds to quite an extent, a finding that is statistically significant and occurs 
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In columns 2 to 6 of Table 5.7 (Panel A) consideration is made for whether other 
aspects of pupil characteristics differ in the Academy school years for pupils starting 
their secondary school phase of education. Columns 2 and 3 look for changes in the 
percentages of pupils with Special Educational Needs in Academies, either with or 
without a statement respectively. Column 4 assesses variations in the ethnic mix of 
pupil intake and in column 5 changes in the proportion of pupils with English as an 
additional language in Academy schools are evaluated. Column 6 looks at how the 
gender balance of Academies compares with that in predecessor and control group 
schools. The results of regression estimation reveal that none of these dimensions of 
intake composition change to a discernable or statistically valuable degree in the 
years in which the policy period applies. The same general finding stems from the 
analysis of changes in whole school features. Panel B of Table 5.7 shows that the 
percentages of pupils eligible for free school meals, those with SEN of any status and 
those classified as white ethnic origin in predecessor schools are unaltered by the 
application of the Academies programme to these schools. 
At this stage, empirical evaluation has highlighted that, apart from prior attainment, 
the only characteristic of pupil intake that does change in a significant and substantial 
way in the Academy school years is FSM eligibility. Columns 7 and 8 in Panel A of 
Table 5.7 gauge whether there is any relation between these two intake categories 
that can enhance knowledge of the policy outcome, and the direction in which any 
association flows. Column 7 repeats the estimation procedure of column 1 and adds 
to this a control for the school-level average annual KS2 attainment of year 7 pupils, 
or in other words, KS2 intake quality. What this shows is that the large negative and 
statistically significant change in the percentage of pupils eligible for FSM in year 7 
of Academy schools in comparison to predecessor schools that was found in column 
1 remains. The coefficient (standard error) on KS2 intake quality (not shown in the 
Table) stands at -0.572 (0.089) and is of high statistical content. The way to interpret 
this result is that a FSM eligible pupil with equivalent prior attainment to another 
pupil who is not eligible for FSM is statistically significantly less likely to enter a 
school that has converted into an Academy. Column 8 goes back to the estimated 
regression shown in column 4 of Table 5.2 and includes as another explanatory 
variable the percentage of year 7 pupils who are eligible for FSM. The addition of 
this further regressor does little to change the estimated 6 coefficient, which remains 
positive and statistically significant, at 2.049 KS2 total point scores. The percentage 
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of pupils in year 7 who are eligible for FSM has high predictive power, with a 
coefficient (standard error) of -0.061 (0.011) (not reported in the Table). The 
interpretation of this outcome is that if two FSM eligible pupils differ by their KS2 
attainment, the pupil who achieved a higher mean result in these tests is statistically 
significantly more likely to enter a school that has switched to Academy status. 
Overall, analysis into further intake composition changes in Academies relative to 
predecessor and non-Academy schools has revealed that these schools not only 
intake academically stronger pupils and reduce their admission of weaker-attaining 
students, but they also tend to feature fewer pupils from deprived backgrounds. 
These findings are in direct contrast to their stated objective of having a more 
inclusive and mixed ability pupil profile (see Section 3.3, Chapter Three). 
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5.7 	 Summary and Discussion 
Education policy in the UK has increasingly sought to raise school standards and the 
performance of individual pupils through the introduction of school renewal 
programmes that target institutions at the lower end of the attainment distribution. 
Under these schemes schools deemed to be failing in their delivery of education 
experience a complete overhaul in their operations in order to generate their revival 
and subsequent return to the education market place as viable competitors. A reform 
strategy that has been increasingly applied to state secondary schools since the early 
2000s is that of the Academies Programme, where underachieving schools are 
granted autonomy from LEA control and are guided towards better functioning by an 
external sponsor. The first wave of Academies opened from September 2002 and at 
the time of writing (June 2009) there are 133 Academy schools in existence. Plans to 
extend the scheme to 15 per cent coverage of the secondary education phase in the 
future will make this the most prominent form of school reconstitution in the 
education arena. 
School improvement in the shape of the Academies Programme started out in 
deprived inner city areas, aiming to tackle the legacy of access to poor quality 
schooling among underprivileged pupils and the subsequent inequalities in 
educational opportunities. The broadening geographical coverage of Academy 
schools reflects an understanding of the lack of confinement of this scenario to urban 
areas. Though they are becoming more widespread, there is a distinct shortfall in 
knowledge on the effectiveness of these renewed schools in turning around the 
circumstances of the pupils for whom they are meant to cater in the areas in which 
they are set up. Chapters Three to Five have sought to examine the issue of the 
inclusiveness of the Academies scheme using information on schools that underwent 
conversion to the new status between 2003 and 2007. The analytical stance taken 
here has focused on compositional changes in these schools relative to their 
predecessors and to other schools within the LEA of Academies who share a similar 
historical evolution in their characteristic make-up but differ by their non-
participation in the strategy of school reform. Two different angles of composition 
have been investigated, these being relative changes in both the intake composition 
and the whole school pupil profile of Academy schools. 
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The results of empirical difference-in-differences evaluation undertaken here offer up 
interesting findings with regard to this particular programme of school reform. The 
dimensions of intake that appear to change the most in Academy schools are the 
prior attainment distribution of pupils joining these schools and the percentage of 
new entrants who are eligible for free school meals. There is a distinct and robustly 
estimated rise in intake ability among Academies as soon as they re-open under their 
new status and a significant drop in the number of new pupils from deprived social 
backgrounds, patterns of change that did not occur in predecessor schools and that 
are not shown in non-Academy control schools. Growth in the pupil capacity of these 
schools does not explain away these measured effects, implying that composition 
changes are achieved through re-drawing the fractions of pupils that are admitted to 
the school from within the ability and social background ranges. Evidence presented 
here suggests that Academy schools raise the average quality of their intake by 
lowering their admissions of weaker attaining students. Accordingly, school renewal 
of this kind appears to have resulted in a more 'exclusive' pupil profile within 
Academies and reduced entry into these schools of pupils that likely lower the 
general academic performance of the school. In this respect education inequalities 
and schooling stratification along the lines of ability and social background have 
increased as a result of the compositional changes that Academy schools have made. 
This suggests that the "ultimate" objective of raising levels of achievement in the 
school (aim (1)) is occurring to the detriment of aim (3) of the scheme, which seeks 
to raise the life chances of cohorts of deprived pupils through inclusive access to the 
renewed school (see Chapter Three, Section 3.3). 
As the Academies programme expands, further analysis of the scheme will determine 
the extent to which these findings are a consequence of a small sample size. If the 
well-publicised popularity of Academy schools persists, physical capacity constraints 
may prevent the ability of these schools to admit an ever growing number of pupils. 
This may increase the degree and types of compositional change occurring in these 
schools over time. The difficult issue to empirically pinpoint is whether the driver of 
exclusivity through compositional change is the school or parents. Academies are 
their own admissions authority and therefore control the allocation of admissions, 
while in LEA-governed schools pupil entry is decided by the LEA. This 
characteristic also allows Academies to set their own admissions rules, including 
those to be used in the event of oversubscription, so long as all rules applied comply 
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with the mandatory requirements of the School Admissions Code. Research has 
suggested the need to establish whether relative admissions autonomy is responsible 
for compositional change. As West et al. (2009, pp. 5) note, "[k]ey questions remain 
in relation to the link between admissions criteria and practices and school 
composition....it is still unclear whether school autonomy in relation to school 
admissions may be a factor in determining which pupils apply to which schools and 
which are offered places." Meanwhile, Tough and Brooks (2007) cite research by the 
Sutton Trust which implicates admissions autonomy as the instrument for 
compositional change. The authors write that "[s]chools within the top 200 
comprehensives that are their own admission authorities are also highly 
unrepresentative of the postcode sector in which they are located. Within these 
schools just 5.8 per cent of pupils are eligible for free school meals compared to 13.7 
per cent of the pupils in their local area. By contrast, the other schools in the top 200 
whose admissions are run by the local authority are roughly representative of their 
area" (ibid, pp. 16). To the extent that the ability of a school to set rules of entry 
changes the types of parents who apply to the school, compositional change reflects 
the interdependence of parental and school selection processes. 
Given the unique circumstances surrounding Academy schools, including their 
political and media attention, there is a limit to the general applicability of the 
findings presented here. However, as an initial detailed study into the effectiveness 
of this kind of school reconstitution in delivering its objective of raised inclusion, 
this work flags up concerns about the benefits of expanding a policy that does not 
appear to reap any improvement in circumstances among underprivileged pupils 
attending schools at the bottom end of the performance distribution. 
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Conclusion 
Equality of educational opportunity requires that all pupils have fair access to 
standards of education which maximise their future life chances. School choice 
policies and strategies of institutional reform have each sought to achieve the 
intertwined goals of raising attainment and providing a fairer education system 
through better alignment of the pupil-school match, attempting to deliver this by 
widening the network of schools that pupils can and do want to access from their 
current home location. 
The choice system was introduced in England in the late 1980s in response to the 
perceived failings of the education system that had historically allocated pupils to 
their nearest local school. From its inception the scheme pursued the creation of a 
quasi-market for schools, which was to be developed by two means. Parents were 
allowed for the first time to express a preference for the school to be attended by 
their child. This was combined with school competition generated through the pupil-
led funding of schools, in which those institutions that attracted a higher number of 
students, particularly disadvantaged pupils, received greater revenue. Choice policies 
were designed to improve the pupil-school match by offering all pupils the chance to 
access good-quality schools without moving home. 
As it stood, the choice structure was imposed on an uneven playing field, in which 
some schools had an historical reputation of poor standards of education delivery and 
performance, whilst others were consistently popular due to their high records of 
academic attainment. This divide in quality persisted following the introduction of 
choice policies and school competition, and, by the early 2000s, resulted in the 
formation of school reform strategies that targeted a revival in the reputation of 
underperforming and therefore under-demanded schools. As the largest scheme of 
this kind to date, the Academies Programme began in 2002 and offered school 
renewal at the secondary phase of education in particular, since attainment standards 
in some secondary schools within deprived areas were falling well below 
government-established National Curriculum school performance targets. 
Institutional reform methods sought to raise the potential for a better pupil-school 
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match by increasing the supply of schools pupils would want to attend, given their 
current residential setting. 
Whilst they are two initiatives that are distinct in terms of their timing of introduction 
and their approach to tackling failures in state-provided education, choice policies 
and school reform strategies are united by their overall focus on reducing educational 
inequalities. This thesis has employed the substantial evidence contained in 
England's National Pupil Database to demonstrate shortfalls in the functioning of 
these schemes and hence the persistence of disparities in educational opportunities. 
Deficiencies in the operation of policy have resulted in exclusivity in access to 
oversubscribed or potentially improving schools by pupils from more economically 
advantaged backgrounds with relatively higher academic ability. Key findings are:- 
• The process of transferring between schools at non-standard time points 
during the primary phase of education involves combined school and home 
moves more often than it does school only change. If isolated school shifts do 
take place, these are far more likely among pupils who are not entitled to free 
school meals; 
• There is limited evidence of the existence of a quasi-market for schooling, 
measured here as the amount of pure school moves into oversubscribed 
Community schools by pupils coming from under-capacity institutions. 
Preliminary indications of a choice system were found to be dominated by the 
London region and were not present elsewhere in England, implying that the 
connection between the school and the home still matters for admission into 
popular schools throughout much of the country. However, a breakdown of 
the regional analysis by FSME status revealed that both eligible and 
ineligible-FSM pupils in London were making choice-type school changes, 
with stronger indications among those eligible. Further investigation is 
necessary in order to determine whether such moves do actually reflect the 
choice scheme in operation; 
• Restrictions on the choice system appear to stem from oversubscription 
admissions rules applied to LEA-governed Community schools which 
reinstate the school-home proximity link. Among more autonomously- 
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governed Voluntary-aided (VA) schools, it is likely that oversubscription 
criteria use non-distance related factors to rank pupil entry (such as an 
expression of religious faith). In these institutions there are signs of choice-
type school change taking place for FSME pupils, and these moves are not 
confined to the London region. This relative difference in the presence of a 
quasi-market between the Community and VA school types suggests the 
potential for proximity rules to be imposing inhibiting effects on the choice 
process. 
• School improvement applied to state secondary schools in the form of the 
Academies Programme is failing some disadvantaged pupils inhabiting areas 
of deprivation, precisely the group the scheme aims to cater for. Academy 
conversion is associated with a school performance-favouring change in the 
pupil profile of these schools. Intake into year 7 of an Academy features a 
reduced proportion of pupils of a weaker KS2 attainment background, and a 
lower proportion of students on free school meals relative to the fractions of 
these groups in both predecessor schools and comparable non-Academies. 
This evidence of the development of stratification in Academies along the 
lines of pupil characteristics and prior ability suggests a worsening of 
education inequality. 
The most positive finding to come out of this study, in terms of equality in 
educational opportunity, is that deriving from the regional and FSME status 
breakdown of moves from under-filled to full-to-capacity Community schools. This 
analysis signalled a likelihood of some less-advantaged pupils gaining access to 
popular, well-performing LEA-governed schools in the London area by making pure 
school changes, and therefore the possibility that choice is exploited by this group 
despite the continued emphasis on school and home proximity in oversubscription 
rules. However, this is only true insofar as these moves do reflect the exercise of 
choice, and are not driven by factors specific to conurbations that allow for a greater 
likelihood of entry into popular schools through isolated school change. 
At present the education system appears to be organised into two distinct tiers. 
Current school choice provisions are mainly conferring advantages on pupils of 
above-average academic attainment who come from higher income households, 
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allowing them to engage in "aspirational mobility" to better-performing institutions 
that are expected to increase their future education outcomes133. School renewal 
targets the lower end of the achievement and income distribution, aiming to increase 
the supply of schools improving in their quality in regions typically inhabited by 
disadvantaged pupils. Reform of this kind can essentially be viewed as promoting 
aspirational immobility, in that it encourages higher service provision and better 
standards of education in the schools pupils from low-income households would 
usually attend, a strategy that, if effective, should reduce the need to search for 
alternative school quality. 
To the extent that school reform in the shape of schemes such as the Academies 
Programme is allowing at least some underprivileged pupils access to potentially 
improving school quality, it can be argued that this two-tier outcome of education 
policy is efficient. If better-off families face lower search costs in the process of 
choice participation, associated with the costs of acquiring, interpreting and utilising 
information on the quality of different schools, and if their gains from choice-related 
school change are larger, then their relatively greater exploitation of this policy is 
resource-saving (Adnett and Davies, 2002). Pupils from worse-off families, however, 
may well be confronted by higher costs of searching due to low family wealth and 
may anticipate lower returns to be derived from school change that takes place in the 
quest for a better pupil-school match. Unless the costs of engaging in choice can be 
reduced among financially disadvantaged households in particular, then a strategy of 
effectively discouraging mobility among pupils in deprived areas and instead 
attempting to boost the quality of their local schools might also be deemed to be 
more economically viable. 
However, where failures in the correct targeting of school improvement lead to some 
pupils being made worse-off in terms of their fair access to education, these point 
towards inefficiencies in the policy and therefore in the education system as it 
presently stands. More importantly, these suggest the existence of inequalities that 
may lead to a deterioration in the life chances of underprivileged pupils. Findings 
from the research undertaken here into the intake and compositional changes of 
133 Ewens (2005) describes aspirational mobility as that "where parents of children with higher levels 
of attainment seek to better their child's educational prospects by seeking out 'better' schools, 
regardless of where those schools may be" (pp. 5). Aspirational mobility relating to schooling may 
confer additional advantages on pupils where the move also entails increases in the quality of the 
home, the area, and/or employment opportunities (see Verropoulou et al., 2002). 
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Academy schools have highlighted the validity of these concerns: the displacement 
of pupils with low attainment at KS2 suggests an involuntary change in the choice of 
school attended among weaker-performing pupils who might otherwise have gone to 
the Academy. At the same time disadvantaged pupils, who likely underestimate the 
expected returns to taking part in choice compared to the associated costs, may stand 
to gain the most from a choice system. If this boosts the quality of education they 
receive and reduces the gap between their attainment and that of other pupils from 
higher social classes, then their benefits from participation in the choice process will 
far exceed the costs. For pupils from better-off families, learning achievements are 
likely being raised all the more by their greater use of choice, while it can be claimed 
that even in the absence of this scheme such pupils may have acquired strong 
academic performance because of the higher motivation for academic success that is 
associated with their relatively more advantageous socio-economic family 
background (Mortimore and Whitty, 2000). With these points in mind, policy 
implementations that allow poorer families to benefit to a greater extent from the 
initiatives of choice and school reform would appear to be useful in raising standards 
and educational equality. 
i. New Policy Developments and Their Effectiveness 
Recent developments in education policy have aimed to bolster the school choice 
system on the demand-side, targeting participation in choice by low-income 
households in particular, with introduced initiatives also likely impacting on school 
improvement programmes through their potential to increase competition between 
schools for pupils. The 2006 Education and Inspections Act enforces the promotion 
of fairness in access to educational opportunities by placing a duty on LEAs to 
reduce the costs of exercising choice among poorer families (Burgess and Briggs. 
2006; Tough and Brooks, 2007). Two key methods of access promotion concern 
home-to-school transportation and the provision of support to parents when making 
schooling choices, as outlined below134:- 
134 Other important components of the Act include a ban on the use of interviews in any school's 
admissions process (Part 3, Section 44) and a strengthening of "the legal status of the School 
Admissions Code so that admission authorities will have to 'act in accordance' with it, rather than 
simply 'have regard to' it" (Part 3, Section 40; see DCSF, 2006b, pp. 6). 
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• School travel — Part 6, Section 77 of the Act places "a new duty on local 
authorities to provide free transport for some of the most disadvantaged 
pupils (those eligible for free school meals or whose parents are in receipt of 
the maximum level of Working Tax Credit) to attend any of three suitable 
secondary schools closest to their home, where these schools are more than 
two (and less than six) miles away. Alternatively, pupils may choose a school 
up to 15 miles away where this is the nearest suitable school preferred on 
grounds of religion or belief" (DCSF, 2006b, pp. 9);135 
• Parental support in the choice process — Part 3, Section 42 of the Act requires 
local authorities "to provide advice and assistance to parents in expressing a 
preference for a school for their child" 	  "In this way it helps a broader 
range of parents to exercise their right to choose the most suitable school for 
their child and take advantage of the diversity of local provision" (DCSF, 
2006b, pp. 2 and pp. 7). 
The extent to which the provision of free transport to secondary school-age pupils 
from low-income households will lead to greater school choice take-up among this 
group depends in part on whether this scheme changes the quality of schools they 
can access. Burgess et at.. (2006a) study the journey-to-learn travelling distances 
made by one cohort of pupils who enter state secondary schools during the academic 
year 2001/02. The authors consider the "feasibility of choice", that is "how far pupils 
would have to travel to reach at least three schools" (ibid, pp. 2), and they assess the 
likelihood of at least one of these schools being "good", where this is defined as a 
school that ranks in the top third of the national school performance tables in terms 
of the percentage of its pupils getting five A*-C GCSE grades in the pre-entry year 
for the cohort (2000/01)136. Pupils who are eligible for free school meals are found to 
135 In terms of primary school-age children, "[r]egardless of the level of family income, children of 
compulsory school age, but under the age of eight are entitled to free travel arrangements to their 
nearest qualifying school more than two miles from their home (paras.102-105). In addition, from 
September 2007, children aged eight, but under age 11 from low income families must have travel 
arrangements made where they live more than two miles from their nearest qualifying school. This 
two mile limit should be measured in the same way as the 'statutory walking distance', i.e. along the 
`nearest available route'. This might include footpaths, bridleways and other tracks which are not 
passable by motorised transport" (DIES, 2007a, pp. 21, paragraphs 93 and 94). 
136 The authors measure straight line distances between the home and the school to identify the nearest 
three schools and they do not take into account whether there are spare places at each school or if each 
school adheres to the religious denomination of the pupil. Only gender mis-matches are taken into 
account, in that each nearest school must not be a single sex school catering for the opposite gender to 
the pupil. 
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have considerable choice feasibility, with their median commuting distance to three 
schools being 2.0km, compared to 2.5km among non-FSM entitled students. 
Furthermore, 91 per cent of FSME pupils live within 5km of three schools, relative 
to 78 per cent of pupils from better-off families. However, the chances that any one 
of the three accessible schools is a "good" school is much lower for a FSME pupil 
than it is for a student who is ineligible for FSM, standing at 44 per cent versus 61 
per cent respectively. This evidence focuses on journey patterns of a single cohort 
and as such is unlikely to be representative of all secondary school year groups. It 
also pre-dates the 2006 Act by five years, during which time the performance of the 
schools surrounding FSME pupils may well have improved. Nevertheless, with these 
statistics in mind, it is plausible to suggest that the successfulness of the transport 
policy in boosting choice feasibility is undermined by the notion that the scheme may 
not go far enough to change the quality-set of schools accessible to pupils from 
poorer backgrounds. The areas of relative deprivation that these pupils frequently 
inhabit may be characterised by no "good" schools as defined by Burgess et 
al. (2006a). even within the maximum free transport allowance of less than six miles. 
Then, if increased schooling access simply provides FSM-entitled students with a 
greater number of reachable schools of the same (or possibly worse) quality, these 
pupils would have little logical incentive to engage in longer journeys to school if 
doing so leaves their learning experiences unchanged. 
The underlying assumption behind a policy of offering support to parents involved in 
the process of choosing schools for their child(ren) to attend is that all parents value 
education and will benefit from guidance that aims to increase the match of the 
school to the pedagogic needs of their child(ren) because they each seek to maximise 
the education potential of their offspring. In fact, qualitative research into the 
decision-making procedure behind choosing schools indicates variation in the values 
and priorities parents place on learning and aspects of its provision according to their 
own income and education levels. Croft (2003, pp. 17) summarises literature 
evidence on this provided by Ball et al. (1995), who find that "[t]here are two distinct 
discourses of choice in evidence. A working class discourse dominated by the 
practical and the immediate and a middle class discourse dominated by the ideal and 
advantageous." A study into the school choice process carried out by the DIES in 
2001 also highlighted that "parents from lower socio-economic backgrounds are 
more likely to consider their child's friendship groups and proximity to the school as 
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more important than its performance table position. On the other hand, academic 
factors are more likely to be relevant in establishing which schools to apply to for 
mothers in a non-manual social class" (Tough and Brooks, 2007. pp. 17). That 
worse-off families place strong emphasis on practical considerations such as 
proximity to the school is corroborated by the work on home-to-school travelling 
distances by Burgess et al. (2006a), who estimate that FSM-eligible students travel 
about one third of a kilometre less further to school than non-FSME pupils, even 
after conditioning for the higher tendency for pupils who are entitled to FSM to 
inhabit urban areas. Disparities in the aspects of schooling that families give 
precedence to are likely to be related to variations in aspiration levels along the 
income and social class spectrum. Croft (2003. pp. 17) notes that "[t]here are some 
data which suggest that children reject schools which they think they can not have 
(Reay and Lucey, 2000); this mirrors findings in studies of low income families, 
where children's aspirations were found to be quickly limited (see Middleton et al., 
1994). In the case of school choice, rejection involves stating that they do not want to 
go to the 'unattainable' school, or that they prefer others."137 
It should be noted that while the provisions of the 2006 Education and Inspections 
Act target the costs of school choice, with transport and knowledge of the system 
being two particularly high costs for low-income households, guidance services are 
open to all parents, regardless of their financial situation. Taken together, all of the 
points raised above suggest that the offer of support in the school-choosing process 
may be less than fully utilised among economically disadvantaged parents and stands 
a greater likelihood of benefitting pupils from better-off families. Then choice 
exploitation among higher-income households could be raised by this provision, 
while that of worse-off families could remain largely unaltered if the service does 
little to change their perceptions of the long-term education benefits to be derived 
from more informed choice. The counterargument to this is that raising the supply of 
information on the choice process to low-income parents may encourage positive 
changes in the values they attach to education and the aspirations they have for their 
children, if the low weight placed on these issues stems directly from a lack of 
understanding of how the system works. 
137 See Croft (2003) for full references to the work of Ball et a/. (2005): Reay and Lucey ,.2000); and 
Middleton et al. (1994). See Tough and Brooks (2007) for a full reference to the work of the DfES 
(2001). 
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The travel provisions offered by the 2006 Act could be made more effective and 
equitable by increasing the home-to-school distance over which all secondary school 
pupils from economically-disadvantaged households are guaranteed to receive free 
transport. The Act stipulates that pupils from low-income families may travel up to 
15 miles to reach a school that satisfies religious affiliations or beliefs. If this journey 
distance is considered feasible for pupils to undertake in order to maximise their 
schooling preferences on the basis of religious grounds, then it would appear fair to 
augment the travel service for all students covered by the scheme, irrespective of 
faith-based factors. This may widen the scope for underprivileged pupils to access 
schools differing in their quality, especially helping to ensure the possibility of entry 
to "good" schools with a stronger league table performance than that achieved by the 
institutions these pupils typically attend, an outcome which in turn may achieve a 
more substantial reduction in cost-related non-participation in choice by poorer 
households. A broader impact of transport extension may be to boost standards in all 
schools, including Academies, if the field of competitive pressure surrounding each 
individual school were enlarged as a result. In respect of the supply of guidance to 
parents on the school choosing process, this initiative could be strengthened by close 
monitoring of usage among households in which children are entitled to FSM. If 
take-up were low within this group, the equity and efficiency of the provision may be 
raised if awareness of the educational benefits to be derived from making better-
informed schooling choices were specifically targeted towards low-income families. 
Successful service usage targeting would stand to further reduce the connection 
between family socio-economic background and the capacity to exercise school 
choice (Tough and Brooks, 2007). 
While policy initiatives on the demand-side of the choice equation may serve to 
redress some of the overall imbalance in the use of choice by households differing in 
their income levels, the fundamental flaw in the 2006 Act lies in its failure to rectify 
problems on the supply-side of the schooling system, which cause it to continue to 
operate in a way that is not fair to all pupils (Tough and Brooks, 2007). Croft (2003, 
pp. 16) neatly summarises these problems in her discussion of the work by Taylor 
(2002), who "found parents raising the issue of constrained choice; sometimes they 
saw this as connected with where they lived, with the problem either being 
affordability of transport, or the restrictions of catchments and prioritisation 
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mechanisms."138 The provision of free transport for secondary school pupils from 
low-income households coupled with more informed schooling preferences may on 
their own have a measured degree of impact on reducing the costs of exercising 
choice among these families. However, assignment rules governing entry to schools 
— particularly those applied when popular, well-performing schools become filled-to-
capacity — currently revert access back to the community-based model of schooling, 
because of the emphasis they place on admissions determination according to a well-
defined school-home distance. The success of recent policy reforms in raising choice 
uptake rests on the adjustment of admissions criteria to allow pupils living within 
two to six miles of the school to be classified as satisfying proximity-focused entry 
rules, a situation which the latest School Admissions Code does not appear to have 
taken into account139. For as long as geographically-related schooling allocation 
mechanisms persist along their current lines, parents who are financially better-off 
will continue to benefit from strategic housing moves into the catchment areas of 
preferred popular schools in order to ensure access based on adherence to proximity 
clauses, with the result that house prices in such areas will be sufficiently high to 
crowd out economically worse-off families (Gibbons and Machin, 2006)14°. In the 
long-run the pursuit of location advantages can only serve to create or perpetuate a 
situation of "selection by mortgage" and a segregated schooling system, with 
composition that reflects the homogeneity of pupil-types in the vicinity surrounding 
the school (Croft, 2003, pp. 18; Silva, 2009)141. Without corrections to supply-side 
proximity allocation rules, demand-side policies deal with only half of the 
restrictions on the use of choice among poorer households and consequently impose 
138 See Croft (2003) for a full reference to the work of Taylor (2002). 
139 The most recent School Admissions Code (2009) came into effect on 10 February 2009. Inspection 
of the Code did not reveal any explicit statement that admissions criteria relating to distance must 
accommodate the extended provision of free transport between the school and home of between two 
and six miles. At best the Code states that "Local authorities must consider, for example, whether 
their admission or transport policies....are in line with the principle of fair access to educational 
opportunity (DCSF, 2009, pp. 23, paragraph 1.70; original emphasis). In terms of oversubscription 
rules and transport, the Code notes that "[i]t is good practice to give priority to children who could 
reach one school (but not others) by public transport, or to children who would have a 
disproportionately long journey to another school if denied admission to their nearest school ( ibid, pp. 
35, paragraph 2.38). 
14° The 2009 Code acknowledges the connection between proximity rules and the housing market, but 
does not fully prevent their having an unfair admissions effect, as the use of should rather than must in 
paragraph 2.39 of the Code indicates: "If using distance as an oversubscription criterion, admission 
authorities should ensure in their admission arrangements as a whole that families who are less able to 
afford property nearest the school are not excluded as a result" (ibid, pp. 35, original emphasis). 
141 Tough and Brooks (2007, pp. 8) define segregation in schools as "the degree to which pupils from 
different backgrounds, or with different characteristics such as their level of prior attainment, are 
likely to be concentrated in particular schools." 
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limitations on the government aims of raised standards of attainment and equality of 
educational opportunity. 
ii. Avenues for Future Research 
Empirical analysis of school change at the primary school stage presented in this 
thesis has shown there to still be a significant association between entry to above-
capacity schools and combined school-home moves, a result which suggests that the 
choice system has not gone far enough to disentangle this historical and geographical 
link. Interestingly, the government's approach to tackling school underperformance 
through improvement schemes does not appear to be immune to admissions 
restrictions, with reports indicating that Academy schools are becoming increasingly 
oversubscribed (see Chapter Three, Section 3.5). These findings propose directions 
that future research into the mobility and school choice relationship could take. Two 
key pieces of information that matter for the assessment of primary school mobility 
are missing from the evaluation undertaken here. The first is details on pre-school-
entry moves, that is, those taking place from birth up to the age at which a child first 
starts their compulsory education. As was noted in Chapter One, relocation activity is 
more likely before children join the school system and any mobility that takes place 
during this stage needs to be accounted for if the definition and measurement of 
stable and mobile pupil populations during later schooling years, such as in the 
primary phase, is to be accurately determined. The second is qualitative evidence on 
the reasons for moving school only or school and home. The use of comprehensive 
survey data is paramount to gleaning some knowledge on these areas, one main 
source being the Millennium Cohort Study (MCS), a UK-based longitudinal dataset 
that tracks children from birth and contains information on schooling-related factors, 
such as the grounds for choosing a particular school. The study includes 
disproportional representation of families in England that inhabit regions of child 
poverty and areas containing high ethnic minority populations. A significant 
advantage of this study concerns its capacity to be linked to the NPD, which would 
then allow details on school choice to be correlated with move activity using the 
mobility measurement techniques that have been applied in this thesis. This could 
open up more substantial evidence on whether strategic moves of home take place 
among parents in order to secure entry to a particular popular school or whether the 
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choice system can be exploited by school change only, and how these outcomes vary 
by household financial circumstances. Preliminary research by Burgess et al. (2009) 
has considered the amount of school choice that is present in the MCS sample by 
assessing how stated parental preferences of schooling differ from the actual school 
attended by their child(ren). It could well be that the deviations of stated from 
revealed preferences found in the data are differentially associated with school 
change and school-home moves as defined here, suggesting that the analysis of 
mobility using the MCS linked to PLASC represents a valuable avenue for future 
research to take. 
In terms of the secondary schooling phase, this thesis has considered fairness in 
access to potentially improving Academy schools among disadvantaged pupils and 
therefore whether these students are able to benefit from this aspirational immobility 
dimension of school choice. One area of analysis that has not been explored is 
whether the relatively increased intake proportions of higher ability and non-FSME 
pupils in schools that convert into Academies are driven by the circumstance of 
oversubscription, which allows Academy schools, as their own admissions authority, 
more discretion to set their own rules of entry (whilst adhering to the statutory 
requirements of the School Admissions Code). If a higher quality pupil profile can be 
mostly attributed to Academies that are oversubscribed, this might hint at an 
increasing role of choice within the schools themselves and therefore exclusivity that 
is mainly a consequence of the potential that popularity creates for schools to 
influence their intake (Burgess and Briggs, 2006). This research exercise is likely to 
produce more fruitful results as the number of Academies rises and the areas in 
which they locate shift away from regions of deprivation and towards wealthier 
neighbourhoods. It may then be found that oversubscription restores the school-home 
connection and allows Academies to reap the performance-enhancing benefits of 
access to a more homogeneous, higher ability, neighbourhood composition. 
Preliminary investigation into the availability of data on the capacity of Academy 
schools from the DCSF-provided Edubase data source has revealed there to be a lack 
of consistent annual observations. However, as the scheme still accounts for a low 
share of the secondary school market and as media interest in the successfulness or 
otherwise of the Academies Programme remains high, web-based sources and 
newspaper stories could prove to be useful outlets for determining those Academies 
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that are popular and apply admissions restrictions, so that this future research avenue 
may still be feasible. 
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Section 1A.A: Patterns of child migration in the UK 
Descriptive details on patterns of child migration in the UK and how they have 
changed over time are given here. Table IA.1 illustrates the levels and percentages of 
migrant children aged 1 to 15 within the UK according to the 1990/91 and 2000/01 
Population Census statistics. In this context the term child refers to all dependent 
children living in the household, either aged under 16 or aged 16-18 and in full-time 
education, and the term migrant follows the 2001 Census definition of "a person with 
a different address one year before the Census to that on Census day" 142. Migration 
activity then reflects moves that involve a change of home. 
The Table shows that in the year prior to both the 1991 and 2001 Census days, the 
most migrant children were those in the pre-school ages of 1 to 4 (42.03 per cent and 
36.37 per cent of all ages 1 to 15 within each Census year respectively), with 
migration tailing off as children reached a more non-dependent, close to compulsory 
school-leaving age (at 3.83 per cent and 4.15 per cent respectively by age 15). 
Approximation to the years of primary schooling is given by the aged 5-9 category 
and for secondary schooling by the aged 15 category, with some overlap of 2 years 
appearing for both school stages in the 10-14 age group. Along these lines, the Table 
suggests that children of primary school age moved more than those in secondary 
school. 
Across the Census years migration was highest in 2001, apart from for children in the 
1 to 4 age group, where it was slightly greater in 1991 (at 20.00 per cent of the total 
number of migrants, compared with 19.07 per cent in 2001). The largest increase in 
migration occurred for those in the 10-14 age category, with a 3.06 percentage point 
rise in the percentage of migrants of this age range, from 15.12 per cent of the total 
(1991) to 17.48 per cent (2001). This was followed closely by children aged 5 to 9 (a 
2.36 percentage point increase between the Census years). This suggests that in the 
10-year period between Census records, child migration activity rose. 
142 Office for National Statistics (ONS) (2004). 'Census 2001 Definitions', p. 37. Available to 
download from:-http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/census2001/definitions chapters 1 5.pdf 
Note that persons under the age of 12 months are treated as migrants if their next of kin was one. 
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Table 1A.1: Migrant Children in the UK by Age Group, 1990/91 and 2000/01  
(levels and percentages) 
All ages 
1 to 4 
All ages 
5 to 9 
All ages 
10 to14 
All aged 15 
All ages 
1 to 15 
1990/91 360,958 272,988 191,970 32,852 858,768 
% of all ages 1-15 42.03 31.79 22.35 3.83 100.00 
% of total 20.00 15.12 10.63 1.82 47.58 
2000/01 344,189 315,574 247,288 39,261 946,312 
% of all ages 1-15  36.37 33.35 26.13 4.15 100.00 
% of total 19.07 17.48 13.70 2.18 52.42 
Total - - - 1,805,080 
Sources: 1991 Census; Local Base Statistics (LBS 15) and 2001 Census; Standard Tables (ST008). 
Notes for 1991 Census figures: 1991 figures are based on the sum total of 8 migration categories: (1) 
Within wards (2) Between wards but within districts (3) Between districts but within county (4) 
Between counties but within region (5) Between regions or from Scotland (6) From outside Great 
Britain (7) Between neighbouring districts and (8) Between neighbouring counties. The migration 
period covers one year before the Census day of 21 April 1991. 
Notes for 2001 Census figures: 2001 figures are based on the sum total of 3 migration categories: (1) 
Lived elsewhere one year ago within the same area (2) Inflows - the number of persons moving into 
the area from elsewhere within the UK and (3) Outflows - the number of persons moving out of the 
area to elsewhere within the UK. Inflows exclude persons with no usual address one year ago who did 
not live within the area. Outflows exclude persons moving outside the UK. Area refers to the counties 
of England. The migration period covers one year before the Census day of 29 April 2001. 
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Section 1A.B: Initial steps in developing a KS1-2 cohort 
Prior to merging together the Key Stage 1 and Key Stage 2 files, some observations 
are dropped from the dataset as follows:- 
(i) If the pupil does not sit for their English, Maths or Science KS2 
examinations in the academic year 2005/2006 (where the exams are taken 
in the summer of 2006). The following numbers of pupils are dropped 
from the KS2 dataset: 13 (English), 20 (Maths) and 6 (Science) pupil 
observations respectively. 
(ii) There are a few duplicate observations (more than one row of 
observations for the same KS2 pupil). 10 pupils are dropped from the 
KS2 file here. 
(iii) The KS1 file does not have the above issues (no pupils are dropped from 
the dataset because they do not sit for their KS1 exams in 2001/2002 and 
there are no duplicate pupil observations). 
Merging the Key Stage 1 and Key Stage 2 data together gives the following results:- 







Number of pupils less 
independent school 
pupils (3) 
In Key Stage 1 
only (1) 
27,427 3,375 24,052 
In Key Stage 2 
only (2) 
32,849 7,681 25,168 
In 	 both 	 KS1 
and KS2 (3) 
562,400 9,091 553,309 
Total (4) 622,676 20,147 602,529 
There are 20,147 independent school pupils in the sample. PLASC does not sample 
all pupils attending independent schools. Only pupils attending private schools that 
follow the National Curriculum and register to be included in PLASC will feature, 
therefore the independent school pupils who are in the dataset are unlikely to be fully 
representative of the population of this school type. 
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Section 1A.C: Merging in PLASC data to the KS1-2 cohort 
Prior to merging in the PLASC data for 2001/2002-2005/2006, the following 
observations are dropped from each of the five PLASC waves:- 
(i) duplicate observations on the same pupil 
(ii) Pupils recorded as attending the school on a part-time basis 
(iii) Pupils recorded as being in a nursery class 
(iv) Boarding school pupils 
(v) Pupils in special schools whose registration type indicates that they are 
currently registered at more than one school 
Table 1A.3: Dropping Invalid PLASC 2001/2002-2005/2006 Observations 
PLASC academic 
year 
2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 
Original no. of 
pupil observations 
(1) 
7,739,335 7,740,153 7,733,278 7,164,816 7,351,518 
Duplicates (2) 122 20 2 66 0 
Part-time basis (3) 299,712 290,720 296,232 45,400 19,615 
Nursery class 
pupils (4) 
34,248 34,780 34,250 6,534 1,121 
Boarding school 
pupils (5) 
3,198 2,994 3,613 3,780 4,107 
Enrolled in more 
than one school (6) 
996 2,130 5,012 3,951 6,385 
Total no. of 
remaining pupil 
observations (7) 
7,401,059 7,409,509 7,394,169 7,105,085 7,320,290 
Note that the total number of remaining pupil observations (row 7) includes all state 
school pupils (across the primary and secondary school stages). Not all of these 
observations are valid in merging the PLASC waves to the KS1 to KS2 dataset, as 
the Table below shows. 
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Table 1A.4: Linking PLASC 2001/2002-2005/2006 to the Key Stage 1-2 Cohort 
















In KS1 or KS2 or 
both only (1) 
41,212 41,878 42,431 42,944 41,810 
In PLASC 	 wave 
only (2) 
6,819,595 6,828,711 6,813,924 6,525,353 6,739,424 
In KS1 or KS2 or 
both 	 and 	 in 
PLASC wave (3) 
581,464 580,798 580,245 579,732 580,866 
Note that in the above merges of the PLASC data to the merged KS1-KS2 dataset, 
the PLASC waves have been merged to the whole set of KS1 to KS2 observations, 
and not just those pupils in the KS1 file who have a matching KS2 observation (i.e. 
rows (1) and (3) of Table 1A.4 add up to 622,676 in each PLASC year, where this 
figure is equivalent to the maximum number of pupils who can be in KS1-KS2 and 
in any PLASC wave, as shown in Table 1A.2, row (4), column (1)). 
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Section 1A.D: Creating a sample with non-missing mobility indicators and valid 
key stage results 
Looking at the merge of the Key Stage 1 and Key Stage 2 datasets the sample size of 
the cohort should be at most 562,400 pupil observations (Table 1A.2, row (3), 
column (1)), or 553,309 observations if independent schools are excluded from the 
analysis (Table 1A.2, row (3), column (3)). 
However, there are other factors to take into account in assessing the workable 
sample size, and these are:- 
• Some pupils in the sample have no observations on the mobility variables of 
interest in any of the 5 PLASC waves, namely home postcode, school code, 
and the date of school entry. 
• Not all pupils in the Key Stage files have valid Key Stage test outcomes. A 
recorded entry in a Key Stage test is considered to be valid where either the 
pupil has achieved a recognised level of attainment in that test or otherwise 
records indicate that the pupil was eligible to take the test, but failed to do so. 
Removing pupils from the sample with no mobility indicators affects the sample of 
pupils featured in Table 1A.2 as shown below:- 








Number of pupils less 
independent school 
pupils (3) 
In Key 	 Stage 	 1 
only (1) 
23,499 3,273 23,397 
In 	 Key 	 Stage 	 2 
only (2) 
24,414 7,401 24,135 
In both KS1 and 
KS2 (3) 
557,876 4,465 553,264 
Total (4) 605,789 15,139 600,796 
Valid Key Stage 1 test outcomes in English reading, English writing and 
Mathematics are considered to hold where the level achieved in each test can be 
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categorised as shown in the Table below. This Table also indicates how levels 
achieved in Key Stage 1 are converted into points scores (according to the scoring 
system set by the government Department for Children, School and Families, or 
DCSF) making them comparable across Key Stages 1 and 2:- 
Table 1A.6: Valid Key Stage 1 Test Outcomes (levels and points score 
equivalents)  
KS1 National Curriculum Level 	 Points Score Equivalent 
Level 4+ 	 27 
Level 3 	 21 
Level 2A 	 17 
Level 2B 	 15 
Level 2C 	 13 
Level 1 	 9 
W — Working towards Level 1 	 3 
X — Not required to take the test* 	 Disregard 
M — Missing 	 Disregard 
D — Disapplied from National Curriculum 	 Disregard 
A — Absent 
	
Disregard 
Source: DCSF http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/performancetables/16to18 08/testandexam pointscores08.doc  
(accessed 14 August 2008). Pupils undertake National Curriculum Key Stage 1 exams in England's 
state primary schools in the subjects of English reading, English writing and mathematics at the age of 
6/7. * X applies to the reading test outcome only. In the calculation of the Average Points Score (APS) 
`disregard' is coded as missing, so that the APS for a pupil ranges between 3 and 27. In the calculation 
of a pupil's Total Points Score (TPS) 'disregard' is coded as zero, so that the range of the TPS is 0 to 
81. 
At Key Stage 2 English, Mathematics and Science test outcomes are considered to be 
valid if the level achieved in each test can be categorised as shown in the Table 
below. Points score equivalents are also given here:- 
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N — Not awarded a test level 
B — Working below the level of the tests 
T — Working at the level of the tests but unable to 
access them 	 Disregard 
L — Pupil has left the school 	 Disregard 
Pupil will take the test in the future 	 Disregard 
Not eligible for the tests (not at the end of KS2) 	 Disregard 
Annulled 	 Disregard 
Absent 	 Disregard 
Lost scripts 	 Disregard 
Missing 	 0 
S — Pending maladministration 	 0 
Source: DCSF http://www.dcsf.gov.u1c/performancetables/16to18 08/testandexam pointscores08.doc  
(accessed 14 August 2008). Pupils undertake National Curriculum Key Stage 2 exams in England's 
state primary schools in the subjects of English, mathematics and science at the age of 10/11. In the 
calculation of the Average Points Score (APS) 'disregard' and '0' are coded as missing, so that the 
APS for a pupil ranges between 15 and 33. In the calculation of a pupil's Total Points Score (TPS) 







Table 1A.7: Valid Key Stage 2 Test Outcomes (levels and points score 
equivalents) 
The condition that only those pupils with valid entries in Key Stage tests 1 and 2 are 
retained in the sample is set so as to reduce the likelihood of the sample picking up 
observations on pupils from other cohorts, thereby aiming to boost sample accuracy. 
The following Table indicates pupil-level observations taking into account the 
validity of their test outcomes:- 
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Table 1A.8: Developing a Key Stage 1 to Key Stage 2 Cohort With a Valid KS  







Number of pupils less 
independent school 
pupils (3) 
Valid test outcome 
in Key Stage 1 (1) 
581,597 4,728 576,869 
Valid test outcome 
in Key Stage 2 (2) 
581,462 4,660 576,802 
Valid 	 test 
outcomes in both 
KS1 and KS2 (3) 
557,296 4,404 552,892 
Comparing column (2) in Tables 1A.5 and 1A.8 with that in Table 1A.2, it is evident 
that a large number of independent school pupils are missing mobility information as 
contained in PLASC and, furthermore, others do not have valid KS1 and KS2 test 
outcomes. Therefore: this sample of pupils is dropped from the analysis at this point. 
Thus a total of 552,892 pupils have data on mobility and a valid test outcome in 
every test taken at Key Stages 1 and 2, a sample loss of just 417 pupils (compared 
with 553,309 non-independent school pupils attained previously (see Table 1A.2, 
column and row (3)). 
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Section 1A.E: Defining a 'full' sample 
A sample of full observations required for the purpose of accurately estimating 
mobility is characterised as having:- 
(a) Valid Key Stage 1 and Key Stage 2 test outcomes in all of the Key Stage tests 
associated with these stages 
(b) A home postcode observation in all of the 5 PLASC waves (covering the 
academic years 2001/2002 to 2005/2006 inclusive) 
(c) A date-of-school-entry observation in all of the 5 PLASC waves 
(d) A school code observation in all of the 5 PLASC waves. 
(e) No missing data on pupil characteristics in each of the 5 PLASC waves and 
no inconsistencies on pupil attributes that should remain unchanged over 
time. 
For the purposes of measuring school and residential mobility, it is possible to 
impute some of the missing school code, date of school entry, and home postcode 
observations to increase the size of the full sample. Imputations that were made to 
both the school and home mobility indicators involved replacing a missing 
observation with that from the following PLASC year when observations on an 
individual pupil in adjacent PLASC years to the missing year were the same (except 
for in tail-end sample cases, where imputation used either the previous (if missing in 
2005/06) or the following (if missing in 2001/02) year observation instead). In terms 
of the actual measurements of home mobility, there are some errors in the home 
postcode observations across the PLASC waves and these have been corrected for. 
The details on these corrections are discussed after Table 1A.9, which indicates the 
extent of imputations and corrections made. 
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Note that in all cases in Table 1A.9 pupils have valid KS1 and valid KS2 test 
outcomes. Imputations to the date of school entry leave the annual number of 
observations unchanged. Information on the home postcode and date of school entry 
are held in the PLASC waves only. Information on the school code is held in each 
PLASC wave and in the Key Stage 1 and Key Stage 2 waves. 
Error corrections that were made to the pupil home postcode data are as follows:- 
• Type (1) corrections on the home postcode are for those where only the first 
or the last letter of the pupil's home postcode changes between the PLASC 
waves, and otherwise the home postcodes are identical. 
• Type (2) corrections are for those where the length of the pupil's home 
postcode changes by one character (so that the postcode length increases or 
decreases) between the PLASC waves, and otherwise the postcodes are 
identical. 
• Type (3) corrections are for Royal Mail Changes to the home postcode. 
Note that there are no corrections made to the date of school entry or the school code 
where use is made of information across all PLASC waves since with these codes it 
is less easy to identify inaccuracies in collected records. 
Taking into account these imputations and adjustments to the mobility indicators of 
interest, our sample is given by:- 
Table 1A.10: Sample sizes of the Key Stage 1 to Key Stage 2 Cohort With all 
Mobility Variables 
Number of pupils 
Sample change 
(number of pupils) 
KS12 cohort 552,892 
Original sample size 
(1) 539,387 -13,505 
Imputations on 
mobility indicators (2) 
4,515 +4,515 
New sample size (3) 543,902 -8,990 
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The original sample size is that sample size attained using the original home 
postcode, date of school entry and school code indicators, prior to any imputations. 
The new sample size indicates the number of additional pupil observations that are 
obtained following imputations (the error corrections made to the pupil home 
postcode affect estimated home mobility, not the overall sample size). So the process 
of cleaning increases the sample size for analysis by 4,415 pupil observations at this 
point. 
The sample is additionally amended for missing observations or inconsistencies on 
pupil characteristics across the 5 PLASC waves as detailed in Table 1A.11 below:- 
Table 1A.11: Sample sizes of the Key Stage 1 to Key Stage 2 Cohort With all 
Mobility Variables and Pupil Characteristics 
Number of pupils 
Sample size (all mobility indicators) (1) 543,902 
Missing pupil characteristics in all 5 PLASC waves (2) 138 
Dropping pupils with inconsistencies on gender (3) 2,049 
Dropping pupils with inconsistencies on ethnicity (4) 13,586 
Dropping pupils with inconsistencies on En (5) 5,689 
FULL sample size (6) 522,440 
Pupils dropped from the sample in row (2) are those with no ethnicity, Free School 
Meal eligibility, or Special Educational Needs data in any of the 5 years of PLASC. 
Row (3) drops pupils with miscoded or incorrectly recorded gender observations, a 
variable that should be consistent throughout. Likewise inconsistencies in recorded 
ethnicity lead to a further 13,586 pupils being dropped from the sample (row (4)). In 
row (5) pupils with changing English as a First Language (EFL) status are also 
eliminated from the sample, to give a final full sample size of 522,440 pupil-level 
observations, as shown in row (6). 
In the process of checking the availability of data on ethnicity and EFL, it was 
noticed that there were inconsistencies in records for the former variable in particular 
in 2001/02 and 2002/03 and for the latter variable in 2001/02 that could be corrected 
for. Where records on ethnicity or EFL in all other years were the same, the 
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inconsistent year observations were replaced with observations from the next most 
adjacent year (2002/03 for inconsistent ethnicity or EFL in 2001/02; 2003/04 for 
inconsistent ethnicity in 2002/03). Actual imputations made were small in number, 
being 1,295 and 778 pupil-level imputations on ethnicity in 2001/02 and 2002/03 
respectively; and 1,476 imputations on EFL in 2001/02. Note that these corrections 
were made prior to dropping any remaining pupils with inconsistencies in their 
ethnicity and/or their EFL as detailed in rows (4) and (5) of Table 1A.11. 
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Section 1A.F: Changes to the number of moving pupils due to missing 
observations on KS1 APS 
If a pupil does not achieve a recognised level of attainment across all three KS1 tests, 
but they were eligible to sit for these tests, their KS1 Average Points Score (APS) is 
coded as missing in the data. Pupils without an entry on KS1 APS are not excluded 
from the descriptive content of Chapter One, though they drop out in regression 
estimation in Chapter Two. The following Table indicates how the number of pupils 
in each move category shown in Tables 1.9 to 1.12 of Chapter One change when 
pupils with missing KS1 test scores are excluded. As can be seen from this Table, 
sample size losses are small and not sufficient enough to affect the weighted average 
percentages shown in the Chapter One Tables. 
Table 1A.12: Sample Size Changes in Mobility when Pupils without KS1 APS 
are Excluded 
Panel A: Pupils moving once 
Excluding Excluding 
Year Pure pupils School- pupils 
group pupil with Difference home with Difference 
transitions mobility* missing moves* missing 
KS1 APS KS1 APS 
2-3 10,615 10,516 99 14,444 14,322 122 
3-4 8,812 8,738 74 13,371 13,306 65 
4-5 8,241 8,183 58 11,082 11,041 41 
5-6 6,057 6,002 55 8,093 8,067 26 
Panel B: Pupils moving twice 
2-3; 3-4 471 464 7 1,454 1,430 24 
2-3; 4-5 466 460 6 988 978 10 
2-3; 5-6 198 194 4 715 700 15 
3-4; 4-5 267 266 1 1,284 1,279 5 
3-4; 5-6 202 201 1 934 928 6 
4-5; 5-6 180 178 2 1,030 1,027 3 
*Figures shown here are the same as those in Tables 1.9 to 1.12 of Chapter One. 
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Section 1A.G: Conditions for Free school meal (FSM) eligibility 
"Children whose parents receive the following are entitled to free school meals: 
Income Support (IS); 
Income Based Jobseekers Allowance (IBJSA); 
Support under part VI of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999; 
Child Tax Credit, provided they are not entitled to working Tax Credit and have an 
annual income, as assessed by HM Revenue and Customs, that (for 2007/2008) does 
not exceed £14,495; or 
The guaranteed element of State Pension Credit; and 
Children who receive IS or IBJSA in their own right are also entitled to free school 




Table 2A.1: Logit Model Estimates of the Relationship Between Mobility and 
Pupil Characteristics: One Move 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 









Age = 7 
(transition yrs 3 - 4) 
Age = 8 
(transition yrs 4 - 5) 
Age = 9 



























































































































KS1 Average M.002*** 0.001 
Points Score (APS) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age = 7 x KS1 APS 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Age = 8 x KS1 APS 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
Age = 9 x KS1 APS 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
GOR dummies No No Yes No No No 
LEA dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Predicted probability 
of a pure school move 0.418 0.417 0.414 0.416 0.415 0.415 
Number of obs. 80,715 80,715 80,343 80,713 80,173 80,173 
Notes: See the notes to Table 2.1, Chapter Two. 
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Independent Variable 









Age = 7 
(transition yrs 3 - 4) 
Age = 8 
(transition yrs 4 - 5) 
Age = 9 
(transition yrs 5 - 6) 
KS1 Average 
Points Score (APS) 
Age = 7 x KS1 APS 
Age = 8 x KS1 APS 




of a pure school move 
Number of obs. 
(1) 	 (2) 	 (3) 	 (4) 	 (5) 	 (6)  
0.023*** 0.016** 0.016** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
	
(0.006) 	 (0.006) 	 (0.006) 	 (0.006) 	 (0.006) 	 (0.006) 
-0.121*** -0.117*** -0.104*** -0.103*** -0.097*** -0.097*** 
	
(0.025) 	 (0.025) 	 (0.027) 	 (0.022) 	 (0.024) 	 (0.024) 
0.082** 0.088** 0.088** 0.062*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 
	
(0.038) 	 (0.038) 	 (0.036) 	 (0.023) 	 (0.023) 	 (0.023) 
	
-0.027 	 -0.021 	 -0.002 	 -0.027 	 -0.019 	 -0.018 
	
(0.019) 	 (0.020) 	 (0.019) 	 (0.017) 	 (0.018) 	 (0.018) 
	
-0.003 	 0.006 	 0.015 	 0.004 	 0.006 	 0.006 
	
(0.022) 	 (0.023) 	 (0.023) 	 (0.019) 	 (0.019) 	 (0.019) 
0.453*** 0.445*** 0.451*** 0.449*** 0.506*** 0.506*** 
	
(0.096) 	 (0.099) 	 (0.094) 	 (0.109) 	 (0.117) 	 (0.117) 
-0.064*** M.072*** M.057*** M.055*** -0.055*** 
	
(0.011) 	 (0.011) 	 (0.009) 	 (0.009) 	 (0.008) 
0.048*** 0.048*** 0.059*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 
	
(0.009) 	 (0.009) 	 (0.008) 	 (0.009) 	 (0.009) 
-0.054** 	 0.048* 	 -0.034* 	 -0.033* 	 -0.046 
	
(0.026) 	 (0.025) 	 (0.018) 	 (0.018) 	 (0.034) 
	
-0.043 	 -0.037 	 0.035** 	 0.035** 	 -0.012 
	
(0.027) 	 (0.026) 	 (0.016) 	 (0.016) 	 (0.034) 
M.079*** M.071*** M.044*** M.043*** 0.027 
	
(0.020) 	 (0.019) 	 (0.014) 	 (0.014) 	 (0.040) 
	
0.002 	 0.003 
	







No 	 No 	 Yes 	 No 	 No 	 No 
No 	 No 	 No 	 Yes 	 Yes 	 Yes 
	
0.217 	 0.213 	 0.209 	 0.188 	 0.187 	 0.187 
16,378 	 16,378 	 16,348 	 16,365 	 16,197 	 16,197 
Table 2A.2: Logit Model Estimates of the Relationship Between Mobility and 
Pupil Characteristics: Two Moves 
Notes: See the notes to Table 2.2, Chapter Two. 
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Table 2A.3: Probit Model Estimates of the Relationship Between Mobility and 
Pupil Characteristics: One Move  
Independent Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 









Age = 7 
(transition yrs 3 - 4) 
Age = 8 
(transition yrs 4 - 5) 
Age = 9 



























































































































KS1 Average -0.002*** 0.001 
Points Score (APS) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age = 7 x KS1 APS -0.005*** (0.001) 
Age = 8 x KS1 APS -0.002 (0.001) 
Age = 9 x KS1 APS M.007*** (0.002) 
GOR dummies No No Yes No No No 
LEA dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Predicted probability 
of a pure school move 
0.418 0.418 0.415 0.416 0.415 0.415 
Number of obs. 80,715 80,715 80,343 80,713 80,173 80,173 
Notes: See the notes to Table 2.1, Chapter Two. 
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Table 2A.4: Probit Model Estimates of the Relationship Between Mobility and 
Pupil Characteristics: Two Moves 
Independent Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gender = Male 0.023*** 0.015** 0.015** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ethnicity = -0.121*** -0.118*** -0.105*** -0.106*** -0.100*** -0.100*** 
Other White (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) 
Asian 0.082** 0.088** 0.087** 0.062*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 
(0.038) (0.038) (0.036) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Black -0.027 -0.021 -0.001 0.029* -0.021 -0.020 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Other -0.003 0.006 0.016 0.005 0.005 0.006 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Unknown 0.453*** 0.443*** 0.451*** 0.441*** 0.494*** 0.494*** 
(0.096) (0.098) (0.094) (0.100) (0.106) (0.106) 
FSME M.064*** -0.071*** M.057*** M.055*** M.054*** 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
SEN 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.061*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Age = 7 M.055** M.049** M.034* M.033* -0.045 
(transition yrs 3 - 4) (0.026) (0.025) (0.018) (0.018) (0.035) 
Age = 8 -0.044 -0.037 M.035** M.035** -0.011 
(transition yrs 4 - 5) (0.028) (0.026) (0.016) (0.016) (0.034) 
Age = 9 M.081*** M.072*** M.041*** M.040*** 0.028 
(transition yrs 5 - 6) (0.020) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014) (0.039) 
KS1 Average 0.002 0.003 
Points Score (APS) (0.001) (0.002) 
Age = 7 x KS1 APS 0.001 (0.003) 
Age = 8 x KS! APS -0.002 (0.003) 
Age = 9 x KS1 APS M.005* (0.003) 
GOR dummies No No Yes No No No 
LEA dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Predicted probability 
of a pure school move 
0.217 0.214 0.211 0.195 0.194 0.194 
Number of obs. 16,378 16,378 16,348 16,365 16,197 16,197 
Notes: See the notes to Table 2.2. Chapter Two. 
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Table 2A.5: Logit Model Estimates of the Relationship Between Mobility and 
Entry to Oversubscribed Schools: One Move  
Independent Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Choice dummy=pupil moves 0.041*** 0.018** 0.018** 0.017** 0.017** 
to oversubscribed school (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Choice dummy x VA school 0.006 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.014 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Pupil moves to VA school (0.077)*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Pupil moves from VA school 0.011 -0.007 -0.008 -0.011 -0.008 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
% FSME (old school) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% FSME (new school) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pupil-teacher ratio -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** M.006*** 
(old school) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Pupil-teacher ratio M.002** M.002** -0.001 -0.001 
(new school) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
School size (old school)*100 M.028*** M.027*** M.027*** M.027*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
School size (new school)*100 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
% non-white (old school) M.002*** M.002*** M.002*** -0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% non-white (new school) 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pupil characteristics No No Yes Yes Yes 
GOR dummies No No No Yes No 
LEA dummies No No No No Yes 
Predicted probability 
of a pure school move 
0.377 0.374 0.373 0.372 0.371 
Number of observations 72,123 70,707  70,422 70,405 70,421 
Notes: See the notes to Table 2.3, Chapter Two. 
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Table 2A.6: Probit Model Estimates of the Relationship Between Mobility and 
Entry to Oversubscribed Schools: One Move  
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Choice dummy=pupil moves 0.041*** 0.018** 0.018** 0.018** 0.017** 
to oversubscribed school (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Choice dummy x VA school 0.006 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.015 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Pupil moves to VA school 0.076*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.084*** 0.085*** 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Pupil moves from VA school 0.012* -0.007 -0.008 -0.011 -0.007 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
% FSME (old school) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% FSME (new school) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pupil-teacher ratio M.006*** -0.007*** M.007*** -0.006*** 
(old school) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Pupil-teacher ratio 0.002** -0.002** -0.001 -0.001 
(new school) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
School size (old school)*100 M.028*** -0.026*** -0.026*** M.027*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
School size (new school)*100 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
% non-white (old school) 0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% non-white (new school) 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pupil characteristics No No Yes Yes Yes 
GOR dummies No No No Yes No 
LEA dummies No No No No Yes 
Predicted probability 
of a pure school move 
0.377 0.374 0.373 0.373 0.372 
Number of observations 72,123 70,707 70,422 70,405 70,421 
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Section 3A.A: Schools sample construction 
Below the details of the procedures carried out in the process of arriving at a 
balanced sample of Academy and non-Academy schools are set out in detail, 
beginning with a Table that indicates how the sample sizes of the two school groups 
changed at each stage of data cleaning. 
Table 3A.1: Procedures for Creating a Balanced Panel of Academy and Non- 
Academy Schools.  
Academy schools Non-Academy schools 
Procedure Number of 
schools 
Sample 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Step 1 46 Step 1 1,699 
Change -1 Change -461 
Step 2 45 Step 2 1,238 
Change -5 Change -551 
Step 3 40 Step 3 687 
Change -2 Change -91 
Step 4 38 Step 4 596 
Change -2 Change -80 
Step 5 36 Step 5 516 
Change -1 Change -87 
Step 6 35 Step 6 429 
Change -2 Change -14 
Step 7 415 
Change -26 
Total 33 -13 Total 389 -1,310 
Changes made to the sample of Academy schools  
Step 1: In all cases where two predecessor schools are replaced by one Academy 
school there are 2 sets of observations in the predecessor years. In the academic year 
2006/07 there is a unique case of 2 Academy schools replacing a single predecessor 
school, resulting in two sets of observations in the Academy years. In order to ensure 
that the constructed balanced panel consists of 11 annual observations for each 
individual school, which includes predecessor schools that convert to Academies, a 
process of weight-averaging the observations takes place in the years where there is 
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more than one set of annual observations. The weights that are used are the number 
of pupils entering school year 7 in each year, such that in the case where one 
Academy school replaces two predecessor schools:- 
WA 
—
I st = [(I pit *Pupils entering year 7 pit) + (I  Per *Pupils entering year 7 p2t )1 
(Pupils entering year 7 pit + Pupils entering year 7 Pet ) 
And where one predecessor school is replaced by two Academies:- 
WA _I st = [(I alt. *Pupils entering year 7 alt  ) + (I a2t *Pupils entering year 7 al t )1 
(Pupils entering year 7 alt + Pupils entering year 7 alt ) 
Where WA.] is the weighted average of indicator I for school s at time t (s is either 
an Academy school formed from two predecessors or a predecessor school that is 
split between two Academies); pit refers to predecessor school 1 at time t; p2t is 
predecessor school 2 in time t; and ait and a2t are Academy schools 1 and 2 
respectively in time t. 
Not all indicators are weight-averaged for these schools. Those that refer to the 
school size, for example, are summed because pupils from 2 predecessor schools can 
enter one Academy school. Likewise for the unique case mentioned above, pupils 
from one predecessor school can enter either of the 2 different Academies that this 
school becomes. Weighted averaging is carried out on Academy cohort 1 
(Academies opening from September 2002, where 1 Academy school replaces 2 
predecessors); Academy cohort 2 (Academies opening from September 2003, where 
2 Academy schools each replace 2 predecessors); and Academy cohort 5 (Academies 
opening from September 2006, where 2 Academy schools each replace 2 
predecessors, and also where 1 predecessor is replaced by 2 Academy schools). 
Weighted averaging on Academy cohort 5 in particular reduces the initial number of 
Academy schools from 46 to 45, since two Academy schools are redefined into one 
here. 
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Step 2: All Academy schools that represent completely new schools are removed, 
since these schools have no historical information on their intake patterns prior to 
Academy status. 
Step 3: Two Academy schools are dropped because they are each missing an annual 
observation of information that relates to their predecessor school. 
Step 4: Two Academy schools are dropped because their predecessor versions were 
not open at the start of the sample period (1997) and therefore they lack enough 
predecessor school annual observations. 
Step 5: One Academy school is dropped because its predecessor school catered for 
pupils aged 13 upwards and therefore there was no year 7 entry to the school. 
Step 6: At this stage a balanced panel of 11 annual observations covering the years 
1997 to 2007 has been created. The final step of data cleaning involves imputations. 
In order to minimise the amount of data that has to be imputed a 'rule' is created: 
imputations are made in cases where there are no more than 2 missing data points on 
variables of interest in any given year for a school and no more than 4 missing data 
points in total for that school as a whole across all 11 years of data. This rule leads to 
a further 2 Academies being dropped, leaving the overall number of Academy 
schools in the sample at 33. 
Changes made to the sample of non-Academy schools  
Step 1: All schools that are not directly comparable to state secondary schools 
(including Academies) are dropped from the sample of non-Academies. These 
schools are identified using variables that describe each school as provided in the 
LEASIS/ASC and Edubase datasets that are linked in via the school code. 
Specifically, the following categories of school are excluded from the sample: 
Independent schools, general hospitals, grammar schools, maintained and non-
maintained special schools, Pupil Referral Units (PRUs), special maintained 
hospitals, and maintained and non-maintained special boarding schools. 
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Step 2: All small non-Academy schools for which there are at most 10 pupils in year 
7 in the school in a given year are dropped. This represents the point at which the 
largest number of non-Academy schools are lost from the sample. In the process of 
dataset construction it was identified that the academic year 2005/2006 featured an 
unusually large number of schools relative to all other years (around 1,000 compared 
to around 600 respectively). At this point of data cleaning the sample of schools in 
2006 dropped to resemble that in other years, totalling 608 schools. This suggests 
that the higher quantity of schools in 2006 might reflect a recording error that was 
corrected by the procedure of removing small schools from the sample. 
Step 3: Non-Academy schools that cannot be compared to Academies because they 
do not have any observations in any of the years over which the sample of Academy 
schools opened (2002/03 to 2006/07) are dropped from the non-Academies group. 
Step 4: All non-Academy schools are required to have 11 annual observations 
spanning 1997-2007 if their intake trends are to be compared with those of 
Academies and their predecessors without missing observations affecting the 
findings. Therefore all non-Academy schools for which there are 10 or fewer annual 
observations are dropped. 
Step 5: The cleaning of the Academy schools sample and the dropping of 11 
Academies (as set out in steps 1-6 above and in columns 1 to 3 of Table 3A.1) results 
in 7 LEAs no longer containing any Academy schools. All non-Academy schools 
also featuring in these LEAs then become redundant to the analysis, since their use as 
a comparison group is no longer valid. Dropping all schools within these 7 LEAs 
reduces the sample of non-Academies by 87 schools. 
Step 6: A balanced panel of 11 annual observations covering the years 1997 to 2007 
has been created at this point. Imputations are also carried out on the sample of non-
Academy schools, using the same rule as for the Academy schools sample. This 
leads to 14 more non-Academy schools being dropped from the sample. 
Step 7: Application of step 6 to the sample of Academy schools results in 2 
Academies being cut from the sample and, as these are the only Academies in their 
respective LEAs, the subsequent loss of all schools within these 2 LEAs. This 
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Section 3A.B: Testing various logit model specifications 
Several logit model specifications were estimated in order to strengthen the power of 
observable pre-policy school-level characteristics in predicting the likelihood of 
school conversion to Academy status. A step-by-step process of eliminating each 
variable in turn from the full logit specification outlined in model 1 of Table 4.6 was 
attempted in the first instance. In almost all cases the only statistically significant 
variable was found to be the percentage of pupils getting no passes at the GCSE 
stage, as was true for model 1. Carrying out this elimination procedure on model 2 of 
Table 4.6 also resulted in the same outcome. Secondly, the Key Stage 2 total points 
score of year 7 pupils (averaged over 1997-2002) was included in logit models 1 and 
2 each as an additional regressor, in order to allow for the predicted probability of 
Academy school status to depend on school-level KS2 intake quality in the pre-
policy period. With a marginal effect (standard error) of 0.0022 (0.0038) in model 1 
and 0.004 (0.004) in model 2, this regressor is not statistically significant. The sign 
of the estimated coefficient on this indicator in both models is also counterintuitive to 
expectations, where a priori the assumption is that as the KS2 intake quality of a 
school rises the probability of that school becoming an academy declines. Then the 
expectation is for a negative sign to appear on the coefficient rather than a positive 
sign as was obtained from estimation. Other specifications that were tried included 
(i) re-estimating both logit models 1 and 2 using the raw levels of the regressors in 
2002 rather than 1997-2002 school-level averages; (ii) re-estimating logit model 2 
using the raw levels of the regressors in 2002 and additionally including lags of each 
of these indicators; (iii) re-estimating logit model 2 with the following interaction 
terms added separately in each case, where all variables and interaction terms use 
1997 to 2002 school-level averages: the percentage of pupils eligible for FSM 
interacted with the percentage of white pupils, the percentage of pupils getting no 
GCSE passes interacted with the percentage of white pupils, and the percentage of 
pupils eligible for FSM interacted with the percentage of pupils getting no GCSE 
passes; (iv) re-estimating logit model 2 with squared terms for the percentage of 
pupils eligible for FSM and the percentage of pupils getting no GCSE passes added; 
(v) re-estimating logit model 2 with averaged growth rates of each variable added. 
Across the board none of these models displayed significantly different predictive 
capabilities over and above the chosen specification of model 2 in Table 4.6. 
307 
00 
v?) 	 oo nr.-) • cl cr") nC) 
	
1-1 	 .7t 	 71: 	 c'771 













00 In 	 11 .0  
- 06 


























A ,t  


































CU Cd 9 
ra. 
	
-o 	 • - CO 
 








77) 	 a. 
.s4 
\c) cct 
N 	 N 1n1 
o 4`)  
	
oo 	 ,4 0 
c). 	
- 











(1) 04 2 -- 0 >-,  4.) 	 o 4 <4 • 
bA 	 >st 
• O N 
;-
• 
'=I • 1.,) • -* •-n 
• r-- • 
-o 8 
4) 	 csi 






. 	 a) 
U 
-(5_ 
_o 0 cz 
•E 71. 




U  C1N 
• cl) :„ 
, 
'O
0 • "' 
0 E  
• „ 
cd "0 E 
P. 
 
-n (I) t:113  czt 0 •  v.; CO ct 
,L) 
-c) 










co 0  
cd\ 
CN CT CD N 
ooh 





















































































































Section 3A.C: Restricting the sample of schools to the Common support regions 
— impact on the t-statistics of Table 4.5 (Chapter Four) 
Tables 3A.4 and 3A.5 presented below show that restricting the sample of schools to 
those within the common support region reduces the t-statistic of the difference in 
observable characteristics between Academy predecessor and non-Academy schools 
when logit regression follows both the full and selected controls specifications. 
Therefore non-Academy schools that differ greatly in terms of their pre-policy 
observable characteristics from Academy predecessors are excluded from the 
estimation procedure when the CSR is in place. The process of defining a CSR 
results in less heterogeneity in the pre-treatment attributes of treated and control 
schools. Logit model 2 (with selected controls) represents the preferred specification 
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Section 3A.D: Discussion of school type changes among non-Academy schools 
and the types of schools that become Academies 
It could be that non-Academy secondary schools also change their type over the 
period, such as converting from a Community to a Voluntary-aided school, or from a 
Community to a Foundation school. If the incidence of status change in this group is 
high, this raises the issue of the reliability of comparing intake patterns of some 
schools within this group to those of Academies. The extent to which this is a cause 
for concern is investigated here:- 
• Within the full sample of 389 non-Academy schools, 11 schools change their 
type from a Community to a Foundation school. This is equivalent to 2.828 
per cent of the full sample. This is the only recorded type of school change 
among all non-Academy schools. 
• Within the sample of 266 non-Academy schools contained within the CSR 
determined under logit model 1 (with full controls), 10 schools change their 
type from a Community to a Foundation school. This is equivalent to 3.759 
per cent of this restricted sample. 
• Within the sample of 326 non-Academy schools contained within the CSR 
determined under logit model 2 (with selected controls), 10 schools change 
their type from a Community to a Foundation school. This is equivalent to 
2.571 per cent of this restricted sample. 
Therefore it appears that non-Academy schools do not change their type to such an 
extent that the reliability of using these schools as a comparison group could be 
called into question. 
In terms of Academy schools, the following indicates the numbers and percentages 
of school types that changed into an Academy between 2003 and 2007:- 
• 24 Academies were formerly Community schools (72.73 per cent of the 
sample of 33 Academies); 
• 4 Academies were formerly Voluntary-aided schools (12.12 per cent); 
• 1 Academy was formerly a Voluntary-controlled school (3.03 per cent); 
• 4 Academies were formerly CTCs (12.12 per cent); 
• No Academies were formerly Foundation schools. 
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